Event Notification Report for February 06, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/05/2006 - 02/06/2006
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42318
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: R.P. TODD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: R.P. TODD
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 02/07/2006
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2006
Event Time: 20:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2006
Notification Time: 15:49 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2006
Event Time: 20:50 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/27/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNANALYZED CONDITION - NON-CONFORMING FIRE BARRIERS
"Event: Field inspections have discovered several instances of non-conformance with acceptance criteria for fire barriers. The non-conformance has been conservatively assumed to reduce the fire rating of the affected penetrations below the required three hours.
"At 2050 hours on 2-6-06 the Operations Shift Manager conservatively declared the all Oconee 'NRC committed' fire barrier penetration seals 'inoperable' pending further inspection.
"Initial Safety Significance: Per NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.4, loss of fire barrier separation of Appendix R trains is an unanalyzed condition. Some Oconee 'NRC committed' fire barriers provide train separation between Appendix R safe shutdown trains. At this time, no specific Appendix R train separation penetrations have been discovered to be non-conforming. The reportability determination is based on the decision to conservatively declare the penetrations inoperable. Implementation of hourly fire watches in the affected areas reduces the potential for a significant fire to develop in those areas.
"Corrective Actions: Operations entered Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5 and established an hourly firewatch in the affected areas. Further inspections continue. Evaluation of inspection findings and repairs will follow."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1500 EST ON 3/27/06 FROM R.P. TODD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Event: At 1549 on 2-7-06 Oconee Nuclear Station reported that field inspections had discovered instances of non-conformance with a Duke Energy installation specification for fire barrier penetrations in walls and floors. The non-conformance was conservatively assumed to reduce the fire rating of affected penetrations below the required three hours. Reportability was based on the conservative declaration that the penetrations were inoperable.
"Following additional inspections and review of the as-found conditions, Oconee has determined that the as-found conditions still provided a three hour fire barrier so the fire barrier penetrations were actually operable. Oconee has concluded that the event is not reportable and hereby retracts the ENS notification.
"Corrective Action(s): Fire barrier penetrations will be repaired to restore compliance with Duke Energy specifications."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Carolyn Evans).
"Event: Field inspections have discovered several instances of non-conformance with acceptance criteria for fire barriers. The non-conformance has been conservatively assumed to reduce the fire rating of the affected penetrations below the required three hours.
"At 2050 hours on 2-6-06 the Operations Shift Manager conservatively declared the all Oconee 'NRC committed' fire barrier penetration seals 'inoperable' pending further inspection.
"Initial Safety Significance: Per NUREG 1022, Section 3.2.4, loss of fire barrier separation of Appendix R trains is an unanalyzed condition. Some Oconee 'NRC committed' fire barriers provide train separation between Appendix R safe shutdown trains. At this time, no specific Appendix R train separation penetrations have been discovered to be non-conforming. The reportability determination is based on the decision to conservatively declare the penetrations inoperable. Implementation of hourly fire watches in the affected areas reduces the potential for a significant fire to develop in those areas.
"Corrective Actions: Operations entered Selected Licensee Commitment 16.9.5 and established an hourly firewatch in the affected areas. Further inspections continue. Evaluation of inspection findings and repairs will follow."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 1500 EST ON 3/27/06 FROM R.P. TODD TO S. SANDIN * * *
The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:
"Event: At 1549 on 2-7-06 Oconee Nuclear Station reported that field inspections had discovered instances of non-conformance with a Duke Energy installation specification for fire barrier penetrations in walls and floors. The non-conformance was conservatively assumed to reduce the fire rating of affected penetrations below the required three hours. Reportability was based on the conservative declaration that the penetrations were inoperable.
"Following additional inspections and review of the as-found conditions, Oconee has determined that the as-found conditions still provided a three hour fire barrier so the fire barrier penetrations were actually operable. Oconee has concluded that the event is not reportable and hereby retracts the ENS notification.
"Corrective Action(s): Fire barrier penetrations will be repaired to restore compliance with Duke Energy specifications."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO(Carolyn Evans).
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 42313
Rep Org: MAXIM TECHNOLOGIES
Licensee: MAXIM TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 3
City: NOVI State: MI
County:
License #: 48-32185-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL MICHLIG
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: MAXIM TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 3
City: NOVI State: MI
County:
License #: 48-32185-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL MICHLIG
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/06/2006
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2006
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2006
Notification Time: 10:03 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2006
Event Time: 07:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
CANADA NSC
TAS (EMAIL)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
CANADA NSC
TAS (EMAIL)
STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The licensee (Wisconsin company doing work in Michigan) reported that a Troxler moisture density gauge (Model 3440, S/N 36172, 40 milliCuries Am-241/Be, 8 milliCuries Cs-137) was discovered stolen from a construction site in Novi, MI early Monday 02/06/06. The gauge was stored in a contractor trailer and was stolen sometime over the weekend. The lock on the trailer and the chain locking the gauge case to the trailer were both cut. The general contractor reported the theft to the local police.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
The licensee (Wisconsin company doing work in Michigan) reported that a Troxler moisture density gauge (Model 3440, S/N 36172, 40 milliCuries Am-241/Be, 8 milliCuries Cs-137) was discovered stolen from a construction site in Novi, MI early Monday 02/06/06. The gauge was stored in a contractor trailer and was stolen sometime over the weekend. The lock on the trailer and the chain locking the gauge case to the trailer were both cut. The general contractor reported the theft to the local police.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42314
Facility: BWX TECHNOLOGIES
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: LEAH MORRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Region: 2 State: VA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: LEAH MORRELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOE O'HARA
Notification Date: 02/06/2006
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2006
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 15:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2006
Event Time: 04:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
74.57 - ALARM RESOLUTION
10 CFR Section:
74.57 - ALARM RESOLUTION
Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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ALARM RESOLUTION IN URANIUM RECOVERY UNIT - 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On February 6, 2006 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on February 6, 2006 at approximately 7:30 a.m. The time in which the alarm was initially reported was approximately 4:00 a.m. on February 6, 2006. The re-analysis that was done cleared the alarm at approximately 11:30 a.m. on February 6, 2006. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. The final difference after re-analysis was below the Alarm Threshold Limit.
"Per E41-116 and the FNMCP, an Alarm Investigation team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its alarm threshold limit. NRC Ops was contacted at 1502 on February 6, 2006. The NPD MC&A contact at NRC (Tom Pham) was contacted at 1500 on February 6, 2006. Our resident inspector was notified via voice mail at approximately 1530 on February 6, 2006."
The licensee notified Doug Collins, NRC Region 2.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
ALARM RESOLUTION IN URANIUM RECOVERY UNIT - 24 HOUR NOTIFICATION
"In accordance with 10CFR74.57(f)(2), a report to NRC is required for the following event. On February 6, 2006 the Alarm Threshold Limit was exceeded for [DELETED] Extraction (Column Based) System. This was reported to the Measurement Control Unit Manager on February 6, 2006 at approximately 7:30 a.m. The time in which the alarm was initially reported was approximately 4:00 a.m. on February 6, 2006. The re-analysis that was done cleared the alarm at approximately 11:30 a.m. on February 6, 2006. The initial test difference exceeded the Alarm Threshold Limit. The final difference after re-analysis was below the Alarm Threshold Limit.
"Per E41-116 and the FNMCP, an Alarm Investigation team was established since a process monitoring test exceeded its alarm threshold limit. NRC Ops was contacted at 1502 on February 6, 2006. The NPD MC&A contact at NRC (Tom Pham) was contacted at 1500 on February 6, 2006. Our resident inspector was notified via voice mail at approximately 1530 on February 6, 2006."
The licensee notified Doug Collins, NRC Region 2.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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