Event Notification Report for January 20, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/19/2006 - 01/20/2006
EVENT NUMBERS
4227642277422794228042281
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42276
Facility: DAVIS BESSE
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF CUFF
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 3 State: OH
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-R-LP
NRC Notified By: JEFF CUFF
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 11:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 11:34 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 11:25 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
MONTE PHILLIPS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRESS RELEASE ISSUED REGARDING AGREEMENT WITH DOJ RELATED TO DAVIS-BESSE REACTOR HEAD ISSUE
"A press release is being made today by the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company that it has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office related to FENOC's communication with the NRC during the fall of 2001 in connection with the reactor head issue at the DBNPS. FENOC has agreed to pay a penalty of $28 million."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A press release is being made today by the First Energy Nuclear Operating Company that it has entered into a deferred prosecution agreement with the U.S. Attorney's Office related to FENOC's communication with the NRC during the fall of 2001 in connection with the reactor head issue at the DBNPS. FENOC has agreed to pay a penalty of $28 million."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42277
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BOB HATFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: BOB HATFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 08:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 12:49 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 08:56 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
RPS ACTUATION
"On 1/20/2006 at 0730 hrs, a Unit 2 control room annunciator was received indicating high conductivity/sodium in the main condenser. The Chemistry Dept. confirmed the sodium level was high indicating saltwater intrusion from a tube leak in the 2B2 Condenser Waterbox. Per the Secondary Chemistry Off-Normal Procedure, a rapid downpower to less than 5% power was initiated to remove the affected waterbox from service. It was decided to go ahead and remove Unit 2 from service rather than remain critical at a low power level. The downpower was planned to decrease power to approximately 25%, perform a manual transfer of plant electrics to the auxiliary transformers, and then manually trip the reactor in accordance with plant procedures. All systems worked as planned during the downpower and the reactor was manually tripped at approximately 25% power at 08:56 hrs. Standard Post Trip Actions and the Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure were carried out without incident.
"All control rods fully inserted and no Steam Generator (S/G) Safety Valves lifted. Feedwater to the S/G was supplied by the Main Feedwater pumps during the shutdown and later transferred to the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. All safe shutdown equipment operated as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby conditions, with decay heat removal being accomplished by steaming through the Atmospheric Dump Valves. The Main Feedwater pumps remain available if needed.
"Unit 1 was not affected by this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 1/20/2006 at 0730 hrs, a Unit 2 control room annunciator was received indicating high conductivity/sodium in the main condenser. The Chemistry Dept. confirmed the sodium level was high indicating saltwater intrusion from a tube leak in the 2B2 Condenser Waterbox. Per the Secondary Chemistry Off-Normal Procedure, a rapid downpower to less than 5% power was initiated to remove the affected waterbox from service. It was decided to go ahead and remove Unit 2 from service rather than remain critical at a low power level. The downpower was planned to decrease power to approximately 25%, perform a manual transfer of plant electrics to the auxiliary transformers, and then manually trip the reactor in accordance with plant procedures. All systems worked as planned during the downpower and the reactor was manually tripped at approximately 25% power at 08:56 hrs. Standard Post Trip Actions and the Reactor Trip Recovery Procedure were carried out without incident.
"All control rods fully inserted and no Steam Generator (S/G) Safety Valves lifted. Feedwater to the S/G was supplied by the Main Feedwater pumps during the shutdown and later transferred to the Auxiliary Feedwater pumps. All safe shutdown equipment operated as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby conditions, with decay heat removal being accomplished by steaming through the Atmospheric Dump Valves. The Main Feedwater pumps remain available if needed.
"Unit 1 was not affected by this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42279
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: J.R.J. PAVING INC.
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L05307-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: J.R.J. PAVING INC.
Region: 4
City: DALLAS State: TX
County:
License #: L05307-002
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAN JISHA
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 16:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 14:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
TAS (e-mail)
MEXICO (via-fax)
WILLIAM JONES (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
TAS (e-mail)
MEXICO (via-fax)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
At about 1400 hours Central Standard Time, while working at a site in Fort Worth, a 2003/2004 Chevrolet pick-up carrying a Troxler moisture density gauge belonging to the licensee was stolen. The gauge is a model number 3440 with a serial number of 28640. It has two sources. One is a 44 millicurie Americium-Beryllium source (model # A/S AmBe Model 997 Type X-LP 3021 and 3027) and the other is a 9 millicurie Cesium-137 source (model # A/S CDCW556; IPL Model HEG/137-AM). The licensee called the State an hour after the truck and gauge were stolen.
The licensee filed a police report. The State of Texas is continuing to investigate the incident.
Texas Incident #: I-8290
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
At about 1400 hours Central Standard Time, while working at a site in Fort Worth, a 2003/2004 Chevrolet pick-up carrying a Troxler moisture density gauge belonging to the licensee was stolen. The gauge is a model number 3440 with a serial number of 28640. It has two sources. One is a 44 millicurie Americium-Beryllium source (model # A/S AmBe Model 997 Type X-LP 3021 and 3027) and the other is a 9 millicurie Cesium-137 source (model # A/S CDCW556; IPL Model HEG/137-AM). The licensee called the State an hour after the truck and gauge were stolen.
The licensee filed a police report. The State of Texas is continuing to investigate the incident.
Texas Incident #: I-8290
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42280
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK BAREFIELD
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 10:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 17:07 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 10:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PUBLIC PROMPT NOTIFICATION SYSTEMS SIRENS DISCOVERED INOPERABLE
"The Public Prompt Notification System sirens were inoperable from 10:17 CST until 11:36 CST on 01/20/06. [They were inoperable for] a period of one hour and 19 minutes. The siren system was returned to operation when the antennae for operating the sirens was changed. The Tone Alert Radio System was operational during this entire time period and remains operable. The cause of the failure is not clearly understood at this time. The appropriate test equipment is being sent to the site and a complete troubleshooting plan with a test plan will be started on Monday 01/23/06. Until that time a contingency plan is in place that has personnel on call that will report to the three siren sites if an emergency is declared. They will be in communications with the local authorities to activate the sirens locally in accordance with an approved plant procedure. While performing the troubleshooting and maintenance on the siren system we will have staff standing by at the sirens that will be able to activate the sirens in accordance with an approved plant procedure."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The Public Prompt Notification System sirens were inoperable from 10:17 CST until 11:36 CST on 01/20/06. [They were inoperable for] a period of one hour and 19 minutes. The siren system was returned to operation when the antennae for operating the sirens was changed. The Tone Alert Radio System was operational during this entire time period and remains operable. The cause of the failure is not clearly understood at this time. The appropriate test equipment is being sent to the site and a complete troubleshooting plan with a test plan will be started on Monday 01/23/06. Until that time a contingency plan is in place that has personnel on call that will report to the three siren sites if an emergency is declared. They will be in communications with the local authorities to activate the sirens locally in accordance with an approved plant procedure. While performing the troubleshooting and maintenance on the siren system we will have staff standing by at the sirens that will be able to activate the sirens in accordance with an approved plant procedure."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Hospital
Event Number: 42281
Rep Org: MERCY HOSPITAL - SCRANTON, PA
Licensee: MERCY HOSPITAL - SCRANTON, PA
Region: 1
City: SCRANTON State: PA
County:
License #: 37-01374-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMUEL PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: MERCY HOSPITAL - SCRANTON, PA
Region: 1
City: SCRANTON State: PA
County:
License #: 37-01374-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SAMUEL PAYNE
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Notification Time: 17:46 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2006
Event Time: 15:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/20/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
CHRIS HOTT (R1)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
LOST IODINE SEEDS
After an implantation procedure using Iodine 125 seeds was performed at 1500 at Mercy Hospital of Scranton, PA the staff became aware that there were potentially 2 seeds missing. The total activity of the 2 seeds is estimated to be 1.26 millicuries.
The hospital ordered 88 seeds for this operation. 68 seeds were implanted in the patient. The number of implanted seeds was verified using an x-ray. After the operation the hospital counted 18 remaining seeds for return shipment to the seed provider thus, 2 seeds were unaccounted for. The hospital performed surveys of the operating room and was unable to locate any other seeds. At the time of the report the operating room was quarantined for further investigation.
The hospital contacted the health services company that sterilized the seeds to determine if fewer seeds were provided but Anazao Heath was unable to provide an exact count of the seeds. On Monday 1/23/06 the Radiation Safety Officer plans to contact the seed provider, Amersham Health to determine an exact count of seeds shipped.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
After an implantation procedure using Iodine 125 seeds was performed at 1500 at Mercy Hospital of Scranton, PA the staff became aware that there were potentially 2 seeds missing. The total activity of the 2 seeds is estimated to be 1.26 millicuries.
The hospital ordered 88 seeds for this operation. 68 seeds were implanted in the patient. The number of implanted seeds was verified using an x-ray. After the operation the hospital counted 18 remaining seeds for return shipment to the seed provider thus, 2 seeds were unaccounted for. The hospital performed surveys of the operating room and was unable to locate any other seeds. At the time of the report the operating room was quarantined for further investigation.
The hospital contacted the health services company that sterilized the seeds to determine if fewer seeds were provided but Anazao Heath was unable to provide an exact count of the seeds. On Monday 1/23/06 the Radiation Safety Officer plans to contact the seed provider, Amersham Health to determine an exact count of seeds shipped.
THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.