Event Notification Report for January 13, 2006
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/12/2006 - 01/13/2006
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42257
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: GARY OLMSTEAD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/13/2006
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2006
Notification Time: 16:53 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2006
Event Time: 08:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
REBECCA NEASE (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRESSURIZER PORV STROKE TIMES EXCEED ANALYSIS ASSUMPTIONS
"The analyses for the Callaway Cold Overpressure Mitigating System (COMS) assumes an opening time and delay time for the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV)s. Evaluations performed by Callaway engineering personnel have determined that PORV stroke times measured during surveillance testing do not account for all of the delay times credited in the Design Bases COMS Analyses of Record. Further reviews determined the allowed delay times could not be met by the control loop. This results in potentially non-conservative PORV lifts settings relative to those specified in the PTLR (Pressurizer & Temperature Limits Report) for satisfying Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12.a and 3.4.12.c.
"At the time the determination was made, the plant was in Mode 1. Technical Specification 3.4.12, COMS, is applicable in Mode 4 with RCS temperature less than or equal to 275 F, Mode 5 (cold shutdown) and Mode 6 (refueling) with the head on the reactor vessel. The TS allows other methods of providing cold overpressure protection (ex. Residual Heat Removal system suction relief valves).
"Remedial actions have been initiated to ensure the COMS TS function is maintained when required, pending completion of corrective actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"The analyses for the Callaway Cold Overpressure Mitigating System (COMS) assumes an opening time and delay time for the pressurizer Power Operated Relief Valves (PORV)s. Evaluations performed by Callaway engineering personnel have determined that PORV stroke times measured during surveillance testing do not account for all of the delay times credited in the Design Bases COMS Analyses of Record. Further reviews determined the allowed delay times could not be met by the control loop. This results in potentially non-conservative PORV lifts settings relative to those specified in the PTLR (Pressurizer & Temperature Limits Report) for satisfying Technical Specification (TS) 3.4.12.a and 3.4.12.c.
"At the time the determination was made, the plant was in Mode 1. Technical Specification 3.4.12, COMS, is applicable in Mode 4 with RCS temperature less than or equal to 275 F, Mode 5 (cold shutdown) and Mode 6 (refueling) with the head on the reactor vessel. The TS allows other methods of providing cold overpressure protection (ex. Residual Heat Removal system suction relief valves).
"Remedial actions have been initiated to ensure the COMS TS function is maintained when required, pending completion of corrective actions."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42258
Facility: CLINTON
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TOM CHALMERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: TOM CHALMERS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 01/13/2006
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2006
Event Time: 16:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2006
Notification Time: 20:58 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2006
Event Time: 16:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/13/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF COMMUNICATIONS - GREATER THAN 25% OF EMERGENCY NOTIFICATION SIRENS UNAVAILABLE
"At 1645 on 01/13/2006, greater than 25% of the Clinton Power Station emergency notification sirens became unavailable, most likely caused by inclement weather. A total of 18 of the 44 sirens were unavailable.
"At 1745, 15 of the 18 inoperable sirens were restored to an operable status. 1(one) siren remains unavailable due to a loss of communication and two others due to loss of power.
"At 1745, this condition was considered to be a major loss of emergency preparedness. Restoration of the 3 remaining unavailable sirens is in progress. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place for the 3 remaining unavailable sirens."
The licensee notified the local DeWitt County Sheriff office and the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1645 on 01/13/2006, greater than 25% of the Clinton Power Station emergency notification sirens became unavailable, most likely caused by inclement weather. A total of 18 of the 44 sirens were unavailable.
"At 1745, 15 of the 18 inoperable sirens were restored to an operable status. 1(one) siren remains unavailable due to a loss of communication and two others due to loss of power.
"At 1745, this condition was considered to be a major loss of emergency preparedness. Restoration of the 3 remaining unavailable sirens is in progress. Appropriate compensatory measures are in place for the 3 remaining unavailable sirens."
The licensee notified the local DeWitt County Sheriff office and the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42389
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DON SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 03/06/2006
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2006
Event Time: 11:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2006
Notification Time: 12:00 [ET]
Event Date: 01/13/2006
Event Time: 11:57 [CST]
Last Update Date: 03/06/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Refueling | 0 | Refueling |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNPLANNED, INVALID ACTUATION OF EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of any of the equipment specified in paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). In this case, the equipment actuated was emergency diesel generator (EDG) A. This EDG is common equipment for Units 1 and 2.
"On January 13, 2006, troubleshooting was being conducted by maintenance personnel to determine the cause of observed alarm malfunctions on the EDG A local annunciator panel. Browns Ferry Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled and Unit 2 was operating at 100% thermal power. During this troubleshooting activity, at 1157 hours CST, EDG A was inadvertently started. The exact cause of the start could not be conclusively determined.
EDG A properly started and ran in response to the invalid start signal. No loss of normal plant electrical power occurred, and the EDG did not connect to its associated shutdown board. The EDG was allowed to run for approximately one hour, and then it was shut down in accordance with plant operating procedures.
"Since no actual plant condition existed which required the EDG to start, and since the start occurred inadvertently, most likely as a result of a human error during the electrical circuit troubleshooting effort, this EDG start is classified as invalid.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. [Reference BFN corrective action document PER 96291]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This 60-day telephone notification is being made under reporting requirements specified by 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) to describe an invalid actuation of any of the equipment specified in paragraph 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(B). In this case, the equipment actuated was emergency diesel generator (EDG) A. This EDG is common equipment for Units 1 and 2.
"On January 13, 2006, troubleshooting was being conducted by maintenance personnel to determine the cause of observed alarm malfunctions on the EDG A local annunciator panel. Browns Ferry Unit 1 was shutdown and defueled and Unit 2 was operating at 100% thermal power. During this troubleshooting activity, at 1157 hours CST, EDG A was inadvertently started. The exact cause of the start could not be conclusively determined.
EDG A properly started and ran in response to the invalid start signal. No loss of normal plant electrical power occurred, and the EDG did not connect to its associated shutdown board. The EDG was allowed to run for approximately one hour, and then it was shut down in accordance with plant operating procedures.
"Since no actual plant condition existed which required the EDG to start, and since the start occurred inadvertently, most likely as a result of a human error during the electrical circuit troubleshooting effort, this EDG start is classified as invalid.
"There were no safety consequences or impacts on the health and safety of the public. The event was entered into TVA's corrective action program for evaluation and resolution. [Reference BFN corrective action document PER 96291]."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.