Event Notification Report for January 11, 2006

SHUTDOWN COOLING INOPERABILITY DUE TO SMALL DISCHARGE HEADER LEAK

"On Wednesday, January 11, 2006, at approximately 1248 PST, with San Onofre Unit 2 in Mode 5 (loops not filled), Southern California Edison (SCE) declared both trains of the Shutdown Cooling (SDC) System inoperable. This action was taken following discovery and evaluation of an approximate 1.5 inch crack and minor leak (about 10 drops per minute) in a line located at the Low Pressure Safety Injection (LPSI) common discharge header (the LPSI pumps are also used as the SDC system pumps). Although both trains of the SDC system remain functional and one train is in service, SCE declared both SDC trains inoperable because the affected pipe might not be ASME Code qualified as a result of this crack.

"SCE is conservatively reporting this event in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) as a condition that could prevent the remove residual heat. SCE is continuing to evaluate this condition.

"SCE is following the actions required by Technical Specifications 3.4.8, and will repair the pipe crack during the current refueling outage, after the reactor core has been off-loaded to the spent fuel pool. SCE expects to place the plant in Mode 6 tomorrow.

"At the time of this report, Unit 2 is in Mode 5 and Unit 3 is in Mode 1 at 100% power. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector, NRC Region IV, and the Nuclear Reactor Regulation Project Manager have been briefed of this event and will be provided with a copy of this report."

Shutdown cooling has been running for approximately one week and the leak was initially discovered sometime on 01/10/06 during an inspection in which Boric acid accumulation was discovered . A work request was written to perform a more thorough inspection that was performed on 01/11/06. The crack is on an 8 inch line that returns to RCS Loop 2A which is normally isolated during high pressure shutdown conditions and reactor power operation.

* * * RETRACTION FROM C. WILLIAMS TO W. GOTT AT 2039 EST ON 3/3/06 * * *

"On January 11, 2006, Southern California Edison (SCE) reported to the NRC that both trains of Shutdown Cooling System (SDC) were inoperable at San Onofre Unit 2 due to a through-wall crack in a pipe in the common discharge header. That occurrence was reported to the NRC in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) for a condition that could prevent the removal of residual heat.

"SCE has since analyzed the pipe integrity at the design basis conditions and determined the pipe would have remained intact and that system leakage through the crack would have remained below the allowable system leak rate. Based on these results, SCE concluded that the pipe was capable of performing its safety functions under design basis conditions. Because the system was always capable of performing its safety function, SCE is retracting the January 11, 2006 report. Nevertheless, SCE plans to submit a voluntary licensee event report to document this event and inform the NRC of the corrective actions taken.

"At the time of this phone call, Unit 2 was in the middle of the Cycle 14 refueling outage and Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. SCE has notified the NRC resident inspectors about this retraction and will provide them with a copy of this report."

Notified R4DO (J. Whitten)

LICENSEE DID NOT HAVE A WRITTEN DIRECTIVE BEFORE ADMINISTERING A DIAGNOSTIC WHOLE BODY SCAN.

A patient had a physicians order to perform a diagnostic whole body scan but the two technologists over-looked that the patient did not have a written directive to give the patient 4.1 millicuries of Iodine-131. The patient got the correct dose of Iodine-131 for his diagnostic whole body scan.

The licensee stated that they were operating under Departmental Protocol for Thyrogen Whole Body Iodine doses.

* * * RETRACTION FROM C. MAJEK TO W. GOTT AT 1307 ON 01/19/06 * * *

Based on discussions with NRC personnel, the licensee does not consider this to meet the criteria of a medical event. This event is retracted.

Notified R1DO (C. Hott) and NMSSEO (G. Morell)

COAL ANALYZER SHUTTER INSTALLED INCORRECTLY

Last Wednesday, 01/11/06, an NRC Inspector discovered that the company's SABIA online, Model No. XC-5000 coal analyzer which contains a Cs-137 source could not lock the shutter closed. The online analyzer is used for elemental analysis of coal. Vigo Coal contacted SABI, located in CA and their representatives arrived at Vigo Coal Company this morning, 01/14/06.

The SABIA representative found that the lever arm to the shutter of the camera was installed 180 degrees out of its proper position (reversed). The SABIA representative took the two screws out and reversed the handle, which corrected the problems. The shutter worked properly. The holes on the lever and the camera shutter now line up so a padlock can be installed to lock the camera shut.

There were no personnel exposures, contamination nor safety issues associated with this incident.

MODIFICATION TO THE UNIT 2 PROCESS COMPUTER THAT WILL IMPACT ERDS AND SPDS

"The Unit 2 Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) will be taken out of service for an approximate 2 week period to implement a planned modification. The current PPCS is being replaced and the computer outage is required to allow cutover to the new PPCS. During this time period ERDS and SPDS will not be available. Unit 2 ERDS and SPDS parameters will be monitored by control board indications. Compensatory actions have been developed.

"This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action.

"The Unit 2 PPCS outage started at 0743 CST on 1/11/2006. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspectors of the modification and schedule. The NRC was previously notified of this planned outage via letter dated November 7, 2005."

* * * UPDATE FROM J BAARTMAN TO W GOTT AT 2019 EST ON 01/18/06 * * *

"The Unit 2 Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) was restored at 1801 CST on 01/18/06. The Unit 2 Safety Parameter Display System (SPDS) and Emergency Response Data System (ERDS) have also been returned to service."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (M Phillips)

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO SMALL DISCHARGE OF UNKNOWN OILY SUBSTANCE

"Approximately one gallon of an oily substance was spilled into the plant discharge cove of Lake Wylie. The source of the substance is unknown. Notification of the event has been made to South Carolina DHEC (Columbia and Fort Lawn offices) and the National Response Center (Report #784895)."

The substance had been noticed earlier today in a yard drain sump, but was not removed prior to heavy rains on site forcing it into the discharge cove. The licensee will be notifying North Carolina and South Carolina Emergency Operations Centers, and the Emergency Operations Centers for York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg counties.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - DEFECT IN A MATERIAL ANALYZER

The RSO provided a report for the failure of a source position indicator on a SABIA, Model XC-series-25 materials analyzer (device per NR-1195-D-103-S) located at Cyprus Creek Mine in Indiana. During a scheduled NRC inspection on 01/11/06 of the shutter for the radioactive source, with the shutter indicating being in the locked out (OFF) position, the source was actually in the open position and the shutter lever appeared to be 180 degrees out of position. During an internal inspection by SABIA on 01/14/06, everything appeared to be in good working order. It was determined that prior to the NRC inspection on 01/11/06, a contractor who was performing a wipe survey of the device retracted the source, but rather than moving the source lever as indicated by the arrows, moved the lever the shortest distance to OFF. This action forced set screws to slip and move the handle to OFF but the sources remained active (ON).

In this instance, because the NRC inspector arrived soon after the lever position had been changed, no maintenance was done on the conveyor inside the analyzer while the indication was wrong and no one received any radiation dose resulting from this problem. The unit was repaired by removing the handle and replacing it in the proper position.

SABIA will prepare mechanical stops to put on all analyzers that will prevent the source handle from being moved in the wrong direction and will install them as analyzers are routinely serviced.

This information represents an interim report, and a final report, together with corrective actions, will be forwarded within 30 days.