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Event Notification Report for January 05, 2006

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/04/2006 - 01/05/2006

EVENT NUMBERS
422434224442255

Power Reactor
Event Number: 42243
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4     State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GLENN KRAUSE
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 01/05/2006
Notification Time: 15:44 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2006
Event Time: 09:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/05/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
MICHAEL SHANNON (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
UNANALYZED CONDITION INVOLVING RCIC OPERATION DURING MCR EVACUATION

"During an engineering assessment, a condition was found which does not meet the assumptions of the River Bend post-fire safe shutdown analysis. 10CFR50 Appendix R states that for alternate shutdown capability (i.e. shutdown from outside the main control room), reactor coolant system process variables shall be maintained within those predicted for a loss of normal AC power, and the fission product boundary integrity shall not be affected. Generic Letter (GL) 86-10, 'Implementation of Fire Protection Requirements,' states that the following assumptions are required for evaluation of a control room fire: 1) fire-induced spurious operation of safe shutdown components has occurred; 2) offsite power is lost; and, 3) the emergency diesel generators (DGs) do not automatically start.

"Based on the conservative assumptions imposed by GL 86-10, the following control room fire scenario must be addressed. A fire is assumed to cause motor-operated valve E51-MOVF063, the inboard steam supply to Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) turbine to close. The same fire requires the main control room (MCR) to be evacuated, and during relocation to the Division 1 Remote Shutdown panel, offsite power is lost.

"The post-fire safe shutdown analysis has evaluated RCIC to be available from the Remote Shutdown Panel in order to maintain reactor water level, and that the Division 1 and 3 DGs are started locally. The Division 2 DG is not analyzed to remain free of damage caused by the MCR fire. Since valve E51-MOVF063 is powered from Division 2, and there is no Division 2 power available to re-open the valve, steam would not be available to power the RCIC turbine. E51-MOVF063 is located in the drywell, making manual operation of the valve impractical. Therefore, RCIC is postulated to not be available to maintain reactor level. Establishing reactor level control is a time-critical function that is required to occur within ten minutes of MCR evacuation in order to meet one of the Appendix R safe shutdown performance goals.

"This condition involves compliance with 10CFR50, Appendix R. Plant equipment remains operable. The scope of this analysis deficiency is limited to the MCR fire scenario, with three concurrent failures. The MCR Is continuously manned. The affected cables in the MCR under-floor area are protected by fire detection and automatic suppression systems, which would rapidly detect and smother a fire. Introduction of ignition sources, such as work involving welding or grinding, is strictly controlled by station procedures.

"While the assumptions of the post-fire safe shutdown analysis are not met for this scenario, it has been verified that the components required to properly align the Division 1 Residual Heat Removal system in the low pressure coolant injection mode would be available at the Division 1 Remote Shutdown Panel. Control of three safety-relief valves is also available at the Division 1 Remote Shutdown Panel to depressurize the reactor vessel for low pressure injection. An analysis is under way to determine the response of reactor water level, given these conditions."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42244
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2     State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/06/2006
Notification Time: 10:30 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2006
Event Time: 16:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
PART 70 APP A (b)(2) - LOSS OR DEGRADED SAFETY ITEMS
Person (Organization):
JAMES MOORMAN (R2)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
Event Text
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

MONITOR SETPOINT IMPROPERLY SET

"During a revision to a related Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation (NCSE), it was determined that the setpoint for the Building [DELETED] Condensate Tank in-line uranium concentration monitor was set at a non-conservative value.

"Along with other controls, the in-line uranium concentration monitor for the Building [DELETED] Condensate Tank is relied on in two Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluations which are associated with two different facility areas/operations: 1)The monitor is relied on to maintain mass control for the condensate tank in Building [DELETED]; and 2) the monitor is relied on to maintain concentration control for tanks in the Waste Water Treatment Facility (WWTF).

"There were no actual or potential safety consequences to workers, the public, or the environment.

"Upon discovery of the situation, transfer operations to the condensate tank were suspended. WWTF overcheck sample results were reviewed (for condensate solutions) which confirmed extremely low uranium concentrations. The condensate tank in-line monitor was re-set to the most conservative concentration value and the monitor was recalibrated and re-tested. A review was performed for all other in-line monitor set-points to verify that the set-points were appropriate; no problems were noted with the set-points for other in-line monitoring systems."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42255
Rep Org: ILLINOIS EMERGENCY MGMT. AGENCY
Licensee: CHICAGO PROSTATE CANCER CENTER
Region: 3
City: WESTMONT   State: IL
County:
License #: IL-02015-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAREN PERRERO
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 01/12/2006
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 01/05/2006
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/12/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
C.W. (BILL) REAMER (NMSS)
Event Text
LEAKING SEALED SOURCE DUE TO IMPROPERLY PACKAGED MATERIAL

The State provided the following information via email:

"On January 11, 2005 the Division learned of an event involving a leaking sealed source that was intended for the therapeutic treatment of prostate cancer. On January 5, 2006, the Chicago Prostate Cancer Center (CPCC) in Westmont, IL (IL-02015-01) received four packages [which] contained sources that had been loaded into [an] applicator as well as 'loose seeds' for reference and potential application. One of the four packages contained 10 sealed sources of Cs-131 and 42 additional sources (actual activity of 3.8 milliCi, each) [were] pre-loaded into treatment applicators by Anazao Health of Tampa Florida via IsoRay, Inc of Richland Washington who manufactured the sources.

"Although the outer packaging was shown to be free from contamination, once the cardboard outer container was opened, and the secondary lead container was opened, a seed was visually detected on the outer lead container. The seed was also notably damaged. Associated contamination was subsequently found on the secondary container, and the primary lead container as well as a second 'seed' of Cs-131 that had been trapped and bent within the primary lead container. Although all the sources were accounted for, none of the 10 seeds were contained within the innermost glass vial as its lid was not engaged with the vial. Cs-131 is a very low energy gamma emitter (33 KeV) with a half life of 9.7 days. The form of Cs involved is bound to a non-volatile, insoluble material.

"The Division discovered that the CPCC had experienced widespread contamination within the source preparation area as a result of the damaged sources and the failure to don proper protective gloves. The affected surfaces and items had been subsequently decontaminated and set aside as waste by the staff that was present on January 5, 2005. Contamination levels ranged from 1,000 cpm to 5,000 cpm as measured by their Geiger counter and rate meter. Items which had been touched by the medical physicist who had not been wearing disposable gloves were found to be contaminated. One of the assisting staff members experienced contamination on their hand that was later completely decontaminated.

"A Division representative was dispatched from the West Chicago offices to the facility shortly after we were notified, to determine the effectiveness of the decontamination effort, the extent of contamination that may have remained and to interview the Radiation Safety Officer [redacted]. The inspector's initial investigation today showed that contamination was limited to the source handling room which is a restricted area and that indeed all the sources were accounted for and secured. She also obtained the verbal report from [the RSO]. The only remaining contamination she was able to find were two spots on a counter of approximately 1,000 cpm - 2,000 cpm and the containers which were involved. The inspector returned to the facility on the following day to interview the responsible physicist, and the assisting technician. Gamma spectroscopy performed on samples of the contaminated items indicate the presence of Cs-131 rather than any of the other nuclides used by the facility.

"The Division is continuing its investigation and is acquiring additional information from the licensee. The Division has been in contact with the State of Washington regarding this matter. A formal report is due from the licensee within the next 30 days. This event was reported to the U.S. NRC Operations Center on January 12 and assigned event number 42255."