Event Notification Report for December 01, 2005

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL

While reducing power in order to enter containment, and following a manual main turbine trip due to high vibration, an automatic reactor trip on low steam generator level was received as a result of the turbine trip transient. Containment was being entered to investigate the source of an RCS identified leakage, which was less than the Technical Specification limit. In conjunction with the reactor trip, an automatic actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System was received as expected.

All control rods fully inserted on the automatic trip. The current decay heat removal path is via the steam dumps to the main condenser. No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the transient. There are no known primary to secondary leaks. All safety related buses are powered from offsite power. With the exception of one diesel out of service for planned maintenance, all emergency diesel generators are available and in standby. Unit 2 was not affected.

The licensee notified State and local agencies and the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

"Brief Description of Incident:
Licensee's October Landauer [dosimetry processor] report reported a whole body exposure of 11,016 milliRem (Deep) and 10,465 milliRem (Shallow) to an individual who is a cyclotron operator. Landauer reported that this appears to have been a single exposure event, not a continuous exposure over the course of the month. Landauer is assessing the badge at this time to determine if it is a static or a dynamic exposure. The licensee reported a single contamination event that occurred 10/5/05 and resulted in skin and clothes contamination. The licensee is evaluating their documentation of this contamination event at this time. The licensee also reported that ring badges are exchanged weekly but that the badges in use during this contamination event are missing or have not been reported yet. The licensee reported that the individual in question was wearing an electronic dosimeter during the contamination event and recovery time span and had a recorded dose of 19 milliRem on 10/5/05. More information will follow as it becomes available.

"Additional Notes:
Licensee reported a contamination event (details to be reported later) that occurred 10/5/05 resulting in contamination of the cyclotron operator's skin, clothes and lab coat. The individual left his/her badge on the lab coat overnight so the RAM on the lab coat could decay (110 min half life). Landauer reported the dose today (12/1/05) and has not evaluated if it is a static or dynamic exposure yet, but did report to the licensee that the reported dose appears to be from a single event. The individual who purportedly received this dose has been placed in non-RAM worker status."

North Carolina Incident No. 05-40

HOO Note: The radioisotope identified in the report is F-18 (FDG) which is accelerator produced.

UNANALYZED CONDITION - EMERGENCY DIESEL CAPABILITY

"This report addresses a concern with the capability to field flash the diesel generator after the diesel engine has started in response to a fire in the Control Room. Step C9 in procedure OFN RP-017 opens NB0212 to drop power to NB02 and force an automatic start of the 'B' Train emergency diesel engine. Step C10 states to verify that the diesel engine is running and provides an RNO action to start the diesel if it is not running.

"Step C10.d in OFN RP-017 has the operator check NB02 voltage on breaker NB0201 NORMAL. There is no RNO action if the voltage is not normal.

"A fire in control room panel RL015 has the potential to cause a loss of diesel generator field flashing. For example, a short to ground on conductor 51 in cable 14KJK03AH with a simultaneous short to ground on conductor N1 in cable 14NEB11AA could blow the fuse(s) associated with the speed control relays (LSR and HSR). Loss of power to these relays will prevent field flashing, which will prevent voltage generation from the diesel generator, even though the diesel engine may be running.

"Step C10.b in OFN RP-017 has the operator place the master transfer switch (KJHS0109) in LOC/MAN. Based on drawing E-13KJ03A, this action will isolate the control room start circuit by opening the contact between G7 and H7, and effectively isolate the short circuit potential. However, the fuse may have already blown before this action is taken. The circuit is not provided with redundant fusing, so it may be necessary to replace one or both fuses (FU5 and FU6) in panel KJ122 to re-establish power to the speed relays.

"Wolf Creek has implemented the following compensatory measures:

"Staged 4 spare fuses in the emergency locker in the B Train Diesel Generator Room.
Revised OFN RP-017, Control Room Evacuation.
Continued hourly fire watch in the control room (established due to another concern). "

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

IMPROPER DISPOSAL OF I-131 CAPSULES

On 12/01/2005, a technician at Southside Community Hospital in Farmville, VA disposed of six vials that had contained I-131. At least one patient had not received therapy that day and the vials contained at least two capsules of Iodine. On 12/08/2005, Stericycle Disposal in Baltimore, MD informed the hospital of radioactive material in two of their sharps disposal boxes. On 12/13/2005, RSO Inc. measured the radiation level on the sharps boxes of 50 mR/hr and 60 mR/hr. On 12/19/2005, RSO Inc. delivered the sharps boxes back to the hospital and the sharps radiation level was 10 mR/r and 15 mR/hr. On 12/21/2005 the vials were retrieved from the sharps boxes and the total activity was 479 microCuries.

An estimate of the dose received by the drivers was performed assuming the packages were one meter from the driver. The total dose received on 12/01/2005 was less than eight milliRem.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.