Event Notification Report for November 21, 2005

DIVISION 3 EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR DECLARED INOPERABLE

"The Division 3 Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) was declared INOPERABLE following a trip during a routine monthly surveillance run. As soon as the Division 3 EDG was at full load it tripped off line (output breaker tripped). The Division 3 EDG supplies electrical power to the High Pressure Core Spray System in the event of a loss of offsite power.

"No problems occurred on the Division 3, 4160 volt, safety related bus.

"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B), Event or Condition That Could Have Prevented Fulfillment of a Safety Function for a single-train system failure.

"The NRC Resident inspector has been notified."

* * * THIS EVENT IS BEING RETRACTED ON 12/20/05 AT 1557 * * *

"Subsequent trouble-shooting and testing determined that the cause of the engine trip on 11/21/05 was an invalid high coolant temperature trip signal. This trip is bypassed during a Loss of Coolant (LOCA) initiation of the system, therefore, it was determined that the EDG would have been able to perform its safety function during a LOCA. Following a Loss of Offsite Power (LOOP), reactor water level is expected to reach Reactor Pressure Vessel (RPV) Water Level Low Low (Level 2) within 30 seconds of the initiating signal. Once Level 2 is reached, both the EDG and the LOCA Trip bypass signals are actuated. It was determined that the bypass would have occurred prior to the high coolant temperature trip. Based on the above, it was determined that the Division 3 EDG would have been fully capable of performing its safety function under both LOCA and LOOP. The Division 3 EDG was restored to an operable condition at 0214 on 11/22/05.

"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified."

Notified R3DO (H. Peterson).

POSTULATED FIRE SCENARIO AFFECTING REACTOR MAKEUP FROM A CHARGING PUMP

"On November 21, 2005, continued engineering evaluation determined that the Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 1 (BV-1) charging pump used to provide make-up to the Reactor Coolant System (RCS) may not perform its credited safety function during all postulated fire scenarios. This potential issue was first identified by a condition report on November 18, 2005. The BV1 Primary Plant Component Cooling Water System (CCR) is not credited during any postulated fire scenario. However, two postulated fire scenarios were identified where the absence of CCR could lead to elevated temperature of the water entering the charging pump suction, which could result in pump cavitation and subsequent pump damage. One scenario involves continued normal letdown entering the Volume Control Tank (VCT) at elevated temperatures raising VCT outlet water temperatures above 250 degree Fahrenheit which then goes to the charging pump suction. Another scenario involves elevated suction temperatures during a minimum flow scenario when charging flow to the RCS may be normally isolated by procedure.

"Hourly fire tours were immediately initiated as interim measures on November 18, 2005 in applicable areas to reduce the risk of an initiating fire to support continued plant operation. Plant procedure changes are being developed which will address these two scenario issues. These plant procedure revisions, expected shortly, will return the plant into compliance with the current fire protection licensing and design bases. Preliminary engineering evaluation also determined that the complete loss of RCS make-up during the two identified scenarios will not lead to core damage.

"This event is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) since the make-up function to the RCS may not be available during a postulated fire event which is credited for maintaining the reactor in a safe shutdown condition. The Beaver Valley Power Station Unit No. 2 (BV-2) Component Cooling Water System is credited and evaluated in its fire design bases. BV-2 operator action currently exists to protect the BV-2 charging pump during a fire event.

"The NRC resident inspector has been notified."

IOWA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - MISSING STATIC ELIMINATOR

The licensee notified the State that on 11/21/05, a static eliminator was discovered missing. The eliminator is a Model P-2021 NRD Static Eliminator, Serial No. A2DT581, containing Po-210 with an original activity of 10 milliCuries. The licensee continues to investigate the loss.


* * * UPDATE FROM STATE (N. FARRINGTON) TO M. RIPLEY 1040 EST 11/22/05 * * *

The licensee notified the State that the missing static eliminator was found 11/22/05 in the area where it was supposed to be in, but unexpectedly under a workbench, and therefore originally missed.

Notified R3 DO (Skokowski), NMSS (G. Morell), and TAS (email).

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.