Event Notification Report for October 29, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/28/2005 - 10/29/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
42106420944209542096
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42106
Rep Org: MA RADIATION CONTROL PROGRAM
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL P. WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: AEA TECHNOLOGY QSA
Region: 1
City: BURLINGTON State: MA
County:
License #: 12-8361
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL P. WHALEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/01/2005
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2005
Notification Time: 15:27 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
SHERI MINNICK (R1)
TAS (email)
CLIFFORD ANDERSON (R1)
MICHELE BURGESS (NMSS)
SHERI MINNICK (R1)
TAS (email)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL MISSING IN SHIPMENT
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
A single package originally containing two pigs arrived on 10/29/05 at the FedEx hub at the Memphis Airport damaged, with one of the two pigs missing. The missing pig contains 10 special form capsules of Am-241/Be with a total activity of 500 milliCuries. The pig is small (described as the size of a shotgun shell). The package was being sent by AEA Technology QSA of Burlington, MA to CPN Corp in California. FedEx stated that the package arrived in Memphis on Saturday morning 10/29, however, it was not determined that one of the pigs was missing until the morning of 10/30.
On 11/1/05, the Tennessee Radiation Control Program was at Fed Ex hub to assist in the search for the pig, and AEA Technology QSA (now known as QSA Global, Inc.) confirmed that the container did contain 2 pigs.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
* * * UPDATE FROM STATES TO M. RIPLEY 1615 EST 11/02/05 * * *
The following information was provided from the States of Tennessee and Massachusetts via email:
"The following is an summary/update from [the Tennessee State inspector's ] visit: The container/sources have not been found. FedEx said they have thoroughly searched and continue to search all possible areas where the source could have been lost. They are tracking all the details of the package from the time it arrived through their system until it was last seen. They are attempting to determine the root cause of the damage to the package and loss of part of its contents. Interviews are being conducted of individuals who played a role in the handling/processing of the package. The damage to the package was such that it looks like a mechanical device (closing metal grate/gate?) was involved in tearing the package. Radiation surveys have been and are being performed by Fed-Ex in any areas that they think the source could have been lost. There is a suspicion that the container and the sources have been swept up and disposed of at the landfill.
AEA Technology (now QSA Global) provided the following information via the State of Massachusetts: "The W1 lead pot (i.e., pig) is 2.5 inches tall X 1 inch diameter, it is painted white and has tape securing the cap. AEA performed measurements on the W1 lead pot and found the surface measurements were: 36 mr/hr gamma and 70 mr/hr neutron. They performed measurements on a pig with the same amount of Am-241/Be lost in TN - 500 mCi of Am241/Be"
Notified R1DO (C. Anderson), NMSS EO (J. Gitter), TAS (L. English).
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
A single package originally containing two pigs arrived on 10/29/05 at the FedEx hub at the Memphis Airport damaged, with one of the two pigs missing. The missing pig contains 10 special form capsules of Am-241/Be with a total activity of 500 milliCuries. The pig is small (described as the size of a shotgun shell). The package was being sent by AEA Technology QSA of Burlington, MA to CPN Corp in California. FedEx stated that the package arrived in Memphis on Saturday morning 10/29, however, it was not determined that one of the pigs was missing until the morning of 10/30.
On 11/1/05, the Tennessee Radiation Control Program was at Fed Ex hub to assist in the search for the pig, and AEA Technology QSA (now known as QSA Global, Inc.) confirmed that the container did contain 2 pigs.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
* * * UPDATE FROM STATES TO M. RIPLEY 1615 EST 11/02/05 * * *
The following information was provided from the States of Tennessee and Massachusetts via email:
"The following is an summary/update from [the Tennessee State inspector's ] visit: The container/sources have not been found. FedEx said they have thoroughly searched and continue to search all possible areas where the source could have been lost. They are tracking all the details of the package from the time it arrived through their system until it was last seen. They are attempting to determine the root cause of the damage to the package and loss of part of its contents. Interviews are being conducted of individuals who played a role in the handling/processing of the package. The damage to the package was such that it looks like a mechanical device (closing metal grate/gate?) was involved in tearing the package. Radiation surveys have been and are being performed by Fed-Ex in any areas that they think the source could have been lost. There is a suspicion that the container and the sources have been swept up and disposed of at the landfill.
AEA Technology (now QSA Global) provided the following information via the State of Massachusetts: "The W1 lead pot (i.e., pig) is 2.5 inches tall X 1 inch diameter, it is painted white and has tape securing the cap. AEA performed measurements on the W1 lead pot and found the surface measurements were: 36 mr/hr gamma and 70 mr/hr neutron. They performed measurements on a pig with the same amount of Am-241/Be lost in TN - 500 mCi of Am241/Be"
Notified R1DO (C. Anderson), NMSS EO (J. Gitter), TAS (L. English).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42094
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL BANDHAUER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: BILL BANDHAUER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/29/2005
Notification Time: 04:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 01:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2005
Notification Time: 04:39 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 01:26 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | M/R | Y | 16 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP FOLLOWING LOSS OF FEEDWATER PUMPS
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). During a plant shutdown for a refueling outage at 0126 [EDT] on October 29, a manual reactor trip was initiated in anticipation of Critical Operation on Emergency Feedwater. CR3 [Crystal River Unit 3] experienced an automatic Emergency Feedwater Actuation based upon a loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps. Main Feedwater Pumps tripped on a loss of the running Main Feedwater Booster Pump, which was automatically tripped on low Feedwater De-aerator Tank level. The redundant Main Feedwater Booster Pump was shutdown as part of the plant shutdown sequence. The low Feedwater De-aerator Tank level occurred due to a loss of the operating Condensate Pump while the redundant Condensate Pump was tagged out of service for scheduled maintenance."
The cause of the failed condensate pump that initiated the event sequence is still under investigation but the licensee indicated that it appears to be due to a mechanical failure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This event is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72 (b)(3)(iv)(B)(6). During a plant shutdown for a refueling outage at 0126 [EDT] on October 29, a manual reactor trip was initiated in anticipation of Critical Operation on Emergency Feedwater. CR3 [Crystal River Unit 3] experienced an automatic Emergency Feedwater Actuation based upon a loss of both Main Feedwater Pumps. Main Feedwater Pumps tripped on a loss of the running Main Feedwater Booster Pump, which was automatically tripped on low Feedwater De-aerator Tank level. The redundant Main Feedwater Booster Pump was shutdown as part of the plant shutdown sequence. The low Feedwater De-aerator Tank level occurred due to a loss of the operating Condensate Pump while the redundant Condensate Pump was tagged out of service for scheduled maintenance."
The cause of the failed condensate pump that initiated the event sequence is still under investigation but the licensee indicated that it appears to be due to a mechanical failure.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42095
Rep Org: FLORIDA BUREAU OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: ATLANTIC GEO TECH ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: JACKSONVILLE State: FL
County:
License #: FL-2725-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: ATLANTIC GEO TECH ENVIRONMENTAL SERVICES
Region: 1
City: JACKSONVILLE State: FL
County:
License #: FL-2725-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID FERGUSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 10/29/2005
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2005
Notification Time: 13:54 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
LANCE ENGLISH email (TAS)
DAVID SILK (R1)
DANIEL GILLEN (NMSS)
LANCE ENGLISH email (TAS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On 10/29/05, a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge (model 3440, s/n 032146, 8 millicuries Cs-137, 40 millicuries Am-241: Be) was stolen from the back of the operators truck at the job site on Four Acre Road in Jacksonville, FL. The gauge was chained and locked to the operator's truck. The operator left the truck at the job site while she reviewed the job site. She returned to the truck and drove back to the office. At the office she noted that the gauge was gone. The Jacksonville Police Department was notified. The company intends on placing an ad in the local newspaper.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
*** UPDATE AT 15:20 EST ON 11/09/05 FROM FURNACE TO KNOKE ***
"The Troxler gauge was recovered intact and undamaged on 11-8-2005 by Jacksonville Police Department and returned to the licensee. Information on the location of the gauge was supplied by an individual asking the manufacturer (Troxler) about the possibility of a reward. The Troxler representative called this office with information. The individual was arrested for a prior warrant in Tennessee."
Notified the R1DO (Miller), NMSS (Greg Morell), and TAS Email (Perez)
On 10/29/05, a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge (model 3440, s/n 032146, 8 millicuries Cs-137, 40 millicuries Am-241: Be) was stolen from the back of the operators truck at the job site on Four Acre Road in Jacksonville, FL. The gauge was chained and locked to the operator's truck. The operator left the truck at the job site while she reviewed the job site. She returned to the truck and drove back to the office. At the office she noted that the gauge was gone. The Jacksonville Police Department was notified. The company intends on placing an ad in the local newspaper.
Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
*** UPDATE AT 15:20 EST ON 11/09/05 FROM FURNACE TO KNOKE ***
"The Troxler gauge was recovered intact and undamaged on 11-8-2005 by Jacksonville Police Department and returned to the licensee. Information on the location of the gauge was supplied by an individual asking the manufacturer (Troxler) about the possibility of a reward. The Troxler representative called this office with information. The individual was arrested for a prior warrant in Tennessee."
Notified the R1DO (Miller), NMSS (Greg Morell), and TAS Email (Perez)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42096
Facility: HATCH
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL DEES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: AL DEES
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 10/29/2005
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2005
Notification Time: 14:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/29/2005
Event Time: 13:25 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
TOM BLOUNT (IRD)
JOHN HANNON (NRR)
VINNY GOMEZ (DHS)
JIM DUNKER (FEMA)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
TOM BLOUNT (IRD)
JOHN HANNON (NRR)
VINNY GOMEZ (DHS)
JIM DUNKER (FEMA)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
UNUSUAL EVENT - MAIN TRANSFORMER FIRE
"NUE declared on Hatch Unit 1 due to a fire on the main transformer lasting greater than 10 minutes. Unit 1 reactor scram on main turbine trip. Group 2 PCIV (Primary Containment Isolation Valves) isolation on low reactor water level (+3 inches). All group 2 valves closed as required. Fire extinguished at 1358 hours. Plant is stable."
All control rods fully inserted on the reactor scram. The plant is in hot shutdown steaming through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. No safety systems are affected. Emergency electrical buses are on normal offsite power and emergency diesel generators are available if required. The onsite fire brigade responded to the fire and the fire suppression system for the main transformer functioned as expected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. GOTT AT 1950 ON 10/29/05 * * *
The licensee is still in a NUE. The fire is out. The fire reflashed at 1603 when the deluge system was secured to inspect the transformer. The deluge system was restarted immediately. Offsite fire support have responded. Cleanup efforts are in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified IRD (Blount), R2DO (Cahill), and NRR EO (J. Hannon).
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO P. SNYDER AT 2010 ON 10/29/05 * * *
The licensee is still in a NUE. This call is to add an offsite notification per 10 CFR 72.75 (b)(2) to another government agency. The site chemistry department notified the National Response Center (Coast Guard) at 1636 that the site had discharged an unknown quantity of oil into the Altamaha River and was implementing site spill control and countermeasures procedures. The licensee also notified the Georgia Environmental Protection Division.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified IRD (Blount), NRR EO (J. Hannon), and R2DO(Cahill).
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. HUFFMAN AT 0021 EDT ON 10/30/05 * * *
The licensee reports that the fire is confirmed extinguished (i.e., no risk of reflash) based on long term monitoring of the transformer including thermography measurements. The Unit remains in an Unusual Event until assessment activities related to the transformer fire have been completed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. HUFFMAN AT 0105 EDT ON 10/30/05 * * *
Based on the results of assessment activities related to the transformer fire, the licensee has exited the Unusual Event at 0050. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Cahill), EO (Hannon), IRD (Blount), DHS (Doyle), and FEMA (Bisco) have been notified.
"NUE declared on Hatch Unit 1 due to a fire on the main transformer lasting greater than 10 minutes. Unit 1 reactor scram on main turbine trip. Group 2 PCIV (Primary Containment Isolation Valves) isolation on low reactor water level (+3 inches). All group 2 valves closed as required. Fire extinguished at 1358 hours. Plant is stable."
All control rods fully inserted on the reactor scram. The plant is in hot shutdown steaming through the turbine bypass valves to the main condenser. No safety systems are affected. Emergency electrical buses are on normal offsite power and emergency diesel generators are available if required. The onsite fire brigade responded to the fire and the fire suppression system for the main transformer functioned as expected.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. GOTT AT 1950 ON 10/29/05 * * *
The licensee is still in a NUE. The fire is out. The fire reflashed at 1603 when the deluge system was secured to inspect the transformer. The deluge system was restarted immediately. Offsite fire support have responded. Cleanup efforts are in progress.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified IRD (Blount), R2DO (Cahill), and NRR EO (J. Hannon).
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO P. SNYDER AT 2010 ON 10/29/05 * * *
The licensee is still in a NUE. This call is to add an offsite notification per 10 CFR 72.75 (b)(2) to another government agency. The site chemistry department notified the National Response Center (Coast Guard) at 1636 that the site had discharged an unknown quantity of oil into the Altamaha River and was implementing site spill control and countermeasures procedures. The licensee also notified the Georgia Environmental Protection Division.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified IRD (Blount), NRR EO (J. Hannon), and R2DO(Cahill).
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. HUFFMAN AT 0021 EDT ON 10/30/05 * * *
The licensee reports that the fire is confirmed extinguished (i.e., no risk of reflash) based on long term monitoring of the transformer including thermography measurements. The Unit remains in an Unusual Event until assessment activities related to the transformer fire have been completed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM E. BURKETT TO W. HUFFMAN AT 0105 EDT ON 10/30/05 * * *
Based on the results of assessment activities related to the transformer fire, the licensee has exited the Unusual Event at 0050. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. The R2DO (Cahill), EO (Hannon), IRD (Blount), DHS (Doyle), and FEMA (Bisco) have been notified.