Event Notification Report for October 28, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/27/2005 - 10/28/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42093
Facility: SUSQUEHANNA
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: RICH KLINEFELTER
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/29/2005
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2005
Event Time: 23:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2005
Notification Time: 01:44 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2005
Event Time: 23:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/29/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
DAVID SILK (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 18 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE CONTROL RODS
"On 10/28/2005, Susquehanna Unit 1 operators began the process of shutting down the unit for a maintenance outage to address control cell friction. It was expected that during this evolution, "slow to settle" control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL [Pennsylvania Power and Light] believes that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests.
"Accordingly, at 2332 EDT, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 12 hours when nine or more control rods are inoperable. Entry into this specification was also required per 3.1.3.e when it was determined that four inoperable rods resided within one Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) group. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted and disarmed, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function.
"At the time when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit One was operating at 18% power. Unit Two is continuing operation at 100% power.
"PPL is reporting this event as a Technical Specification required shutdown per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee."
Unit 2 is not affected by this problem and will continue to operate at 100% power.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (ILLIADIS) TO NRC HUFFMAN AT 1011 EDT ON 10/29/05 * * *
"At 0744 the plant reached All Rods In and at 0805 entered Mode 3 in accordance with plant procedures to fulfill the requirement of Technical Specification 3.1.3. As stated in the original EN# 42093, it was expected that during this evolution, "slow to settle"' control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. This action was taken on a total of 41 control rods that failed to settle at position 00 during the shutdown. There are 4 additional control rods that were declared inoperable previously during the cycle and subsequently settled to 00. Of the 41 control rods that failed to settle at the time of the shutdown, 6 have settled to 00 at the time of this update.
"Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL continues to believe that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function.
"There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to containment."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified.
"On 10/28/2005, Susquehanna Unit 1 operators began the process of shutting down the unit for a maintenance outage to address control cell friction. It was expected that during this evolution, "slow to settle" control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL [Pennsylvania Power and Light] believes that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests.
"Accordingly, at 2332 EDT, Technical Specification 3.1.3.f was entered which requires the unit to be taken to Mode 3 in 12 hours when nine or more control rods are inoperable. Entry into this specification was also required per 3.1.3.e when it was determined that four inoperable rods resided within one Banked Position Withdrawal Sequence (BPWS) group. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted and disarmed, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function.
"At the time when the ninth control rod was declared inoperable, Unit One was operating at 18% power. Unit Two is continuing operation at 100% power.
"PPL is reporting this event as a Technical Specification required shutdown per 10CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i).
"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified by the licensee."
Unit 2 is not affected by this problem and will continue to operate at 100% power.
* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (ILLIADIS) TO NRC HUFFMAN AT 1011 EDT ON 10/29/05 * * *
"At 0744 the plant reached All Rods In and at 0805 entered Mode 3 in accordance with plant procedures to fulfill the requirement of Technical Specification 3.1.3. As stated in the original EN# 42093, it was expected that during this evolution, "slow to settle"' control rods would be encountered, and rather than delay the continuance of the shutdown to perform operability testing, it was determined that these control rods would conservatively be declared inoperable. This action was taken on a total of 41 control rods that failed to settle at position 00 during the shutdown. There are 4 additional control rods that were declared inoperable previously during the cycle and subsequently settled to 00. Of the 41 control rods that failed to settle at the time of the shutdown, 6 have settled to 00 at the time of this update.
"Based on previous testing data and trending analysis of operability testing performed during the cycle, PPL continues to believe that the subject control rods would have passed operability tests. The inoperable control rods are fully inserted, shutdown margin requirements are met, and the control rod system was always fully capable of performing its safety function.
"There were no ECCS initiations and no challenges to containment."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 42089
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: RANDY SHACKELFORD
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/28/2005
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2005
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 11:25 [ET]
Event Date: 10/28/2005
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
70.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DISCARD OF CAUSTIC SOLUTION TO WASTE TANK WITHOUT SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS
A low level caustic discard solution was transferred to caustic waste tanks without sample and analysis. An in-line uranium concentration monitor was also present which would have stopped the transfer of high concentration solution. The solution in the tank was sampled. The solution concentration was very low and would have met analysis requirements.
There was no actual or potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment. The safety significance was very low due to the very low mass (8.91 grams U-235 at 65 weight %) and concentration (0.033 grams U-235/liter) [solution volume discarded without sampling was 270 liters].
This event was entered into the Problem Identification , Resolution and Correction System (PIRCS). An investigation is underway.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
DISCARD OF CAUSTIC SOLUTION TO WASTE TANK WITHOUT SAMPLE AND ANALYSIS
A low level caustic discard solution was transferred to caustic waste tanks without sample and analysis. An in-line uranium concentration monitor was also present which would have stopped the transfer of high concentration solution. The solution in the tank was sampled. The solution concentration was very low and would have met analysis requirements.
There was no actual or potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment. The safety significance was very low due to the very low mass (8.91 grams U-235 at 65 weight %) and concentration (0.033 grams U-235/liter) [solution volume discarded without sampling was 270 liters].
This event was entered into the Problem Identification , Resolution and Correction System (PIRCS). An investigation is underway.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY J KOZAL * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.