Event Notification Report for October 25, 2005

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION BY FRONT END PROCESSOR AND SPARE TRAIN TO FTS-2001 COMMUNICATIONS LINK

"At 1000 EDT on October 25, 2005, it was discovered that no good data is being transmitted via the FTS-2001 communications link. The communications link itself is functioning properly; however, the front end processor and the spare train for Unit 4 are not on-line. The estimated time of repair for restoration of data flow is approximately 1700 EDT on 10/25/05."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

RADIOACTIVE SOURCE LOST IN SHIPMENT

At 1651 ET on 10/24/05, the licensee dropped off two shipping containers at the FedEx shipping facility near the Huntington Tri-State Airport in Huntington, WV for shipment by FedEx to AEA Technology in Burlington, MA . Each container contained an 8.7 Curie Ir-192 source. On 10/25/05, the licensee was notified by AEA that only one of the two sources had arrived. AEA reported that two packages did arrive per schedule (0925 ET 10/24/05): one package was one of the radioactive material shipping containers containing one of the two expected sources, however the other was an attaché case containing only the licensee's shipping papers. The FedEx Response Center was notified and FedEx is searching for the missing shipment.

The shipping containers are both AEA Type 650L containers, each measuring 8" x 10" x 13 " with Yellow 2 radioactive material markings. The Transportation Index for each container is 0.2. The container received by AEA contained an AEA source changer S/N 202 containing an 8.7 Curie Ir-192 source S/N 20284B. The container lost in shipment contains an AEA source changer S/N 190 containing an 8.7 Curie Ir-192 source S/N 20285B.

* * * UPDATE 1120 EDT ON 10/26/05 FROM REGION I (JOHN KINNEMAN) TO S.SANDIN * * *

Region I was notified by AEA that the misdirected shipment arrived at their Burlington, MA facility this morning in good condition.

Notified R1DO (Silk), NMSS (Holahan) and TAS (Danis).


Category 3 sources, if not safely managed or securely protected, could cause permanent injury to a person who handled them, or were otherwise in contact with them, for some hours. It could possibly - although it is unlikely - be fatal to be close to this amount of unshielded radioactive material for a period of days to weeks. These sources are typically used in practices such as fixed industrial gauges involving high activity sources (for example, level gauges, dredger gauges, conveyor gauges and spinning pipe gauges) and well logging.

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO A SMALL FIRE AT THE MAIN TURBINE AREA

"Small Class B fire on the Unit 3 High Pressure Turbine. Fire is currently out, presented no challenges, and lasted 13 minutes"

The fire occurred underneath the high pressure turbine bearing and was caused by oil soaked insulation. The fire was extinguished by the site's fire brigade and resulted in no injuries to plant personnel. Plant safety and emergency systems were not affected by the fire and all plant systems functioned as required. Currently, the fire brigade is being debriefed and it is anticipated that the site will terminate the Unusual Event shortly. The licensee notified the State, local authorities and the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE AT 23:54 EDT ON 10/25/2005 FROM MICHAEL COEN TO RIPLEY * * *

"Small class B fire on the Unit 3 High Pressure Turbine. Fire is currently out, presented no challenge, and lasted 13 minutes. Terminated Unusual Event at 2330."

The plant is in mode three both before and after the event. The plant startup schedule has not been determined.

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the IRD Manager (Blount), FEMA (Chris Leggett), R2DO (Ernstes), and NRR EO (Hannon).

VIOLATION OF ANSI STANDARD FOR UF6 CYLINDERS

"Metropolis Works, Metropolis, Illinois (MTW) is reporting a failure to follow procedure related to the installation of valves in UF6 cylinders."

"A violation of ANSI Standard N14.1 (2001) 'Uranium Hexafluoride Packaging for Transport', Section 6.14.6 was reported 26 October, 2005. This is a reportable event because it is a violation of an applicable national standard and also an action outside the licensee's procedures. ANSI N14-1 (2001) 6.14.6 states, 'No material of any kind other than the specified solder shall be used on the threads to facilitate installation {of cylinder valves into the UH6 type 48Y cylinders}.' Contrary to that standard, MTW site maintenance personnel did use Teflon spray to facilitate installation of cylinder valves into type 48Y cylinders. Use of a thread lubricant, such as Teflon, can be expected to increase the degree the valve threads are engaged for a given torque. Teflon is a fluorinated compound and is not a chemical hazard in contact with UF6.

"This issue was discovered when USEC inspectors noted white residue around cylinder valves previously replaced by the licensee when those valves were later replaced by the cylinder manufacturer. Analysis of the residue showed it was Teflon. USEC notified the licensee of the finding 25 October 2005. Interviews with maintenance workers disclosed that Teflon had been used when replacing some cylinder valves. The licensee is investigating the quantity and type of cylinders that might have been subjected to Teflon during valve replacement. Notification of all customers that might have received cylinders with valves installed with Teflon is in progress.

"The licensee notified NRC Region 2 (D. Hartland)."

Notified R2DO (Ernstes).