Event Notification Report for October 21, 2005

UNANALYZED CONDITION DUE TO RELOCATION OF A FIRE DOOR BOUNDARY

"This event is being reported as 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. A postulated fire water system line break did not take into consideration the movement of a fire door boundary. Consequently, the break may affect safe shutdown of the plant. The door boundary was moved in May 1999.

"While assessing a calculation to update fire pump curves (CR 04-00422-04) it was found that the calculation does not appear to have been updated for the tornado depressurization event modifications (DCP 99-05014). Specifically, door DG-112 was moved to the control complex wall from the diesel generator wall. This door movement isolates the rattle space that was previously credited as a relief path for this internal flood.

"A full break is postulated for this line as the result of a safe shutdown earthquake. As the result of the postulated pipe break, both fire protection pumps are expected to auto start resulting in a break flow rate into the hallway of approximately 6,000 gpm. Standard Perry design practice is to assume a 30 minute duration for the pipe break flow isolation unless justified otherwise.

"The line in question was isolated at 2027 on 10/21/05. The valves are being maintained closed under administrative controls."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

**** RETRACTION ON 10/28/05 AT 1748 EDT FROM H. KELLY TO P. SNYDER ****

"An 8-hour notification was made on October 24, 2005 under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) for an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. The report was made due to a postulated break for a non-safety non-seismic fire water pipe that could possibly affect safe shutdown of the plant.

"An evaluation was completed on October 28, 2005. This evaluation confirmed that the current plant configuration is consistent with the design basis. The evaluation used for the original event notification assumed a full break of the involved piping. Perry design basis for this moderate energy system is a leakage crack. The postulated leakage from the crack in the piping remains within design basis and does not significantly degrade plant safety. Since Perry remains in compliance with design basis and there is no unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety, there is no reportable condition. Therefore, ENF 42072 is retracted."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lipa).

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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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POTENTIAL DEGRADATION OF GLOVEBOX OVERFLOW DRAINS UNDER CERTAIN VACUUM CONDITIONS

The NRC Resident Inspector questioned the impact of glovebox enclosure vacuum on the design and function of the glovebox overflow drains. Enclosure vacuum was not considered in the set-point analysis for these drains such that, under certain circumstances, the drains may not function as intended. The degraded safety scenario would involve high uranium concentration solution entering the glovebox (which is considered unlikely as the solution is typically low level caustic solution). The vacuum on the glovebox enclosure would have to exceed that which could result in the overflow drains being incapable of performing their functions. (The licensee notes that vacuums on enclosures have not been observed which would cause the drains to not be capable of performing their function). The solution in the enclosure would have to exceed the height necessary for criticality.

The licensee suspended operations in the affected enclosures on 10/21/05. A review was performed for all glovebox enclosures (during the week of 10/24/05). Modifications were made to all Building [DELETED] enclosure overflow drains to account for the absolute worst case enclosure vacuum for the facility (week of 10/24/05).

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.