Event Notification Report for October 17, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/16/2005 - 10/17/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42062
Rep Org: IVEYCOOPER SERVICES, LLC
Licensee: INDUSTRIAL NUCLEAR COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CHATTANOOGA State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID W. IVEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: INDUSTRIAL NUCLEAR COMPANY
Region: 1
City: CHATTANOOGA State: TN
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID W. IVEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 10/18/2005
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2005
Notification Time: 17:43 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/18/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
MICHAEL MARKLEY (NMSS)
JOHN KINNEMAN (R1)
MICHAEL MARKLEY (NMSS)
PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING A RADIOGRAPHIC SEALED SOURCE WITH A POTENTIAL SAFEY CONCERN
The following information was provided via fax:
"On October 17, 2005 I became aware of a condition involving a radiographic sealed source that may prove to be a safety concern to users of the sources. The manufacturer was promptly notified of the condition and a resolution was provided to IveyCooper via memo. The attached supplier corrective action has been generated and transmitted to Industrial Nuclear for 'Root Cause' and 'Action to Prevent Recurrence' dispositions. It provides details of the discovered condition. I am providing this notification in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR21.
"Date: 10/17/05
"Supplier: Industrial Nuclear Company, 35 Flagship Dr., North Andover, MA 01845
"Due Date: 12/17/05
"Material: Model 702 Radiographic Source
"Quantity: 8 at IveyCooper, unknown quantity at other licensees
"Description of Nonconformance: Roll pins of source connectors protrude from the source connector bodies on sources purchased from Industrial Nuclear Company in North Andover, MA. The protruding pins may increase risk of disconnect or source hanging in guide tube. Per the manufacturer roll pins should not extend past the outer plane of the connector barrel. A dial caliper was used to determine the amount of stick-out. Note: Two of the sources had been in use since January 05. No operational problems had occurred during use.
"Corrective Action Taken: Per memo from Industrial Nuclear Company the roll pins were filed to a flush condition using a hand file. Sources were secured and locked within the exposure device during the operation.
The following information was provided via fax:
"On October 17, 2005 I became aware of a condition involving a radiographic sealed source that may prove to be a safety concern to users of the sources. The manufacturer was promptly notified of the condition and a resolution was provided to IveyCooper via memo. The attached supplier corrective action has been generated and transmitted to Industrial Nuclear for 'Root Cause' and 'Action to Prevent Recurrence' dispositions. It provides details of the discovered condition. I am providing this notification in accordance with the requirements of 10CFR21.
"Date: 10/17/05
"Supplier: Industrial Nuclear Company, 35 Flagship Dr., North Andover, MA 01845
"Due Date: 12/17/05
"Material: Model 702 Radiographic Source
"Quantity: 8 at IveyCooper, unknown quantity at other licensees
"Description of Nonconformance: Roll pins of source connectors protrude from the source connector bodies on sources purchased from Industrial Nuclear Company in North Andover, MA. The protruding pins may increase risk of disconnect or source hanging in guide tube. Per the manufacturer roll pins should not extend past the outer plane of the connector barrel. A dial caliper was used to determine the amount of stick-out. Note: Two of the sources had been in use since January 05. No operational problems had occurred during use.
"Corrective Action Taken: Per memo from Industrial Nuclear Company the roll pins were filed to a flush condition using a hand file. Sources were secured and locked within the exposure device during the operation.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 42058
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MARK SLIVKA
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 10/17/2005
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2005
Event Time: 18:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2005
Notification Time: 19:18 [ET]
Event Date: 10/17/2005
Event Time: 18:16 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DUE TO LOW STEAM GENERATOR LEVEL
"At 1816 EDT on 10/17/2005 Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to lowering Steam Generator level on Loop 2. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for Loop 2 failed closed and operator attempts to re-open it were unsuccessful. The operators initiated a manual reactor trip when it was apparent that Steam Generator level would not be restored. Following the manual reactor trip, an automatic actuation of the Motor Driven and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps occurred due to low level in the Steam Generators. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for Loop 1 did not close as expected for the feedwater isolation signal (P-4 / Tavg 564 degrees F) that resulted from the manual trip. The Loop 1 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve was manually closed by the operators. All control rods are fully inserted."
This incident did not affect Unit 2. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and removing heat by dumping steam to the condensers. All safety related systems or equipment are available and functioning as required.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1816 EDT on 10/17/2005 Vogtle Unit 1 was manually tripped from 100% power due to lowering Steam Generator level on Loop 2. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for Loop 2 failed closed and operator attempts to re-open it were unsuccessful. The operators initiated a manual reactor trip when it was apparent that Steam Generator level would not be restored. Following the manual reactor trip, an automatic actuation of the Motor Driven and Turbine Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pumps occurred due to low level in the Steam Generators. The Main Feedwater Regulating Valve for Loop 1 did not close as expected for the feedwater isolation signal (P-4 / Tavg 564 degrees F) that resulted from the manual trip. The Loop 1 Main Feedwater Regulating Valve was manually closed by the operators. All control rods are fully inserted."
This incident did not affect Unit 2. Unit 1 is stable in Mode 3 and removing heat by dumping steam to the condensers. All safety related systems or equipment are available and functioning as required.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.