Event Notification Report for October 08, 2005

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE CONTROL ROOM CHILLER TRAIN

"'B' Train Control Room Chiller inoperable due to being aligned to Unit 1 Nuclear Cooling Water Train 'B.' This is a normal alignment for Unit 1 ESF 'B' Train testing. When we attempted to start 'A' Train Control Room Chiller, it failed to start. This placed Unit 2 in Tech Spec 3.0.3 at 0320 on 10/08/05. Unit load reduction started at 0720 on 10/08/05."

The licensee stated that the load reduction was terminated at 0815 on 10/08/05 based on a Notification of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) granting a 24-hour extension. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *

CRITICALITY ALARM SYSTEM INOPERABLE IN THE NDA/LOADING DOCK AREA DUE TO DETECTOR FAILURE

"The NDA RMS-3 detector pair had stopped communicating with the RadNet computer in early September. The RadNet program is not required to actuate the criticality alarm, but is used for detector monitoring and diagnostics. This pair of readouts is in a remote location and are not monitored frequently. On 10/8/05 while performing monthly meter checks and semi-annual calibration the following was noted:

1) NDA East background 10-20 µR/hr, NDA West 0.2 - 0.4 Mr/hr; both had green normal lights.
2) Conducted internal source check, NDA West - normal.
3) Conducted internal source check NDA East- only read 1.1 Mr/hr when >10 Mr/hr is expected, source check took much longer than is normal.
4) Attempted to calibrate East detector, when exposed to 20 Mr/hr indicated 200-300 µR/hr, when exposed to 100 Mr/hr indicated 4 Mr/hr. Normal alarm setpoint is 20 Mr/hr.
5) Attempted to communicate with NDA East RMS-3 with a local computer, but it would not communicate.
6) Replaced detector, no change noted.
7) Replaced RMS-3 internals with a spare RMS-3. This RMS-3 started communicating with the RadNet program normally and was calibrated normally. When the NDA East RMS-3 was turned off for replacement, the NDA West also started communicating with the RadNet program.

"NDA East detector was last calibrated on 8/18/05 due to the replacement of NDA West detector. Locally source checked when communications initially failed on 9/9/05."

A valid signal from both detectors is required in order to initiate a criticality alarm. The source check performed on 9/9/05 may not have confirmed detector operability since it utilized a RadNet generated input signal. The licensee noted that no known condition requiring operation of the criticality alarm system had occurred in this portion of the facility, i.e., the [DELETED] corridor of the Bldg. [DELETED] complex, during the interval when the criticality alarm system was inoperable.

At 1800 hours following replacement of the NDA East RMS-3 internals, all recalibrations and tests confirming operability of the entire criticality alarm system had been completed satisfactorily.

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE 0938 EST ON 11/4/05 FROM RIK DROKE TO S. SANDIN * * *

The licensee is retracting this report based on the following:

"On October 8, 2005, Nuclear Fuel Services, Inc. (NFS) made a 24-hour telephone notification to the NRC Operations Center based on Title 10 CFR Part 70.50 (b) (2). This section requires a 24-hour report for an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: (1) the equipment is required by regulation or license condition to prevent releases exceeding regulatory limits, to prevent exposure to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding regulatory limits, or to mitigate the consequences of an accident; (2) the equipment is required to be available and operable to perform the required safety function; and (3) no redundant equipment is available and operable when it is disabled or fails to function. The report was made on a Saturday by a maintenance team engaged in repair and calibration of the NFS Criticality Accident Alarm System (CAAS), when it was observed that a single detector in the network did not respond to a calibration check as expected. The detector and read-out meter were immediately removed from service, replaced with a properly calibrated unit, and system operability restored.

"On Monday, October 10, 2005, when the NFS Nuclear Measurements Department staff returned to work, and were able to evaluate the CAAS technical basis documentation, it was determined the SNM process and storage area monitored by the out-of-calibration CAAS detector was monitored as well by several other detectors in adjacent areas. Upon further testing of the subject detector in the laboratory, it was demonstrated a redundant electrical circuit in the unit especially designed for nuclear criticality monitoring purposes (which is independent of detector calibration) would have enabled the unit to initiate an alarm in the event of a criticality event. Therefore, for two entirely separate reasons, redundant equipment was available and operable to perform the required safety function during the period of time the subject detector was out of calibration. This information was discussed and reviewed with the NFS Resident NRC Inspector during the week of October 10, 2005. Based on this information and discussion with the NRC Inspector, it is requested that this event report be retracted."

The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (David Ayres) and NMSS (Trish Holahan).

* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions

MISSING SEALED AMERICIUM-241 SOURCE

"Subject: Official Notification

"This is to inform the NRC Operations Center that West Virginia University [WVU] Hospitals License # 47-23066-02 is not in possession of Item 6.I. Am-241 sealed sources (Amersham Model Dwg. ARC 10048B and 10040B) with an activity of 9.825 millicuries.

"NRC Region 1 is aware of this situation and has been working with us to resolve it. In August of 2005, a request was made to remove the item from our license. At that time NRC Region 1, via an October 8, 2005 email control # 137502, requested documentation of the shipment/disposal of the source. Based on NRC Region1 recommendations, on November 1, 2005 West Virginia University Hospitals withdrew the request to remove the item from the license. Control # 137502.

"In a search of the WVU Radiation Safety Department and Vendor records, no evidence of a shipment of the source was found. It was last listed on our physical inventory on May 7, 1991. The former RSO informed us via phone conversation that he believed it was shipped in the early 1990's.

"All of the search results were documented in writing to NRC Region 1 on May 23, 2012 during our license renewal process. Control # 576453.

"There is a current license amendment request to remove the source from our license. Control # 577671.

"West Virginia University Hospitals is officially notifying the NRC Operations Center at this time to document the situation in an effort to bring the situation to a close, and ultimately remove the source from our license."

The licensee has been working with Janice Nguyen in Region 1 to resolve this issue.

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source