Event Notification Report for September 14, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
09/13/2005 - 09/14/2005
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41995
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BERNARD LITKETT
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: BERNARD LITKETT
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/14/2005
Notification Time: 23:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 21:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2005
Notification Time: 23:38 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 21:38 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/30/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM FAILED SURVEILLANCE TESTING
"On 9/14/05 at 2138, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCl) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI Pump In Service Surveillance Test was in progress with system flow and speed being adjusted to establish surveillance test conditions. Speed and flow oscillations were observed when turbine speed approached 3900 rpm. Since speed and flow oscillations prevented the establishment of surveillance test conditions, HPCI was declared inoperable. Evaluations of these speed and flow oscillations are ongoing.
"Loss of the HPCI is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (BREADY) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 11:38 EST ON 10/30/05 * * *
"Evaluation of the HPCI system speed and flow oscillations concluded that the HPCI system was capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident. Therefore this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a loss of a single train safety function and is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified.
"On 9/14/05 at 2138, the High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCl) system was declared inoperable. The HPCI Pump In Service Surveillance Test was in progress with system flow and speed being adjusted to establish surveillance test conditions. Speed and flow oscillations were observed when turbine speed approached 3900 rpm. Since speed and flow oscillations prevented the establishment of surveillance test conditions, HPCI was declared inoperable. Evaluations of these speed and flow oscillations are ongoing.
"Loss of the HPCI is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) as loss of a single train safety system required to mitigate the consequences of an accident. No additional Emergency Core Cooling Systems or Safety Related equipment was inoperable during this time period."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM LICENSEE (BREADY) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 11:38 EST ON 10/30/05 * * *
"Evaluation of the HPCI system speed and flow oscillations concluded that the HPCI system was capable of mitigating the consequences of an accident. Therefore this event is not reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as a loss of a single train safety function and is being retracted."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Silk) notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41991
Facility: BRUNSWICK
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 2 State: NC
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HARDIN
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 09/14/2005
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 08:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2005
Notification Time: 14:11 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 08:32 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
JOEL MUNDAY (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 93 | Power Operation | 93 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF OFFSITE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SIRENS
"On September 14, 2005, at approximately 0832 hours [EDT], Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The maximum number of sirens that were inoperable was twenty (20). As of 1330 [EDT], eleven (11) sirens in Brunswick County and four (4) sirens in New Hanover County remain inoperable. The Brunswick and New Hanover County Emergency Operations Centers are aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM KENON CHISM TO S. SANDIN * * *
"On September 14, 2005, under Event Notification 41991, Brunswick Plant reported the loss of a number of offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. Maintenance activities continue for restoration of the siren capabilities lost. As of 2340 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, nine (9) sirens remain inoperable, six (6) sirens in Brunswick County and three (3) sirens in New Hanover County."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday).
* * * UPDATE AT 1639 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM DANIEL HARDIN TO J. ROTTON * * *
"On September 14, 2005, at 1411 hours, the Brunswick plant provided a notification (reference Event Number 41991) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the loss of function several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. This update is to notify the NRC Operations Center that as of September 15, 2005, at 1600 hours, all but 3 of 36 sirens have been restored and the condition no longer meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Restoration efforts for the remaining sirens are in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday)
"On September 14, 2005, at approximately 0832 hours [EDT], Brunswick began losing the function of several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. There are a total of 36 sirens located in Brunswick and New Hanover Counties, NC. The maximum number of sirens that were inoperable was twenty (20). As of 1330 [EDT], eleven (11) sirens in Brunswick County and four (4) sirens in New Hanover County remain inoperable. The Brunswick and New Hanover County Emergency Operations Centers are aware of the condition of the sirens and maintenance activities are in progress to restore siren capabilities. Other communications with local, state, and federal emergency response organizations have not been affected.
"The initial safety significance of this condition is considered minimal. Unit 1 and 2 are currently operating in Mode 1 under normal parameters. State and county emergency response officials are aware of the condition and compensatory measures are in place to provide warning to the affected areas if required."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE AT 0028 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM KENON CHISM TO S. SANDIN * * *
"On September 14, 2005, under Event Notification 41991, Brunswick Plant reported the loss of a number of offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. Maintenance activities continue for restoration of the siren capabilities lost. As of 2340 hours (EDT) on September 14, 2005, nine (9) sirens remain inoperable, six (6) sirens in Brunswick County and three (3) sirens in New Hanover County."
The licensee will inform the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday).
* * * UPDATE AT 1639 EDT ON 9/15/05 FROM DANIEL HARDIN TO J. ROTTON * * *
"On September 14, 2005, at 1411 hours, the Brunswick plant provided a notification (reference Event Number 41991) in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) for the loss of function several offsite emergency preparedness sirens as a result of adverse weather conditions associated with Hurricane Ophelia. This update is to notify the NRC Operations Center that as of September 15, 2005, at 1600 hours, all but 3 of 36 sirens have been restored and the condition no longer meets the criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii).
"Restoration efforts for the remaining sirens are in progress."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Munday)
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41987
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAN JOHNSON
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 09/14/2005
Notification Time: 04:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 02:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2005
Notification Time: 04:48 [ET]
Event Date: 09/14/2005
Event Time: 02:13 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 09/14/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
JAMES TRAPP (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM ON LOW REACTOR VESSEL WATER LEVEL DURING PLANNED MAINTENANCE
"An automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. The HPCI system started on low reactor level but did not inject, reactor level had risen above the initiation set-point. The RCIC did not receive an initiation signal. Overall plant response was as expected."
Prior to the transient the licensee was in the process of transferring UPS electrical loads to the alternate power supply. The momentary loss of UPS power locked-out the RFP controls during a downtrend in the reactor water level from the normal 201-203 inch operating band. Before Operators could establish manual control, reactor water level reached the 177 inch scram setpoint. Following the scram, reactor water level continued to decrease to the HPCI and RCIC initiation setpoint of 126 inches before recovering. HPCI received a start signal but RCIC did not for reasons under investigation. The unit will remain in mode 3 pending the results of the post-scram investigation and restart.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and is planning on issuing a press release.
* * * UPDATE ON 09/14/05 @ 1918 BY TIM PAGE TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
On September 14, 2005 at approximately 0213. an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. A level transient occurred causing reactor water level to lower, resulting in an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level. The HPCI system auto initiated on low reactor water level but did not inject as reactor water level had risen above the initiation setpoint. The RCIC system auto initiated (and sealed-in) and injected into the reactor vessel. Both systems operated as designed.
In addition, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 isolation occurred, resulting in multiple system isolations. This included isolation signals to Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, Containment Atmosphere Dilution. Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps, Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Lines, Traversing In-Core Probes, LPCI Inboard Injection Valves, Residual Heat Removal Drain to Radwaste, and auto initiation of Standby Gas Treatment. (Note that two Reactor Water Cleanup PCIS valves did not close due to their respective circuit breakers being in the open position for planned maintenance activities.)
The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation while the reactor was critical, as well as 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the valid actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), including general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system, the HPCI system, and the RCIC system.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed.
"An automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. The HPCI system started on low reactor level but did not inject, reactor level had risen above the initiation set-point. The RCIC did not receive an initiation signal. Overall plant response was as expected."
Prior to the transient the licensee was in the process of transferring UPS electrical loads to the alternate power supply. The momentary loss of UPS power locked-out the RFP controls during a downtrend in the reactor water level from the normal 201-203 inch operating band. Before Operators could establish manual control, reactor water level reached the 177 inch scram setpoint. Following the scram, reactor water level continued to decrease to the HPCI and RCIC initiation setpoint of 126 inches before recovering. HPCI received a start signal but RCIC did not for reasons under investigation. The unit will remain in mode 3 pending the results of the post-scram investigation and restart.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector and is planning on issuing a press release.
* * * UPDATE ON 09/14/05 @ 1918 BY TIM PAGE TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *
On September 14, 2005 at approximately 0213. an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level occurred following a momentary loss of the UPS (Uninterruptible Power Supply) system. The power loss resulted in a lock-out of the RFP (Reactor Feed Pump) controls. A level transient occurred causing reactor water level to lower, resulting in an automatic reactor scram on low reactor water level. The HPCI system auto initiated on low reactor water level but did not inject as reactor water level had risen above the initiation setpoint. The RCIC system auto initiated (and sealed-in) and injected into the reactor vessel. Both systems operated as designed.
In addition, a Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 isolation occurred, resulting in multiple system isolations. This included isolation signals to Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, Containment Atmosphere Dilution. Torus Vent and Purge, Drywall Floor and Equipment Drain Sumps, Drywall Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Lines, Traversing In-Core Probes, LPCI Inboard Injection Valves, Residual Heat Removal Drain to Radwaste, and auto initiation of Standby Gas Treatment. (Note that two Reactor Water Cleanup PCIS valves did not close due to their respective circuit breakers being in the open position for planned maintenance activities.)
The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) for RPS actuation while the reactor was critical, as well as 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) for the valid actuation of systems listed in 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(B), including general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system, the HPCI system, and the RCIC system.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been briefed.