Event Notification Report for August 11, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/10/2005 - 08/11/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41911
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOONG KO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JOONG KO
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/11/2005
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2005
Event Time: 10:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2005
Notification Time: 14:33 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2005
Event Time: 10:48 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
IAN JUNG (NRR)
ROBERT HAAG (R2)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
IAN JUNG (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | M/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
MANUAL REACTOR TRIP ON A CONDENSATE PUMP BUS LOCKOUT
"On 8/11/2005, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to lowering steam generator level caused by a partial loss of main Feedwater. The partial loss of feedwater was caused by the differential lock out of the non-vital 2A2 4160 V bus which resulted in loss of the 2A Condensate Pump that tripped the 2A Main Feedwater Pump. All rods inserted and no Steam Generator Safety Valves lifted. The differential lock out of the non-vital 2A2 4160 V [bus] deenergized the 2A3 vital 4160V bus, starting the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2A3 loads were sequenced on the Emergency Diesel Generator per design. Subsequently, the Auxiliary Feedwater System was automatically initiated due to lowering steam generator levels. All safe shutdown equipment operated as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby conditions, with decay heat removal being accomplished by steaming to the Main Condenser and Feedwater to the steam generators supplied by the Main Feedwater system. The Offsite power grid is available and stable. The '2C' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was out of service for routine surveillance and it had no effect on the cause of the trip nor had any effect on the trip recovery. St. Lucie is investigating the cause of the lockout on the 2A2 4160V bus. Unit 1 was not affected by this event."
At the time of this report, the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator was still loaded while investigations were underway. Steam generator level is being maintained using main feed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On 8/11/2005, a manual reactor trip was initiated due to lowering steam generator level caused by a partial loss of main Feedwater. The partial loss of feedwater was caused by the differential lock out of the non-vital 2A2 4160 V bus which resulted in loss of the 2A Condensate Pump that tripped the 2A Main Feedwater Pump. All rods inserted and no Steam Generator Safety Valves lifted. The differential lock out of the non-vital 2A2 4160 V [bus] deenergized the 2A3 vital 4160V bus, starting the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator and the 2A3 loads were sequenced on the Emergency Diesel Generator per design. Subsequently, the Auxiliary Feedwater System was automatically initiated due to lowering steam generator levels. All safe shutdown equipment operated as expected. The plant is stable in Mode 3, Hot Standby conditions, with decay heat removal being accomplished by steaming to the Main Condenser and Feedwater to the steam generators supplied by the Main Feedwater system. The Offsite power grid is available and stable. The '2C' Auxiliary Feedwater Pump was out of service for routine surveillance and it had no effect on the cause of the trip nor had any effect on the trip recovery. St. Lucie is investigating the cause of the lockout on the 2A2 4160V bus. Unit 1 was not affected by this event."
At the time of this report, the 2A Emergency Diesel Generator was still loaded while investigations were underway. Steam generator level is being maintained using main feed.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41912
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HAUTALA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DANIEL HAUTALA
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/11/2005
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2005
Event Time: 08:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2005
Notification Time: 15:56 [ET]
Event Date: 08/11/2005
Event Time: 08:45 [MST]
Last Update Date: 08/11/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 99 | Power Operation | 99 | Power Operation |
ONE EMERGENCY PREPAREDNESS SIREN OUT OF SERVICE
"On August 11, 2005 at approximately 08:45 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Department identified an inoperable single siren (#15). While reviewing the siren monitoring computer log, an Information Services Technician received a 'no response' signal on siren #15. Upon investigation, siren #15 was found inoperable. The siren was vandalized by destroying the siren controller case and stealing the internal battery. The affected siren is estimated to impact approximately 496 members of population in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) beyond 5 miles but within 10 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 10% of the population beyond 5 miles but within 10 miles. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected and the uncertainty of the length of time that will be needed to restore the siren to operable condition. The Palo Verde Emergency Plan (section 6.6.2.1) has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area(s) when sirens are inoperable.
"The County was informed at 09:05 MST to implement the MCSO notification if a need arises.
"There are no events in progress that require siren operation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"On August 11, 2005 at approximately 08:45 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Department identified an inoperable single siren (#15). While reviewing the siren monitoring computer log, an Information Services Technician received a 'no response' signal on siren #15. Upon investigation, siren #15 was found inoperable. The siren was vandalized by destroying the siren controller case and stealing the internal battery. The affected siren is estimated to impact approximately 496 members of population in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) beyond 5 miles but within 10 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 10% of the population beyond 5 miles but within 10 miles. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected and the uncertainty of the length of time that will be needed to restore the siren to operable condition. The Palo Verde Emergency Plan (section 6.6.2.1) has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriff's Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area(s) when sirens are inoperable.
"The County was informed at 09:05 MST to implement the MCSO notification if a need arises.
"There are no events in progress that require siren operation."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.