Event Notification Report for August 10, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
08/09/2005 - 08/10/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
4190941910419074191442108
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41909
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PATRICK DECKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PATRICK DECKER
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 17:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 21:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 17:40 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECURITY OFFICER SHOOTS SELF IN FOOT DURING TRAINING
"[A Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station] Security Officer was shot in the foot on the owner controlled firing range. This occurred outside the protected area. The security officer's injury was accidental and self inflicted." See HOO for additional information. See also EN #41910.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
"[A Prairie Island Nuclear Generating Station] Security Officer was shot in the foot on the owner controlled firing range. This occurred outside the protected area. The security officer's injury was accidental and self inflicted." See HOO for additional information. See also EN #41910.
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41910
Facility: PRAIRIE ISLAND
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD ELLISON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: BRAD ELLISON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 17:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 22:05 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 17:45 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SECURITY OFFICER SHOOTS SELF IN FOOT DURING TRAINING
"A PINSG Security Officer was shot in the foot in the owner controlled firing range at Monticello Nuclear Plant. This occurred outside the protected area. The Security Officer's injury was accidental and self inflicted." See HOO for additional information. See also EN #41909.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A PINSG Security Officer was shot in the foot in the owner controlled firing range at Monticello Nuclear Plant. This occurred outside the protected area. The Security Officer's injury was accidental and self inflicted." See HOO for additional information. See also EN #41909.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41907
Facility: ARKANSAS NUCLEAR
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 4 State: AR
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: RICHARD HARRIS
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 12:34 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 08:15 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 08/10/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SPURIOUS ACTIVATION OF OFF-SITE EMERGENCY PLAN SIRENS
"While performing silent activation tests on two new electronic sirens associated with the Alert and Notification System this morning, a siren cancel signal was sent out to stop the siren test on the two sirens. Mechanical sirens 2Z4 and 2Z8 [not the new electronic sirens] located in the areas around Oakland Heights Elementary School in Russellville and the HWY 7T curve read the signal as an activation and subsequently activated. Pope County 911 called the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) to advise that they had received calls concerning the activation. The normal siren verifiers for those sirens called ADH to report the sounding. ADH contacted ANO regarding the siren activation and issued a press release to four local radio stations."
The signals sounded for 5 - 10 minutes.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"While performing silent activation tests on two new electronic sirens associated with the Alert and Notification System this morning, a siren cancel signal was sent out to stop the siren test on the two sirens. Mechanical sirens 2Z4 and 2Z8 [not the new electronic sirens] located in the areas around Oakland Heights Elementary School in Russellville and the HWY 7T curve read the signal as an activation and subsequently activated. Pope County 911 called the Arkansas Department of Health (ADH) to advise that they had received calls concerning the activation. The normal siren verifiers for those sirens called ADH to report the sounding. ADH contacted ANO regarding the siren activation and issued a press release to four local radio stations."
The signals sounded for 5 - 10 minutes.
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41914
Rep Org: DAIMLER - CHRYSLER
Licensee: DAIMLER - CHRYSLER
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK HARTWIG
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: DAIMLER - CHRYSLER
Region: 3
City: INDIANAPOLIS State: IN
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JACK HARTWIG
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 08/10/2005
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2005
Notification Time: 18:18 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 12:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 08/12/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
ROGER LANKSBURY (R3)
SCOTT FLANDERS (NMSS)
GENERAL LICENSED SOURCE DAMAGED WHEN LEAD SHIELDING MELTED ON A NUCLEAR GAUGE
The RSO from a Daimler - Chrysler foundry reported that excessive heat inside the foundry had caused the lead shielding to partially melt. The device was a GN Technologies (now Thermo Electron Corp) model 5201 with source serial # GV8072 gauge serial # B3021. The gauge, which was on a foundry cuppola out of the area of any foot traffic, contained 100 millicuries of Cs-137. The radiation level on the top of the gauge measured 250 mr/hr at 1 ft from the source. The area near the gauge was roped off to isolate it from the public. They will shut the gauge off and the manufacturer's rep will remove it.
The RSO from a Daimler - Chrysler foundry reported that excessive heat inside the foundry had caused the lead shielding to partially melt. The device was a GN Technologies (now Thermo Electron Corp) model 5201 with source serial # GV8072 gauge serial # B3021. The gauge, which was on a foundry cuppola out of the area of any foot traffic, contained 100 millicuries of Cs-137. The radiation level on the top of the gauge measured 250 mr/hr at 1 ft from the source. The area near the gauge was roped off to isolate it from the public. They will shut the gauge off and the manufacturer's rep will remove it.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42108
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: TURNER INDUSTRIES GROUP LLC
Region: 4
City: PARIS State: TX
County:
License #: L05237-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: TURNER INDUSTRIES GROUP LLC
Region: 4
City: PARIS State: TX
County:
License #: L05237-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 11/01/2005
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2005
Notification Time: 19:09 [ET]
Event Date: 08/10/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/01/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
M. BURGESS (email)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
M. BURGESS (email)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via email:
"[Licensee employee] called RSO to let him know that [a radiographer trainer] had 12.5 rem deep dose equivalent for Quarter 3 - July 1-31, 2005.
"On Wednesday, 8/10/05, [name deleted], RSO for Turner Industries called DSHS Radiation Control (RC) to report that [licensee employee] has informed him that [name deleted] radiographer trainer for his company, had a 12.5 rem deep dose equivalent reading for Quarter 3-July 1-31, 2005 monitoring period.
"[The radiographer trainer] wrote a statement to RC stating that he has worked as an x-ray radiographer for the last 6 years with Turner Industries, is very conscientious & checks his dosimeter often throughout the work day. He stated that he was closely supervised by the RSO for the monitoring period in question & did training for a new trainee.
"An on-site investigation was conducted by [name deleted], a RAM inspector for RC. [The RAM inspector] interviewed [the radiographer trainer] & [another employee] regarding this investigation. Both [the radiographer trainer and the other employee] felt that this was a result of an altercation [the radiographer trainer] had with a contract radiographer & felt that this was the result of a retaliation against [the radiographer trainer] for not allowing the contract radiographer to enter [the radiographer trainer's] shooting bay. [The radiographer trainer] went on vacation & from 6/27-07/5/05.The RSO & [the radiographer trainer] felt that the contract radiographer had access to [the radiographer trainer's] film badge & a radiography camera & could have easily carried out this retaliation without being noticed.
"The RC inspector reviewed past monitoring records for [the radiographer trainer] & found that his results were consistent with someone receiving 50-60 mrem /month & 500-650 mrem/year in this line of work. The inspector concluded that the overexposure appeared to be very suspicious & agreed that the overexposure be readjusted to reflect the normal monthly results for [the radiographer trainer].
"Additional Documents Supplied:
"Personnel monitoring records for the past year for [the radiographer trainer] were obtained & sent in to RC by the RAM inspector. The investigation determined that the dose appeared to be to the dosimeter only. No violation recommended. RC has issued a letter concurring with the licensee's investigation results & has sent a copy of this letter to DSHS RC."
Texas Incident # I-8250
The State provided the following information via email:
"[Licensee employee] called RSO to let him know that [a radiographer trainer] had 12.5 rem deep dose equivalent for Quarter 3 - July 1-31, 2005.
"On Wednesday, 8/10/05, [name deleted], RSO for Turner Industries called DSHS Radiation Control (RC) to report that [licensee employee] has informed him that [name deleted] radiographer trainer for his company, had a 12.5 rem deep dose equivalent reading for Quarter 3-July 1-31, 2005 monitoring period.
"[The radiographer trainer] wrote a statement to RC stating that he has worked as an x-ray radiographer for the last 6 years with Turner Industries, is very conscientious & checks his dosimeter often throughout the work day. He stated that he was closely supervised by the RSO for the monitoring period in question & did training for a new trainee.
"An on-site investigation was conducted by [name deleted], a RAM inspector for RC. [The RAM inspector] interviewed [the radiographer trainer] & [another employee] regarding this investigation. Both [the radiographer trainer and the other employee] felt that this was a result of an altercation [the radiographer trainer] had with a contract radiographer & felt that this was the result of a retaliation against [the radiographer trainer] for not allowing the contract radiographer to enter [the radiographer trainer's] shooting bay. [The radiographer trainer] went on vacation & from 6/27-07/5/05.The RSO & [the radiographer trainer] felt that the contract radiographer had access to [the radiographer trainer's] film badge & a radiography camera & could have easily carried out this retaliation without being noticed.
"The RC inspector reviewed past monitoring records for [the radiographer trainer] & found that his results were consistent with someone receiving 50-60 mrem /month & 500-650 mrem/year in this line of work. The inspector concluded that the overexposure appeared to be very suspicious & agreed that the overexposure be readjusted to reflect the normal monthly results for [the radiographer trainer].
"Additional Documents Supplied:
"Personnel monitoring records for the past year for [the radiographer trainer] were obtained & sent in to RC by the RAM inspector. The investigation determined that the dose appeared to be to the dosimeter only. No violation recommended. RC has issued a letter concurring with the licensee's investigation results & has sent a copy of this letter to DSHS RC."
Texas Incident # I-8250