Event Notification Report for August 05, 2005

MISSING TROXLER GAUGE

Kansas Department of Transportation workers transited from one worksite to another with a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge in their vehicle. When they arrived at their destination, they discovered that their Model 3440 Troxler Moisture Density Gauge (44 milliCuries Am/Be; 8 milliCuries Cs-137) was missing. Someone noticed a gauge on Fort Riley Blvd in Manhattan, KS, and notified the police and fire department. The DOT personnel had used Fort Riley Blvd to get to the second job site. When emergency personnel arrived at the scene, the gauge was gone. The KS DOT notified local law enforcement. The gauge was in its transportation container and the source was locked.

KS Report Number: KS-050016

* * * UPDATE FROM D. WHITFILL TO W GOTT AT 1257 ON 08/08/05 * * *

The Troxler Moisture Density Gauge was found late (2200 - 2300) on 08/05/05 near the location it was reported lost. Kansas Department of Transportation has custody of the gauge and it is not damaged.

Notified R4DO (D. Powers) and NMSS (S. Moore) and emailed to TAS (R. Warren).

AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

At 0945 MDT on 08/05/05, the licensee reported that a Troxler Moisture Density Gauge had been stolen between 2300 MDT on 08/04/05 and 0100 MDT on 08/05/05. The gauge was locked in its transfer case and chained in the back of the truck. The truck was parked in the 1st row of the casino parking lot at the New Mexico State Fairgrounds. Casino police contacted the New Mexico State Police. The Troxler was a model 3430, Serial number 29090 and contained 50 millicuries Am-241/BE and 10 millicuries Cs-137.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABILITY OF ALL EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

"Event reportability is in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Accident Mitigation,' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'TS Required Shutdown,' due to potential COMMON CAUSE FAILURE of all four Emergency Diesel Generators. On 05 August 2005, at 14:31 hrs, DG2 was started for data gathering purposes, and it experienced a trip and lockout on differential current. Investigation revealed that set points for the installed DG differential current protective devices may be set too conservatively. Since each DG has the same relay with the same set point, all DGs were declared inoperable. Preparations are in progress to place both units in Cold Shutdown.

"The site has insufficient operable backup AC sources. The current effect on the plant is minimal due to all normal AC sources being available and operable. However, due to the potential for losing a normal AC source resulting in insufficient power being available to some emergency systems, both units will be placed in cold shutdown until all emergency diesel generators can be restored to operable.

"Corrective actions are in progress to correct differential current protective device problem in order to restore availability of DG2 and operability of all four DGs."

The licensee plans on commencing a down power on both units (Unit 2 first) within several hours. Technical Specifications require both units to be in Hot Shutdown within 12 hours (approximately 0700 on 08/06/05) and Cold Shutdown within 36 hours. Neither unit has any other significant systems LCOs.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (BAIN) TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 10:38 EDT ON 8/06/05 * * *

"This is a follow up message to the initial event reported in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), 'Accident Mitigation' and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(i), 'TS Required Shutdown' due to the potential COMMON CAUSE FAILURE of all four Emergency Diesel Generators. Unit 2 entered Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) at 04:46. Unit 1 entered Mode 3 (Hot Shutdown) at 05:31. Both units are continuing to cool down in preparation for entering Mode 4 (Cold Shutdown)." The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO(Landis), NRR EO (Haney), and IRD (McGinty).

RPS ACTUATION DUE TO LOW REACTOR WATER LEVEL CAUSED BY LOSS OF REACTOR FEED PUMPS

"At 1708 on 08/05/2005, Unit 2 reactor scrammed from 100% power when reactor water level reached Level 3 Reactor Scram setpoint due to loss of 2C and 2B Reactor Feed Pumps. All rods inserted [fully]. Unit 3 was also at 100% power and was unaffected by this event. Reactor water level reached level 2 (-45) HPCI & RCIC initiation setpoint and was recovered by HPCI and RCIC injection. All expected PCIS isolations, Group 2 (RHR S/D cooling), Group 3 (RWCU), Group 6 (ventilation), and Group 8 (TIP) were received along with the auto start of CREV, 3 SGT trains, HPCI and RCIC with injection into Reactor Vessel. Recirc Pumps tripped at -45" as expected. Four MSRVs lifted momentarily to stabilize reactor pressure.

"This event is reportable at 4 hour and 8 hour Non-Emergency Notification along with a 60 day written report in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(A), 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) and 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) as 'Any event or condition that results in a valid actuation of RPS and PCIS as described in (l) and (2) below.'"

Decay heat is being removed via steam to the main condenser using the bypass valves maintaining pressure at 895 psi. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE PROVIDED BY HUNTER TO JEFF ROTTON AT 1524 ON 08/06/05 * * *

"Upon further evaluation by the trip investigation team, it has been determined that no MSRV's lifted during this event. Reactor pressure data indicated no increasing pressure spike during the transient. The post-scram pressure trends indicated the maximum reactor pressure was normal operating pressure at the start of the transient followed by a gradual decline. The initial report which stated that 4 MSRV's had lifted was in error."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified the R2DO (Landis).

LOSS OF BOTH CONTROL ROOM EMERGENCY VENTILATION SYSTEMS DURING TESTING

During maintenance testing of the 'B' Control Room Emergency Ventilation system (CRV) the 'A' Air conditioning unit was running. The 'A' A/C unit (V-EAC-14A) tripped on a low service water flow condition while performing step 0255-11-III-4 which manipulated service water valves for the test. The 'B' loop of the CRV system was in a 30 day LCO due to the maintenance testing. When the 'A' A/C unit tripped and the 'B' unit inoperable due to testing, both CRV trains were inoperable and that placed the unit in a 24 hour Tech Spec LCO, 3.17.A.3.a. The compressor unit V-EAC-14A was reset following restart of the 13 Emergency Service Water pump 8 minutes after the trip and exited the 24 hour LCO.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM R. SCHREIFELS TO J. KNOKE AT 12:35 EDT ON 8/19/05 * * *

"The notification was initiated due to both trains of the Control Room Ventilation system being inoperable and was reported under 50.72 (b)(v)(D) as an event or condition that could have prevented fulfillment of a safety function.

"Monticello is retracting the event notification based on further investigation of the event. Successful completion of subsequent testing indicated that the 'B' train was still capable of performing its required safety function when the 'A' train tripped. Therefore Monticello has determined there was no loss of safety function as reported in Event Notification #41897. Additional investigation is ongoing and any identified issues will be entered into the station's corrective action program."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO(S. Burgess).

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP APPARENTLY DUE TO LIGHTNING STRIKE

The Unit 2 reactor automatically tripped due to an overpower-delta temperature (OpDeltaT) trip signal. The licensee states that an actual OpDeltaT condition did not exist at the time of the trip. The trip signal is believed to have been generated by lightning strikes from an electrical storm that was passing through the area at the time. The trip was uncomplicated and all systems functioned as required. All control rods fully inserted; no safety relief valves lifted; decay heat is being discharged to the main condenser using normal feedwater to supply the steam generators; the reactor temperature and pressure are at normal hot standby range. No obvious grid disturbance was seen during the trip and Unit 1 was not impacted (Unit 1 was being ramped offline at the time for secondary side maintenance work). The licensee noted that Auxiliary Feedwater did auto-start as expected due to a trip from full power and was subsequently secured.

The licensee is still investigating the cause of the OpDeltaT trip signal but noted that other Unit 2 instrumentation was found failed after the transient including the Unit 2, A-loop, wide range T-hot and T-cold indications and the Unit 2, B-loop, T-cold indication. The licensee plans to remain in Mode 3 until the investigation is complete and instrument repairs completed.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.