Event Notification Report for August 01, 2005

POTENTIALLY INOPERABLE SAFETY INJECTION PUMPS

"As part of an ongoing calculation review project, design data is being evaluated on safety related motors. On 07/15/2005 at 2245, design data was accepted for 1P-15A Safety Injection motor. This data determined that during a design basis accident with degraded safeguards bus voltage, the 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump could trip and lockout on over current prior to the safeguards bus stripping on under voltage. The Safety Injection Pump lockout would then prevent an auto start of the Safety Injection Pump during Emergency Diesel Generator load sequencing. 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump was declared out of service at that time. No other safety related motors were affected by this data.

"The 1P-15A Safety Injection Pump time over current set point was adjusted, based on the revised motor data, returning 1P-15A to service on July 17 at 2230. 2P-15A Safety Injection Pump time over current set point was also conservatively reset.

"On 08/01/2005 at 2000, additional design motor data was accepted, which impacted the time over current set point for 1P-15B and 2P-15B Safety lnjection motors. Review of this data determined that a similar potential exists that during a design basis accident with degraded safeguards bus voltage, 1P-15B or 2P-15B Safety Injection Pump could trip and lockout on over current prior to the respective safeguards bus stripping on under voltage. The Safety Injection Pump lockout would then prevent an auto start of the Safety Injection Pump during Emergency Diesel Generator load sequencing. 1P-15B and 2P-15B Safety Injection Pumps have been declared out of service as a result of accepting this new data.

"Based on the combined effect of all received design motor data, a condition existed prior to 07/15/2005, which could have impacted the design function of Unit 1 or Unit 2 Safety Injection Pumps during a design basis accident with degraded safeguards bus voltage. Both Unit 1 and both Unit 2 Safety Injection Pumps had the potential for this effect to prevent auto start on the Emergency Diesel Generator Loading Sequence per design. Therefore, this condition is being reported under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) due to the potential to prevent fulfillment of a safety function to mitigate an accident.

"Previous corrective action has been completed for Unit 1 and Unit 2 P-15A Safety Injection motors therefore, they remain Operable and capable of fulfilling design safety function."

The licensee is currently in a 72 hour Tech. Spec. LCO 3.5.2 (A) action statement for ECCS train B on both Units. Repairs are expected to take six to eight hours. Safety Injection train A equipment is being protected by administrative requirements put in place by the licensee. Operations personnel have been briefed of the potential impacts.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

OHIO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN AND RECOVERED NUCLEAR GAUGE

The State provided the following information via email:

"At approximately 9:45 AM on Monday, 8/1/05, a Humbolt Model 5001, S/N 4634 portable gauge [10 milliCuries Cs-137 and 40 milliCuries Am-241] was stolen from a company vehicle while parked at a fast food restaurant in Dayton, Ohio. The gauge was discovered missing when the employee returned to the vehicle. The gauge was discovered in a roadside ditch about one mile from the restaurant approximately 45 minutes later by a line crew from a local power company. The gauge was intact with no apparent damage. The licensee's RSO responded to the scene and took area measurements which indicated that the integrity of the source had not been compromised. The gauge was taken back to the licensee's offices, where it was leak tested. A police report was filed. The Ohio Department of Health is inspecting the licensee to determine if proper security measures had been followed prior to the theft."

Ohio Report No. OH050003

* * * UPDATE FROM THE STATE OF OHIO TO NRC (HUFFMAN) AT 12:19 EDT ON 8/18/05 * * *

The State provided the following information via email:

"Inspection by Bureau determined that licensee's employee failed to follow procedures for securing device in vehicle. Gauge was only secured in vehicle by bungee cords, with no locking mechanism or fixed restraint system. In addition, vehicle was left unattended and unobserved while employee was in fast food restaurant for prolonged period."

R3DO (Riemer) and NMSS (Hickey) notified. TAS informed via email.

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE MALFUNCTION

This report was received from the state by facsimile.

"Exxon Mobil Chemical Company had an incident occur in August of 2005 and did not report the event. The event was discovered while an inspector was performing a reciprocity inspection on Ronan Engineering at Exxon on July 9, 2008. Ronan was contacted to package a nuclear gauge for transport and disposal. In August 2005, Exxon had a problem with a ThermoMeasure Tech 'SA-10' device that contained four 1000 mCi sources of Cs-137. The sources were QSA model CDC.93 with serial numbers 4421GN, 4424GN, 4425GN, and 4426GN in a rod configuration. In August 2005, the sources could not be returned to the shielded position to perform a shutter check. The facility returned the sources to the normal detent position for operation and continued to use the gauge. Ronan Engineering determined that the sources were encountering friction from the vessel source well. The vessel source well is part of the vessel and not part of the Ronan gauge. The gauge and sources were safely returned to the source holder, locked out, surveyed and leak tested on July 11, 2008. The gauge was shipped to ThermoMeasure Tech on July 11, 2008 for disposal."

Event Report ID: LA0800015