Event Notification Report for June 30, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/29/2005 - 06/30/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
418134181441815418164181741884
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41813
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID VINEYARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID VINEYARD
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 06/30/2005
Notification Time: 11:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2005
Notification Time: 11:52 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 08:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
ALERT NOTIFICATION RADIO TRANSMITTER DISCOVERED INOPERABLE
"During daily maintenance check of alert notification siren system, a siren technician discovered that the radio transmitter used to communicate with the sirens was not available. Investigation revealed that an encoder that utilizes a T1 phone line to send signals from a siren encoder to the transmitter had failed. This failure produced a signal to key the transmitter. After the transmitter is keyed for approximately 15 seconds the transmitter will lock out and therefore not be available for use. Since the transmitter was unavailable this rendered all offsite sirens inoperable. This notification is made under 10CFR50.72(b) because of a significant loss off offsite public notification capability.
"This failure was promptly diagnosed, corrected, and the system tested satisfactorily within approximately 62 minutes from time of discovery of 0800 Eastern Time.
"The tone alert radio portion of the alert notification system was available for notification during this event."
The NRC Resident Inspector and Burke County was notified of this event by the licensee.
"During daily maintenance check of alert notification siren system, a siren technician discovered that the radio transmitter used to communicate with the sirens was not available. Investigation revealed that an encoder that utilizes a T1 phone line to send signals from a siren encoder to the transmitter had failed. This failure produced a signal to key the transmitter. After the transmitter is keyed for approximately 15 seconds the transmitter will lock out and therefore not be available for use. Since the transmitter was unavailable this rendered all offsite sirens inoperable. This notification is made under 10CFR50.72(b) because of a significant loss off offsite public notification capability.
"This failure was promptly diagnosed, corrected, and the system tested satisfactorily within approximately 62 minutes from time of discovery of 0800 Eastern Time.
"The tone alert radio portion of the alert notification system was available for notification during this event."
The NRC Resident Inspector and Burke County was notified of this event by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41814
Facility: SAINT LUCIE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES HURCHALLA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE
NRC Notified By: JAMES HURCHALLA
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/30/2005
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2005
Notification Time: 16:16 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 09:30 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/30/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
BRIAN BONSER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR FAILED FITNESS FOR DUTY TEST FOR DRUGS
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty tests. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details
A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for illegal drugs during a random fitness-for-duty tests. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41815
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS AVRAKOTOS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS AVRAKOTOS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 06/30/2005
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 19:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2005
Notification Time: 19:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 19:29 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED 50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1DO)
CYNTHIA CARPENTER (NRR)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
STEINDURF (FEMA)
CRAIG (DHS)
JOHN WHITE (R1DO)
CYNTHIA CARPENTER (NRR)
MELVYN LEACH (IRD)
STEINDURF (FEMA)
CRAIG (DHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
PRIMARY CONTAINMENT INOPERABLE DUE TO SMALL CRACK IN TORUS
The licensee has determined that the small weep hole crack in the torus (x in shape) is in a position which requires the plant to initiate a normal shutdown to cold shutdown conditions. The crack is located about 5 feet below the waterline and just below the HPCI exhaust pipe discharge. Due to the location of this crack the licensee's engineering staff showed via analysis that it would be prudent to restrict the number of thermal cycles the crack receives. The plant is in a 1 hour Technical Specification LCO shutdown action statement. At 19:50 the licensee commenced the Technical Specification shutdown to cold shutdown conditions.
As an additional item, one of the four Emergency Diesel Generators was deemed inoperable at the time of the event, and continues to be in a LCO action statement.
The licensee made notifications to the State and local agencies, and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE ON 06/30/05 AT 22:24 EDT FROM T. PAGE TO J. KNOKE ***
"With the plant operating at 100% on June 27, 2005 during RCIC Torus Suction piping inspection per ST-24H, inspectors discovered a TORUS leak in the vicinity of a TORUS Support between Bays A and P. The leak was quantified as slight weepage with streaking and a small puddle below leak. This was captured in the plant corrective action program on CR-JAF-2005-02593. Subsequent non destructive examination determined that the leakage was from a small through wall crack. The condition was discussed with the NRC Staff at that time. Initial evaluation at that time determined that there was reasonable expectation of operability, an Operational Decision Making Instruction (ODMI) was prepared and implemented to monitor the leakage while further engineering evaluation was conducted. On June 30,2005 further engineering analysis determined that operability of the primary containment was not assured and at 19:29 on June 30, 2005 the Shift Manager declared Primary Containment Inoperable and entered Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.1 Condition A, Primary Containment Inoperable, and declared an Unusual Event under EAL 9.1.2. Preparations were made for a reactor shutdown and the shutdown was commenced at 20:00.
"At the time of the event the A Train of EDGs was out of service for a planned maintenance LCO. At this time the NRC Resident has been informed."
The A Train EDG is not available nor operable if needed.
The R1DO (White) and NRR EO (Carpenter) have been notified.
**** UPDATE ON 07/01/05 AT 1720 EDT FROM N. AVRAKOTOS MACKINNON ***
An Unusual Event was terminated at 1716 EDT due to achieving cold shutdown. R1DO (John White), NRR EO (Cynthia Carpenter), IRD Manager (M. Leach), FEMA (Todd Kuzia) and DHS (Craig) notified.
NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local officials were notified by the licensee.
The licensee has determined that the small weep hole crack in the torus (x in shape) is in a position which requires the plant to initiate a normal shutdown to cold shutdown conditions. The crack is located about 5 feet below the waterline and just below the HPCI exhaust pipe discharge. Due to the location of this crack the licensee's engineering staff showed via analysis that it would be prudent to restrict the number of thermal cycles the crack receives. The plant is in a 1 hour Technical Specification LCO shutdown action statement. At 19:50 the licensee commenced the Technical Specification shutdown to cold shutdown conditions.
As an additional item, one of the four Emergency Diesel Generators was deemed inoperable at the time of the event, and continues to be in a LCO action statement.
The licensee made notifications to the State and local agencies, and will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
*** UPDATE ON 06/30/05 AT 22:24 EDT FROM T. PAGE TO J. KNOKE ***
"With the plant operating at 100% on June 27, 2005 during RCIC Torus Suction piping inspection per ST-24H, inspectors discovered a TORUS leak in the vicinity of a TORUS Support between Bays A and P. The leak was quantified as slight weepage with streaking and a small puddle below leak. This was captured in the plant corrective action program on CR-JAF-2005-02593. Subsequent non destructive examination determined that the leakage was from a small through wall crack. The condition was discussed with the NRC Staff at that time. Initial evaluation at that time determined that there was reasonable expectation of operability, an Operational Decision Making Instruction (ODMI) was prepared and implemented to monitor the leakage while further engineering evaluation was conducted. On June 30,2005 further engineering analysis determined that operability of the primary containment was not assured and at 19:29 on June 30, 2005 the Shift Manager declared Primary Containment Inoperable and entered Technical Specification LCO 3.6.1.1 Condition A, Primary Containment Inoperable, and declared an Unusual Event under EAL 9.1.2. Preparations were made for a reactor shutdown and the shutdown was commenced at 20:00.
"At the time of the event the A Train of EDGs was out of service for a planned maintenance LCO. At this time the NRC Resident has been informed."
The A Train EDG is not available nor operable if needed.
The R1DO (White) and NRR EO (Carpenter) have been notified.
**** UPDATE ON 07/01/05 AT 1720 EDT FROM N. AVRAKOTOS MACKINNON ***
An Unusual Event was terminated at 1716 EDT due to achieving cold shutdown. R1DO (John White), NRR EO (Cynthia Carpenter), IRD Manager (M. Leach), FEMA (Todd Kuzia) and DHS (Craig) notified.
NRC Resident Inspector, State and Local officials were notified by the licensee.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41816
Facility: FERMI
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK FALLON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Region: 3 State: MI
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4
NRC Notified By: PATRICK FALLON
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/01/2005
Notification Time: 00:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 19:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2005
Notification Time: 00:08 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 19:31 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
JAMNES CAMERON (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
UNANALYZED CONDITION RELATED TO THE STANDBY FEEDWATER PUMPS AND CONTROL CIRCUITS
"During an NRC Triennial Fire Protection Audit the Inspector identified a fuse coordination issue between 130VDC supply circuit and breaker trip circuit fuses for the Standby Feedwater (SBFW) Pump switchgear. The coordination ratio was found to be too low to support requirements for fire related safe shutdown equipment under Generic Letter 81-12. Impacted equipment is SBFW Pumps A & B and control circuits required for Appendix R Alternative Shutdown auxiliary equipment. This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The impacted equipment has been declared inoperable and a team is currently working on design changes to change fuse sizes for the breaker trip circuit/supply circuit to meet the requirements of Generic Letter 81-12."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"During an NRC Triennial Fire Protection Audit the Inspector identified a fuse coordination issue between 130VDC supply circuit and breaker trip circuit fuses for the Standby Feedwater (SBFW) Pump switchgear. The coordination ratio was found to be too low to support requirements for fire related safe shutdown equipment under Generic Letter 81-12. Impacted equipment is SBFW Pumps A & B and control circuits required for Appendix R Alternative Shutdown auxiliary equipment. This event is being reported as an unanalyzed condition that significantly degraded plant safety under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The impacted equipment has been declared inoperable and a team is currently working on design changes to change fuse sizes for the breaker trip circuit/supply circuit to meet the requirements of Generic Letter 81-12."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41817
Rep Org: MARYLAND DEPT OF THE ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: ALBAN HOME INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 1
City: FREDERICK State: MD
County:
License #: MD-21-030-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA PARK
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Licensee: ALBAN HOME INSPECTION SERVICES
Region: 1
City: FREDERICK State: MD
County:
License #: MD-21-030-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: BARBARA PARK
HQ OPS Officer: ARLON COSTA
Notification Date: 07/01/2005
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 11:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2005
Notification Time: 08:46 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 11:05 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/01/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOSS OF X-RAY FLUORESCENCE SURVEY DEVICE
After completing an x-ray fluorescence (XRF) survey for a client, the licensee placed the XRF device on the roof of his vehicle. The licensee left the work area and upon entering the main flow of traffic he pulled over and realized that the device was no longer on top of the roof of his vehicle. He conducted a search along the path he had traveled. The Montgomery County Fire and Rescue responded and proceeded to search the previously identified stretches of roadway and did not find the device. This incident was also reported to the Montgomery County Police Department. The Maryland Department of the Environment is investigating this incident.
The lost instrument is an LPA-1 XRF (S/N 1189) device, gray in color, manufactured by Radioactive Monitoring Devices (RM3) of Watertown, MA. The radioactive source is a Cobalt-57 isotope with an activity of (12) twelve millicuries.
After completing an x-ray fluorescence (XRF) survey for a client, the licensee placed the XRF device on the roof of his vehicle. The licensee left the work area and upon entering the main flow of traffic he pulled over and realized that the device was no longer on top of the roof of his vehicle. He conducted a search along the path he had traveled. The Montgomery County Fire and Rescue responded and proceeded to search the previously identified stretches of roadway and did not find the device. This incident was also reported to the Montgomery County Police Department. The Maryland Department of the Environment is investigating this incident.
The lost instrument is an LPA-1 XRF (S/N 1189) device, gray in color, manufactured by Radioactive Monitoring Devices (RM3) of Watertown, MA. The radioactive source is a Cobalt-57 isotope with an activity of (12) twelve millicuries.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41884
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: LONGVIEW INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: EVERETT State: WA
County:
License #: IR067-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: A. SCROGGS VIA E-MAIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: LONGVIEW INSPECTION
Region: 4
City: EVERETT State: WA
County:
License #: IR067-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: A. SCROGGS VIA E-MAIL
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 07/29/2005
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2005
Notification Time: 17:05 [ET]
Event Date: 06/30/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
DAVID GRAVES (R4)
JOSEPH GIITTER (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE EVENT - HIGH DOSIMETRY BADGE READING
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"On July 28, 2005 the RSO for Longview Inspection, a radiography company located in Everett Washington, notified [the Washington State Radioactive Materials] department of a potential overexposure. In a written report sent that night, events were described as follows: Two Level 2 radiographers were dispatched to Kent Washington to perform radiography work on an above ground pipeline. Each radiographer was properly equipped with survey meters, self-reading pocket dosimeters, rate alarm dosimeters, and OSL [Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimetry]] badges.
"During the course of the on site work, radiographer #1 crawled under the pipe to search for pipe numbers. At that time, it is believed that his OSL badge was knocked off his shirt pocket where he had it clipped. Both radiographers continued to work taking shots in the area unaware of the missing OSL badge. The alarm rate and pocket dosimeters were worn in a pouch on his hip and not in his shirt pocket with the OSL badge.
"At the conclusion of the work, while both radiographers performed their break downs, equipment checks and daily radiation reports to complete the job, radiographer #1 discovered his OSL badge was missing. The immediate area was searched and the OSL badge was discovered under a sheet of plywood pulled into place to crawl upon while under the pipe.
"They returned to their shop in Everett, Washington and notified the RSO of the mishap. The two radiographers reported that their rate alarms had not sounded constantly and periodic checks of the pocket dosimeter did not indicate any abnormal doses. Both men stated that they were working side by side the whole day . Since it was the end of the month wear period, the RSO sent all the radiographers' OSL badges in for processing. He forwarded the dosimetry report to us with his written report of the incident.
"The report on the OSL found under the pipe had millirem readings of 5367 - Deep dose, 5638 Eye dose, and 6237 Shallow dose. The radiographer #2 had readings that were consistent with the doses reported for the wear period with other radiographers in the company.
"The RSO reported that he suspended the radiographer #1 who had lost the OSL badge under the pipe, until the RSO receives approval from the department to resume radiographic operations."
Washington State Report #WA-05-044
* * * UPDATE AT1815 EDT ON 9/2/05 FROM A. SCROGGS VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided as an update and closeout for WA-05-044:
"On August 17, the department received the RSO's final report. In it the RSO stated it had been determined the recorded exposures had not been received by the radiographer. This conclusion was based on:
- Self-reading dosimeters for both radiographers had not gone off-scale,
- Both radiographer alarming rate-meters had not continuously alarmed,
- The OSL dosimeter for the second radiographer showed normal readings, and association with each individual indicated each could be trusted.
"The RSO calculated an exposure of 32 mRem for the day and had the dosimetry service assign a 300 mRem exposure to the individual for the month. The radiographer was allowed to return to work after the department reviewed the reported findings.
"The RSO stated that all facility radiography staff were reminded to ensure they are properly equipped prior to performing each radiographic activity."
Notified R4DO (Linda Smith) and NMSS (Tom Essig).
The licensee provided the following information via email:
"On July 28, 2005 the RSO for Longview Inspection, a radiography company located in Everett Washington, notified [the Washington State Radioactive Materials] department of a potential overexposure. In a written report sent that night, events were described as follows: Two Level 2 radiographers were dispatched to Kent Washington to perform radiography work on an above ground pipeline. Each radiographer was properly equipped with survey meters, self-reading pocket dosimeters, rate alarm dosimeters, and OSL [Optically Stimulated Luminescence Dosimetry]] badges.
"During the course of the on site work, radiographer #1 crawled under the pipe to search for pipe numbers. At that time, it is believed that his OSL badge was knocked off his shirt pocket where he had it clipped. Both radiographers continued to work taking shots in the area unaware of the missing OSL badge. The alarm rate and pocket dosimeters were worn in a pouch on his hip and not in his shirt pocket with the OSL badge.
"At the conclusion of the work, while both radiographers performed their break downs, equipment checks and daily radiation reports to complete the job, radiographer #1 discovered his OSL badge was missing. The immediate area was searched and the OSL badge was discovered under a sheet of plywood pulled into place to crawl upon while under the pipe.
"They returned to their shop in Everett, Washington and notified the RSO of the mishap. The two radiographers reported that their rate alarms had not sounded constantly and periodic checks of the pocket dosimeter did not indicate any abnormal doses. Both men stated that they were working side by side the whole day . Since it was the end of the month wear period, the RSO sent all the radiographers' OSL badges in for processing. He forwarded the dosimetry report to us with his written report of the incident.
"The report on the OSL found under the pipe had millirem readings of 5367 - Deep dose, 5638 Eye dose, and 6237 Shallow dose. The radiographer #2 had readings that were consistent with the doses reported for the wear period with other radiographers in the company.
"The RSO reported that he suspended the radiographer #1 who had lost the OSL badge under the pipe, until the RSO receives approval from the department to resume radiographic operations."
Washington State Report #WA-05-044
* * * UPDATE AT1815 EDT ON 9/2/05 FROM A. SCROGGS VIA EMAIL * * *
The following information was provided as an update and closeout for WA-05-044:
"On August 17, the department received the RSO's final report. In it the RSO stated it had been determined the recorded exposures had not been received by the radiographer. This conclusion was based on:
- Self-reading dosimeters for both radiographers had not gone off-scale,
- Both radiographer alarming rate-meters had not continuously alarmed,
- The OSL dosimeter for the second radiographer showed normal readings, and association with each individual indicated each could be trusted.
"The RSO calculated an exposure of 32 mRem for the day and had the dosimetry service assign a 300 mRem exposure to the individual for the month. The radiographer was allowed to return to work after the department reviewed the reported findings.
"The RSO stated that all facility radiography staff were reminded to ensure they are properly equipped prior to performing each radiographic activity."
Notified R4DO (Linda Smith) and NMSS (Tom Essig).