Event Notification Report for June 29, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/28/2005 - 06/29/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
41810418124183541978
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41810
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: DAN MARKS
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 06/29/2005
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 04:43 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2005
Notification Time: 13:23 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 04:43 [MST]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
JEFFERY CLARK (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EVACUATION SIREN INOPERABLE
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On June 29, 2005 at approximately 08:55 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Program Manager was notified of an inoperable single siren #36. An alarm indicates that the inoperability started at 04:43 AM MST. The siren was vandalized by destroying the battery case and stealing the internal battery. The affected siren is estimated to impact approximately 215 members of population (10.1 %) in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) within 5 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 5% of the population within 5 miles (or 10% within 5 to 10 miles) for greater than 1 hour. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected and the uncertainty of the length of time that will be needed to restore the siren to operable condition. The Palo Verde Emergency Plan (section 6.6.2.1) has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area(s) when sirens are inoperable.
"The County was informed at 09:25 AM MST to implement the MCSO notification if a need arises.
"There are no events in progress that require siren operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren failure and this ENS call."
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On June 29, 2005 at approximately 08:55 Mountain Standard Time (MST), the Palo Verde Emergency Preparedness Program Manager was notified of an inoperable single siren #36. An alarm indicates that the inoperability started at 04:43 AM MST. The siren was vandalized by destroying the battery case and stealing the internal battery. The affected siren is estimated to impact approximately 215 members of population (10.1 %) in the emergency planning zone (EPZ) within 5 miles. Palo Verde's reporting criterion is a loss of capability to inform greater than 5% of the population within 5 miles (or 10% within 5 to 10 miles) for greater than 1 hour. This call is being placed due to the relatively large segment of the population affected and the uncertainty of the length of time that will be needed to restore the siren to operable condition. The Palo Verde Emergency Plan (section 6.6.2.1) has a contingency for dispatching Maricopa County Sheriffs Office (MCSO) vehicles with loud speakers to alert persons within the affected area(s) when sirens are inoperable.
"The County was informed at 09:25 AM MST to implement the MCSO notification if a need arises.
"There are no events in progress that require siren operation.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the siren failure and this ENS call."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41812
Facility: HOPE CREEK
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: DAVID HALL
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 06/29/2005
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 14:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2005
Notification Time: 17:32 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 14:40 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 06/29/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JOHN WHITE (R1)
JOHN WHITE (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
LOSS OF EMERGENCY SIRENS DUE TO POWER OUTAGE
"At 1440 hrs [EDT] on 06/29/05, the Emergency Plan Coordinator for PSEG informed the Hope Creek Control Room that 31 offsite sirens were inoperable due to an unplanned power outage. The Hope Creek ECG [Emergency Communications Guide] requires an eight-hour report to be made if greater than 17 offsite sirens are inoperable for more than one hour. All safety systems are available and operable with the exception of the 'C' Safety Auxiliary Cooling Water Pump, and the 'C' Residual Heat Removal Pump, which is cleared and tagged for a scheduled system outage. At 1555 [hrs.], [we were] notified by [the] Emergency Plan coordinator that power was restored to a majority of the sirens in New Jersey. [Nine] sirens in New Jersey are still inoperable, [one] siren in Delaware is still inoperable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1440 hrs [EDT] on 06/29/05, the Emergency Plan Coordinator for PSEG informed the Hope Creek Control Room that 31 offsite sirens were inoperable due to an unplanned power outage. The Hope Creek ECG [Emergency Communications Guide] requires an eight-hour report to be made if greater than 17 offsite sirens are inoperable for more than one hour. All safety systems are available and operable with the exception of the 'C' Safety Auxiliary Cooling Water Pump, and the 'C' Residual Heat Removal Pump, which is cleared and tagged for a scheduled system outage. At 1555 [hrs.], [we were] notified by [the] Emergency Plan coordinator that power was restored to a majority of the sirens in New Jersey. [Nine] sirens in New Jersey are still inoperable, [one] siren in Delaware is still inoperable."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41835
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: QUEST TRU-TEC, L.P
Region: 4
City: LAPORTE State: TX
County:
License #: L03913
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: QUEST TRU-TEC, L.P
Region: 4
City: LAPORTE State: TX
County:
License #: L03913
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: LATISCHA HANSON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 07/12/2005
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2005
Notification Time: 14:49 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 12/19/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
BLAIR SPITZBERG (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
TEXAS AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - POTENTIAL OVER EXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via email:
"Texas Radiation Control received a telephone call from [the licensee's RSO] . The RSO was contacted by Landauer regarding an exposure to a 'film badge' in excess of 1,000 (one thousand) rads.
"The badge was being worn by [name deleted]. His exposure for the previous quarter was 350 millirem and for 2004 he received a total exposure of 290 Mr. The badge had been returned for evaluation with 4 other badges, which had no problems with excessive exposure.
"[The individual] only performed four tracer study jobs during the monitoring period and worked with a 34 mCi Ir-192 source. [The RSO] believes the badge was not worn. The licensee will be requesting the exposure be deleted.
"Texas Incident Investigation Program has contacted the licensee and requested additional information. A written report will be submitted within 30 days. The Event has received no media attention."
Texas Incident No.: I - 8242
***** UPDATE ON 12/19/05 AT 1830 EST from Latischa M. Hanson (via e-mail) entered by MacKinnon ******
"The licensee believes that the badge worn by (name deleted) during the first quarter of 2005 was intentionally exposed. The licensee states that the reported dose was in excess of the reporting capabilities of 1000 rad & concluded that the reported dose was not accurate. The licensee reported that (name deleted) terminated employee at the end of the first month of the quarterly monitoring period & that the employee worked with sealed sources during the first week & radiation work was performed afterward until time of termination. All jobs were short duration & neither the individual nor his single co-worker (supervisor) reported any unusual occurrences that would have resulted in a higher than normal dose. Based on the amount of the extremely high dose, the licensee concluded that the employee was not the recipient of 1000 rem (rad) dose & that the dose should be considered erroneous. Permanent dose record for (name deleted) reported by the licensee is as follows: 1st quarter 2005 - 0.349 rem; 2nd quarter 2005 - 0.100 rem.
Licensee corrective action: "No corrective actions taken or planned since reported dose appears to be incorrect. The licensee has calculated a dose of 0.100 rem for the 2nd quarter & consequently assigned this to (name deleted) permanent personnel monitoring record. This is based on the individual's previous cumulative six-month period dose of 0.593 rem, which averages to (approx) 0.100 rem/month."
R4DO (Shaffer) & NMSS EO (Essig) notified.
The State provided the following information via email:
"Texas Radiation Control received a telephone call from [the licensee's RSO] . The RSO was contacted by Landauer regarding an exposure to a 'film badge' in excess of 1,000 (one thousand) rads.
"The badge was being worn by [name deleted]. His exposure for the previous quarter was 350 millirem and for 2004 he received a total exposure of 290 Mr. The badge had been returned for evaluation with 4 other badges, which had no problems with excessive exposure.
"[The individual] only performed four tracer study jobs during the monitoring period and worked with a 34 mCi Ir-192 source. [The RSO] believes the badge was not worn. The licensee will be requesting the exposure be deleted.
"Texas Incident Investigation Program has contacted the licensee and requested additional information. A written report will be submitted within 30 days. The Event has received no media attention."
Texas Incident No.: I - 8242
***** UPDATE ON 12/19/05 AT 1830 EST from Latischa M. Hanson (via e-mail) entered by MacKinnon ******
"The licensee believes that the badge worn by (name deleted) during the first quarter of 2005 was intentionally exposed. The licensee states that the reported dose was in excess of the reporting capabilities of 1000 rad & concluded that the reported dose was not accurate. The licensee reported that (name deleted) terminated employee at the end of the first month of the quarterly monitoring period & that the employee worked with sealed sources during the first week & radiation work was performed afterward until time of termination. All jobs were short duration & neither the individual nor his single co-worker (supervisor) reported any unusual occurrences that would have resulted in a higher than normal dose. Based on the amount of the extremely high dose, the licensee concluded that the employee was not the recipient of 1000 rem (rad) dose & that the dose should be considered erroneous. Permanent dose record for (name deleted) reported by the licensee is as follows: 1st quarter 2005 - 0.349 rem; 2nd quarter 2005 - 0.100 rem.
Licensee corrective action: "No corrective actions taken or planned since reported dose appears to be incorrect. The licensee has calculated a dose of 0.100 rem for the 2nd quarter & consequently assigned this to (name deleted) permanent personnel monitoring record. This is based on the individual's previous cumulative six-month period dose of 0.593 rem, which averages to (approx) 0.100 rem/month."
R4DO (Shaffer) & NMSS EO (Essig) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41978
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MIKRON INDUSTRIES
Region: 4
City: KENT State: WA
County:
License #: WN-R0483
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Licensee: MIKRON INDUSTRIES
Region: 4
City: KENT State: WA
County:
License #: WN-R0483
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 09/09/2005
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 10:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2005
Notification Time: 04:58 [ET]
Event Date: 06/29/2005
Event Time: 10:10 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 09/11/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
DALE POWERS (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)
DALE POWERS (R4)
LAWRENCE KOKAJKO (NMSS)
BENJAMIN SANDLER (TAS)
WASHINGTON STATE AGREEMENT STATE REPORT
"This is an update and close of an event in Washington State as reported to and investigation by the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection (ORP).
"STATUS: closed
"Licensee: Mikron Industries
"City and State: Kent, Washington
"License Number: WN-R0483
"Type of License: General License Registration
"Date and time of Event: 29 June 2005, 10:10 a.m.
"Location of Event: Kent, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health, office of Radiation Protection (ORP) on-site investigation; media attention):
"ORP was notified, by telephone on 29 June 2005 by a Mikron Industries representative, the company was unable to locate 34 generally licensed Po-210 static eliminators. The devices were received between 15 May 2003 until 21 October 2004. Of the 34 devices, two are NRD Model P-2021 8101 (each originally containing 370 MBq [10 millicuries] Po-210); the remaining thirty-two are NRD Model P-2035 (each originally containing 1480 MBq [40 millicuries] of Po-210). The company seems not to know any more then that the devices are missing. ORP staff will make a site visit 30 June 2005 to help the company with their investigation.
"ORP staff performed site visits on 30 June and 8 July, 2005. Staff determined from November 2003 until about March 2005 the facility had not properly controlled the licensed material. The facility had not satisfactorily tracked receipt and disposal of the devices. During the visits, staff were able to locate 28 of the 34 missing devices. They had been set aside in work and storage areas. Recovered devices will remain secured on-site until analysis of leak tests will allow for return to the device manufacturer. ORP will follow up with Mikron to ensure proper disposition of the recovered devices. Mikron has instituted management control to ensure proper disposition of devices from now on.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240 (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: 34 devices total. 32 devices originally contained 1480 MBq [40 mCi] of Po-210, 2 devices originally contained 370 MBq [10 mCi] of Po-210. Total initial activities were 48.1 GBq [1300 mCi], decayed activity as of 29 June 2005 is 98.8 GBq [267 mCi].
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown but likely not.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number):
"34 missing NRD Models (2) P-2021 8101 & (32) P-2035 Static Eliminator Devices.
"Model Serial Number / status
"P-2021 8101 A2EA576 Found
"P-2021 8101 A2EA577 Found
"P-2035 A2EA554 Found
"P-2035 A2EA556 Found
"P-2035 A2EA557 Found
"P-2035 A2EA558 Found
"P-2035 A2EA559 Found
"P-2035 A2EA560 Found
"P-2035 A2EA561 Found
"P-2035 A2EA562 Found
"P-2035 A2EA563 Found
"P-2035 A2EA564 Found
"P-2035 A2EA565 Found
"P-2035 A2EA566 Found
"P-2035 A2EA567 Found
"P-2035 A2EA568 Found
"P-2035 A2EA569 Found
"P-2035 A2EA570 Found
"P-2035 A2EA571 Found
"P-2035 A2EA574 Found
"P-2035 A2EA575 Found
"P-2035 A2DU458 Found
"P-2035 A2DU459 Found
"P-2035 A2DU462 Found
"P-2035 A2DH035 Found
"P-2035 A2DH037 Missing
"P-2035 A2DH039 Found
"P-2035 A2DH040 Found
"P-2035 A2DH041 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA168 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA169 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA170 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA171 Missing
"Disposition/recovery:
"Disposition of the missing devices is unknown.
"Leak test?
"Initial, manufacturers leak tests are likely to have been performed. Succeeding, periodic leak tests are unknown. The 30 June 2005 site visit May determine leak test status. Leak tests taken during site visits have been sent for analysis.
Event Report "WA-05-039
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number)
N/A
"Release of activity?
Unknown
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: see above
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: unknown
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided to patient? N/A
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? No"
Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.
Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.
"This is an update and close of an event in Washington State as reported to and investigation by the Washington State Department of Health, Office of Radiation Protection (ORP).
"STATUS: closed
"Licensee: Mikron Industries
"City and State: Kent, Washington
"License Number: WN-R0483
"Type of License: General License Registration
"Date and time of Event: 29 June 2005, 10:10 a.m.
"Location of Event: Kent, Washington
"ABSTRACT: (where, when, how, why; cause, contributing factors, corrective actions, consequences, Dept. of Health, office of Radiation Protection (ORP) on-site investigation; media attention):
"ORP was notified, by telephone on 29 June 2005 by a Mikron Industries representative, the company was unable to locate 34 generally licensed Po-210 static eliminators. The devices were received between 15 May 2003 until 21 October 2004. Of the 34 devices, two are NRD Model P-2021 8101 (each originally containing 370 MBq [10 millicuries] Po-210); the remaining thirty-two are NRD Model P-2035 (each originally containing 1480 MBq [40 millicuries] of Po-210). The company seems not to know any more then that the devices are missing. ORP staff will make a site visit 30 June 2005 to help the company with their investigation.
"ORP staff performed site visits on 30 June and 8 July, 2005. Staff determined from November 2003 until about March 2005 the facility had not properly controlled the licensed material. The facility had not satisfactorily tracked receipt and disposal of the devices. During the visits, staff were able to locate 28 of the 34 missing devices. They had been set aside in work and storage areas. Recovered devices will remain secured on-site until analysis of leak tests will allow for return to the device manufacturer. ORP will follow up with Mikron to ensure proper disposition of the recovered devices. Mikron has instituted management control to ensure proper disposition of devices from now on.
"Notification Reporting Criteria: WAC 246-221-240 (24 hour notification)
"Isotope and Activity involved: 34 devices total. 32 devices originally contained 1480 MBq [40 mCi] of Po-210, 2 devices originally contained 370 MBq [10 mCi] of Po-210. Total initial activities were 48.1 GBq [1300 mCi], decayed activity as of 29 June 2005 is 98.8 GBq [267 mCi].
"Overexposures? (number of workers/members of the public; dose estimate; body part receiving dose; consequence): Unknown but likely not.
"Lost, Stolen or Damaged? (mfg., model, serial number):
"34 missing NRD Models (2) P-2021 8101 & (32) P-2035 Static Eliminator Devices.
"Model Serial Number / status
"P-2021 8101 A2EA576 Found
"P-2021 8101 A2EA577 Found
"P-2035 A2EA554 Found
"P-2035 A2EA556 Found
"P-2035 A2EA557 Found
"P-2035 A2EA558 Found
"P-2035 A2EA559 Found
"P-2035 A2EA560 Found
"P-2035 A2EA561 Found
"P-2035 A2EA562 Found
"P-2035 A2EA563 Found
"P-2035 A2EA564 Found
"P-2035 A2EA565 Found
"P-2035 A2EA566 Found
"P-2035 A2EA567 Found
"P-2035 A2EA568 Found
"P-2035 A2EA569 Found
"P-2035 A2EA570 Found
"P-2035 A2EA571 Found
"P-2035 A2EA574 Found
"P-2035 A2EA575 Found
"P-2035 A2DU458 Found
"P-2035 A2DU459 Found
"P-2035 A2DU462 Found
"P-2035 A2DH035 Found
"P-2035 A2DH037 Missing
"P-2035 A2DH039 Found
"P-2035 A2DH040 Found
"P-2035 A2DH041 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA168 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA169 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA170 Missing
"P-2035 A2DA171 Missing
"Disposition/recovery:
"Disposition of the missing devices is unknown.
"Leak test?
"Initial, manufacturers leak tests are likely to have been performed. Succeeding, periodic leak tests are unknown. The 30 June 2005 site visit May determine leak test status. Leak tests taken during site visits have been sent for analysis.
Event Report "WA-05-039
"Vehicle: (description; placards; Shipper; package type; Pkg. ID number)
N/A
"Release of activity?
Unknown
"Activity and pharmaceutical compound intended: N/A
"Misadministered activity and/or compound received: N/A
"Device (HDR, etc.) Mfg., Model; computer program: see above
"Exposure (intended/actual); consequences: unknown
"Was patient or responsible relative notified? N/A
"Was written report provided to patient? N/A
"Was referring physician notified? N/A
"Consultant used? No"
Less than the quantity of an IAEA Category 3 source.
Sources that are 'Less than IAEA Category 3 sources,' are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury.
For some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are IAEA Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.