Event Notification Report for June 15, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/14/2005 - 06/15/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41864
Rep Org: AREVA
Licensee: FRAMATOME ANP, INC
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: FRAMATOME ANP, INC
Region: 1
City: LYNCHBURG State: VA
County:
License #:
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: GAYLE ELLIOTT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 07/22/2005
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2005
Notification Time: 16:22 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 07/22/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
RICHARD CONTE (R1)
OMID TABATABAI (NRR)
MIKE ERNSTES (R2)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
PART 21 REPORT - PRESSURIZER HEATERS FROM FRAMATOME
AREVA provided the following information via facsimile.
"Reportable Defect
"(i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission: Gayle Elliott, 3315 Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, VA 24501.
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: The components that contain the defect are pressurizer heaters.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Framatome ANP, Inc. supplied pressurizer heaters with internals manufactured by Thermocoax.
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: This issue concerns installed pressurizer heaters that were supplied by Framatome ANP. The heaters in question had a deficiency that may have resulted in a portion of the heated length being located inside the pressurizer heater nozzles (sleeves). Evaluation indicates that the failure mode could cause heating of the pressure boundary base metal (pressurizer heater nozzle) above the design temperature specification.
"(v) The data on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on June 15, 2005.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Framatome ANP supplied 36 Thermocoax pressurizer heaters to Arizona Public Service for Palo Verde Unit 3 and 30 heaters to Entergy for Waterford Unit 3.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: All of the heaters supplied for Palo Verde Unit 3 have been removed from service and will not be reinstalled in the plant. All of the pressurizer heaters delivered for Waterford 3 (except for five) have been removed from service. The remaining five pressurizer heaters are currently installed in the pressurizer, however, Entergy has taken steps to preclude electrically energizing of these heaters and, therefore, the adverse conditions that could be created by the defect are precluded.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: See (vii) above."
Also see related Event # 41783
AREVA provided the following information via facsimile.
"Reportable Defect
"(i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission: Gayle Elliott, 3315 Old Forest Road, Lynchburg, VA 24501.
"(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States which fails to comply or contains a defect: The components that contain the defect are pressurizer heaters.
"(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component which fails to comply or contains a defect: Framatome ANP, Inc. supplied pressurizer heaters with internals manufactured by Thermocoax.
"(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and the safety hazard which is created or could be created by such a defect or failure to comply: This issue concerns installed pressurizer heaters that were supplied by Framatome ANP. The heaters in question had a deficiency that may have resulted in a portion of the heated length being located inside the pressurizer heater nozzles (sleeves). Evaluation indicates that the failure mode could cause heating of the pressure boundary base metal (pressurizer heater nozzle) above the design temperature specification.
"(v) The data on which the information of such a defect or failure to comply was obtained: This issue was determined to be a deviation on June 15, 2005.
"(vi) In the case of a basic component which fails to comply, the number and the location of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: Framatome ANP supplied 36 Thermocoax pressurizer heaters to Arizona Public Service for Palo Verde Unit 3 and 30 heaters to Entergy for Waterford Unit 3.
"(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken; the name of the individual or organization responsible for this action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action: All of the heaters supplied for Palo Verde Unit 3 have been removed from service and will not be reinstalled in the plant. All of the pressurizer heaters delivered for Waterford 3 (except for five) have been removed from service. The remaining five pressurizer heaters are currently installed in the pressurizer, however, Entergy has taken steps to preclude electrically energizing of these heaters and, therefore, the adverse conditions that could be created by the defect are precluded.
"(viii) Any advice related to the defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: See (vii) above."
Also see related Event # 41783
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41777
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN WEEKLEY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 06/15/2005
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2005
Event Time: 08:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2005
Notification Time: 16:06 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2005
Event Time: 08:02 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY OFFSITE FACILITY DECLARED INOPERABLE DUE TO AIR FILTRATION FAN FAILURE TO START
"On 06/15/2005 at 08:02 [CDT] the Callaway Plant declared the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) Inoperable due to the EOF air filtration fan not starting when the system was switched from Normal to Filtration Mode. This was discovered during a scheduled emergency plan drill.
"Repair of the ventilation system is being pursued in a priority manner. Compensatory measures have been put in place. The Backup Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) is available to support the Emergency Plan.
"The resident inspector was notified."
"On 06/15/2005 at 08:02 [CDT] the Callaway Plant declared the Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) Inoperable due to the EOF air filtration fan not starting when the system was switched from Normal to Filtration Mode. This was discovered during a scheduled emergency plan drill.
"Repair of the ventilation system is being pursued in a priority manner. Compensatory measures have been put in place. The Backup Emergency Offsite Facility (EOF) is available to support the Emergency Plan.
"The resident inspector was notified."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41779
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: FRED SCHILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: FRED SCHILL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 06/15/2005
Notification Time: 18:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2005
Event Time: 14:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2005
Notification Time: 18:38 [ET]
Event Date: 06/15/2005
Event Time: 14:00 [PDT]
Last Update Date: 06/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO TURBINE THROTTLE VALVE CLOSURE
"On June 15, 2005 at 1400 PDT Columbia Generating Station experienced a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while operating at full power. Currently, reactor level is being controlled with the feedwater system and reactor pressure is being controlled via the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. All safety systems functioned as expected and there was no ECCS system injection. The initial attempt to trip the main turbine from the control room was unsuccessful and it was subsequently tripped locally. At this time the plant is stable and indications show that the RPS actuation originated from closure of turbine throttle valves. Determination of the cause of the RPS actuation is ongoing at this time."
All rods fully inserted and no relief valves lifted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
"On June 15, 2005 at 1400 PDT Columbia Generating Station experienced a Reactor Protection System (RPS) actuation while operating at full power. Currently, reactor level is being controlled with the feedwater system and reactor pressure is being controlled via the turbine bypass valves to the condenser. All safety systems functioned as expected and there was no ECCS system injection. The initial attempt to trip the main turbine from the control room was unsuccessful and it was subsequently tripped locally. At this time the plant is stable and indications show that the RPS actuation originated from closure of turbine throttle valves. Determination of the cause of the RPS actuation is ongoing at this time."
All rods fully inserted and no relief valves lifted.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.