Event Notification Report for June 07, 2005

TWENTY-EIGHT EARLY WARNING SIRENS TEMPORARILY INOPERABLE

"On June 7th 2005 at 20:00 hours our EWSS System performed an automated poll of active Early Warning Sirens. Normally this action is completed in 15 to 20 minutes. This polling indicated not all sirens had responded to the automated signal. Emergency planning department personnel were notified and called to site to determine system status. Their attempts to manually poll the active sirens determined that twenty eight (28) sirens were not responding. Our EWSS system consists of one hundred six (106) sirens. A loss of twenty eight (28) sirens left our system at seventy three percent (73%) of its capacity. South Carolina state and the four (4) local counties were notified of the systems condition within one hour as required by our Nuclear Licensing procedure (NL-122). This same procedure requires an eight (8) hour telephone notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This requirement is based on 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At 00:15 hours June 8th 2005 our communications department located the faulty siren and disabled its radio transponder, this action restored the other twenty seven (27) sirens to service. This restoration was verified by performing a manual poll of active sirens. The South Carolina state and local counties were notified of system restoration.

"During the evening hours of June 7th 2005 a thunder storm passed through the station's ten (10) mile emergency planning zone. One siren, Fairfield fifty two (F-52) had apparently been struck by lightning and caused its radio transponder to go into a continuous transmit mode. This errant radio signal blocked the polling signal from the other twenty seven (27) sirens. Based on communications department report had the EWSS system been actuated those twenty eight (28) sirens would not have sounded as required."

The licensee has notified State and local authorities as well as the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM SUSAN REESE TO JOE O'HARA ON 12/21/06 AT 1013 * * *

"On June 7th 2005 at 20:00 hours our EWSS System performed an automated poll of active Early Warning Sirens. Normally this action is completed in 15 to 20 minutes. This polling indicated not all sirens had responded to the automated signal. Emergency planning department personnel were notified and called to site to determine system status. Their attempts to manually poll the active sirens determined that twenty eight (28) sirens were not responding. Our EWSS system consists of one hundred six (106) sirens. A loss of twenty eight (28) sirens left our system at seventy three percent (73%) of its capacity. South Carolina state and the four (4) local counties were notified of the systems condition within one hour as required by our Nuclear Licensing procedure (NL-122). This same procedure requires an eight (8) hour telephone notification to the Nuclear Regulatory Commission. This requirement is based on 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii).

"At 00:15 hours June 8th 2005 our communications department located the faulty siren and disabled its radio transponder, this action restored the other twenty seven (27) sirens to service. This restoration was verified by performing a manual poll of active sirens. The South Carolina state and local counties were notified of system restoration.

"During the evening hours of June 7th 2005 a thunder storm passed through the station's ten (10) mile emergency planning zone. One siren, Fairfield fifty two (F-52) had apparently been struck by lightning and caused its radio transponder to go into a continuous transmit mode. This errant radio signal blocked the polling signal from the other twenty seven (27) sirens. Based on the licensee's Communications Department Report, if the EWSS had been actuated, all sirens, except the faulty siren struck by lightning would have activated. However, the siren feedback system may not have been able to determine if all sirens activated."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (Munday)

PART 21 REPORT INVOLVING A POTENTIAL FOR PREMATURE FAILURE OF CONTROL ROD INSTRUMENTATION POWER SUPPLY

Ametek Solid State Controls produces AC-DC power supplies that are used at several nuclear power plants. Ametek states that its Series AC-DC power supplies may have a problem with premature failure. The specific Model Numbers affected are as follows:

85-RP1510-00
85-RP4804-00
85-RP4808-00
85-RP DUAL-4807\1

Ametek states that an intermittent loss of continuity in a magnet wire connector may cause overheating in a lug and transformer which could eventually result in a premature failure of the power supply ( within approximately two years of initial service). The problem was discovered during testing of a power supplies by Ametek. No nuclear power plants have reported any problems with the power supplies.

Ametek states that its records indicate that these power supplies were supplied to Braidwood, Byron, and DC Cook.

Ametek believes that the power supplies are used for control rod instrumentation. A total of 33 power supplies have been sold but Ametek believes that most of these are not in service. Ametek recommends that these power supplies either be returned to Ametek for rework or that the affected sites request a service by an Ametek representative onsite.

OFFSITE NOTIFICATION - OIL SPILL AT PLANT LIQUID DISCHARGE

"An oil spill has been reported at the plant liquid discharge to Lake Wylie. The on-site Hazmat Team has responded to the scene. The spill is contained within the discharge cove and cleanup is on-going. The source of the spill is unknown at this time. South Carolina Dept. of Health and Environmental Control and the National Spill Response Center were notified at approximately 1030. Off-site assistance is being requested for cleanup of the spill.

The quantity of oil spilled has not yet been determined. The licensee has notified York, Gaston, and Mecklenburg Counties and the NRC Resident Inspector.

UNANALYZED POTENTIAL IMPACT ON EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATOR OPERABILITY

"At 1125 on 6/7/2005 it was determined that the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B were out of service due to the possibility of Tornado Missiles potentially collapsing the D/G Fuel Oil Tank Vents. The Emergency Diesel Generators are required as a support system for RHR Decay Heat Removal and RHR was also declared inoperable at the same time. Technical Specification requirements for RHR Decay Heat Removal are, if less than the required number of heat sinks are operable, then corrective action shall be taken immediately to restore the minimum number to operable status. Actions are being taken to restore full operability of the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B.

"Currently RHR is operating and providing decay heat removal and Emergency Diesel Generators are available as a support system for RHR. Event Report # 41528 had similar issues associated with the Emergency Diesel Generators exhaust ducts and their ability to withstand tornado forces."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM G. RISTE TO P. SNYDER ON 7/26/05 AT 1541 * * *

"Event Notice #41752 was initiated on 6/7/2005 to report an unanalyzed condition with the Emergency Diesel Generators A and B. The initial analysis for tornado missile strike probability results for the Emergency Diesel Generator fuel oil tank vent lines indicated they could be damaged by a tornado missile to the point they would potentially adversely affect Diesel operability.

"Additional analysis was performed and it was determined that the original fuel tank oil vent line configuration was acceptable."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Mark Ring).

UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED DUE TO UNIDENTIFIED DRYWELL LEAKAGE GREATER THAN 10 GPM

"Hope Creek manually scrammed the reactor from 100% power at 1413 and declared an Unusual Event due to unidentified drywell leakage exceeding 10 gpm (EAL 2.1.1.b) at 1437. The drywell unidentified leak rate peaked at approximately 15 gpm and is currently 12 gpm and slowly lowering. All safety systems were operable prior to the transient and responded as expected. Drywell pressure peaked at approximately 0.5 psig and is steady using normal drywell cooling (the normal pressure band is 0.1 to 0.7 psig). Drywell and suppression pools sprays were not required to mitigate the drywell pressure transient. Reactor vessel level lowered to approximately -30 inches following the scram and was returned to the normal level band using the feedwater and condensate systems. The expected vessel level 3 (setpoint +12.5 inches) ESF actuations occurred. The plant is proceeding to cold shutdown to investigate the drywell leak."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE BY NRC (HOLIAN) TO HUFFMAN AT 0330 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

As of 0330, Region I IRC in consultation with NRC/IRD (McGinty) secured from Monitoring Mode based on the plant being stable at about 55 psig (about 300 degrees F) and preparing to initiate shutdown cooling. The leak rate remains at about 8 gpm, and an initial drywell entry determined the source of the leakage to be from the A-loop of shutdown cooling testable check valve (50A ). The valve was found with the position indication failed/separated and an approximate 20 foot plume of steam/liquid coming out. Plans are to continue to cool down the plant, go onto the B-loop of shutdown cooling , and isolate valve 50A. The licensee has conservatively remained in the UE and plans to exit when leak rate is assured to remain below 10 gpm (EAL entry condition) or cold shutdown is achieved and the EAL is no longer applicable.

The licensee's outage center remains manned, and an NRC inspector remains on site around the clock.

DHS (Hoisington), FEMA (Sweetser), DOE (Turner) EPA (Crews), USDA (Pimmons), HHS (Williams) were notified.

* * * UPDATE BY NRC (MANGAN - RG 1) TO HUFFMAN AT 0500 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

The licensee has placed RHR loop B into service and reached Mode 4 (cold shutdown) at 0455. Preparations are in progress to isolate the leak by closing manual valve 183.

* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (WILSON) TO HUFFMAN AT 0530 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

The licensee terminated the Unusual Event at 0515 EDT based on reaching cold shutdown with the leak rate less than 10 gpm.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. DHS (Hoisington) and FEMA (Sweetser), R1D0 (Jackson), NRR EO (Hannon), and IRD (Leach) notified.

* * * UPDATE FROM LICENSEE (BAUER) TO HUFFMAN AT 1101 EDT ON 6/08/05 * * *

"On the morning; of 06/08/05, investigation into a previously reported increase in unidentified drywell leakage (Event #41753) identified the leak location as the F050A residual heat removal (RHR) check valve. The F050A check valve is on the return line to the 'A' recirculation loop,. The F050A check valve was isolated at approximately 0545 hours. The position indication magnatrol assembly for the F050A check valve appears to be the source of the leakage. Additional investigation is proceeding to identify the exact location of the leak as well as address the structural integrity of the valve.

"This updated report is being made in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii). At the time of this notification Hope Creek Generating station is in OPCON 4 [Cold Shutdown] at 122 degrees reactor coolant temperature."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. R1DO (Jackson) and NRR EO (Jung) notified.

APPENDIX R SAFE SHUTDOWN STRATEGY DEFICIENCY

"This report is a result of an ongoing evaluation of a previously identified deficiency with the Appendix R Safe Shutdown Strategy with respect to use of charging pumps for a fire in Fire Area A06, 1B-32 480V MCC area.

"This issue was originally identified on April 8, 2005 during work on the Fire Probabilistic Risk Assessment Project. This was entered into the Point Beach Corrective Action Program, and compensatory fire rounds were initiated.

"A postulated fire in the east side of the MCC 1 B-32 could damage both the power and the control cables for charging pumps 1 P-2A and 1 P-2B, and the control cables for redundant charging pump 1 P-2C. The resultant condition of the 1 P-2C charging pump control circuit could prevent operation of this pump as directed in the Safe Shutdown Analysis and FOP 1.2, Potential Fire Effected Safe Shutdown Components. The condition exists as the result of a lack of physical cable separation for power and control cables for the Unit 1 charging pumps. An Operability recommendation was performed for this issue and determined that the condition was Operable but Non-Conforming.

"Based on a continuing review of further information related to this condition, it has been determined that this condition is reportable based on the resultant effect on available charging pump capability. The condition could have resulted in losing the availability of all but a single charging pump operating at slow speed, which would not provide sufficient reactor coolant pump seal cooling, and thereby degrade the level of plant safety. The identified condition requires a revision to the Safe Shutdown Analysis.

"Plant fire mitigation procedure changes to ensure adequate charging pump capability, and reactor coolant pump seal cooling have been made. The Safe Shutdown Analysis will be revised."

The Resident Inspector will be notified.