Event Notification Report for June 03, 2005

DECLARED UNUSUAL EVENT DUE TO RCS LEAKAGE IN EXCESS OF TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION LIMIT

"Declared Unusual Event due to RCS leakage greater than 10 gallons per minute. VCT level is lowering with constant plant temperature, pressure and pressurizer level. VCT level lowering at approximately 19 gallons per minute with associated rise in RWST level approximately 20 gallons per minute."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE FROM MELIN TO W. GOTT AT 0120 ON 06/03/05 * * *

The licensee briefed NRC Management (McGinty, P. Hiland, R. Haag, J Munday) that the leakage was verified to be CVCS leakage and not RCS leakage. The leakage was stopped at 0055 and the licensee is evaluating termination/retraction criteria. NRC will not enter Monitoring Mode.


* * * UPDATE FROM G MELIN TO W. GOTT AT 0140 ON 06/03/05 * * *

"At 0055, leakage stopped. Leakage verified to be CVCS leakage, not RCS. The leakage is stopped. Validating no other anomalies exist then will evaluate termination and retraction of UE notification."


* * * UPDATE FROM G MELIN TO P. SNYDER AT 0221 ON 06/03/05 * * *

"Notification of termination of Unusual Event at 0221. Plant validation complete. RCS gross leakage is 0.07 gallon per minute and plant parameters are stable. Leakage confirmed to be from CVCS system which has been isolated."

The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R2DO (R. Haag), NRR EO (P. Hiland), IRD (T. McGinty), R2 (J. Munday), DHS (I. Lee), FEMA (C. Ligget), and DOE (M. Smith)


* * * UPDATE ON 6/15/05 @ 1243 FROM JIM SPEICHER TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION

Event Notice 41743 reported declaration of an Unusual Event at 00:33 on 6/3/05 for RCS leakage in excess of Technical Specification Limits. The source of leakage was subsequently determined to be from the Chemical and Volume Control System (CVCS) and not from the RCS. The Unusual Event was terminated at 02:00 6/3/05 after the leak was isolated.

This event is retracted since the source of the leakage was not from the RCS and upon further review the event did not meet reporting requirements.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified. RDO (Tom Decker), EO (M. Mayfield) and IRD (Peter Wilson) were notified

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

The gauge was damaged by a construction vehicle while the moisture density gauge was in use. The probe was not extended at the time of the accident. There was no release from the radioactive source. The state will follow up with the licensee.

Troxler Serial 28753
Sources: Am-241 40milliCuries
Cs-137 8 milliCuries

Texas Incident Number: I-8235

FITNESS FOR DUTY - NON-LICENSED SUPERVISOR FAILED BREATHALYZER

A non-licensed employee supervisor had a confirmed positive for alcohol during a random fitness for duty test. The employee's access to the plant has been terminated. Contact the Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - INSTRUMENT SOURCE FAILURE AND SOURCE MATERIAL PLACED IN UNCONTROLLED STORAGE LOCATION

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On Monday, June 6, 2005, the Department received a call from the RSO for Martek Biosciences Boulder. He was reporting an incident that occurred at his facility on Friday, June 3, 2005.

"Martek Biosciences is a small research laboratory authorized to used milliCurie quantities of P-32, C-14, and H-3. Martek has a Beckman model 3801 liquid scintillation counter. The counter contains an internal 30 microCurie Cs-137 calibration source.

"The licensee's RSO reported that the liquid scintillation counter had been producing unusual results and a request for service was made to Beckman. A Beckman serviceman arrived at the facility on Friday to replace the 30 microCurie Cs-137 source. He came without survey equipment and did not have a lab coat. On disassembly of the device for source removal and replacement, it was determined that the source had disintegrated. The licensee RSO surveyed his facility and found contamination on the floor and the lab coat he had loaned to the Beckman serviceman. He decontaminated the areas where he found contamination.

"The Department contacted the Beckman serviceman by phone to discuss the incident. He indicated that the remains of the source and some of the contaminated lead shielding had been packaged and removed from the facility. This package was being stored in a rented storage facility pending return to Beckman. The Beckman serviceman did not know the exact address of the storage facility. At the time of the phone conversation, the Beckman serviceman was on vacation and was heading out of state. He was confident that there was no concern for contamination of the package or himself due to the surveys conducted by the licensee RSO.

"The Department contacted Beckman to obtain additional information on the 3801 liquid scintillation counter. He indicated that this device is generally licensed and is equivalent to the model 5801. The Beckman representative provided a copy of his California license and a copy of the request to amend the device registry sheet for the liquid scintillation counter. Apparently, Beckman is aware of other source failures for the liquid scintillation counter and has asked for a limited operational life of the source. The Beckman representative was not able to provide the actual address for the storage facility and he could not provide the names of any other service representatives in Colorado who might have access to the storage shed. He indicated that he would provide that information the next day.

"Tuesday, June 7, 2005: In phone messages from the Beckman representative the Department received the address of the storage facility and name of the regional service manager for Beckman.

"Wednesday, June 8, 2005: The Department received a call from the Beckman service manager. He indicated that there are two service representatives who have the key to the storage shed. The two Colorado service representatives are the only persons with the keys to the storage shed. One of the Beckman service representatives is out of state and a second is currently in Albuquerque, NM.

"The Beckman service manager indicated that the Beckman serviceman should not have removed the source from the Martek facility. He also indicated that the shed did not contain any other sources and that it was only used for the storage of parts. One of the Beckman service representative is expected to return to Denver on Thursday morning. He will open the shed for inspection by the Department.

"Additional data to be provided to complete this report pending the inspection at Martek and the storage facility."

HALF SCRAM ON VOLTAGE REGULATOR FAILURE

"On June 3, 2005 at approximately 1705, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant (JAF) operating at 100% reactor power, a failure of the 'A' Reactor Protection System (RPS) motor generator voltage regulator occurred, resulting in a loss of power to the 'A' RPS bus, a half scram and multiple system isolations. The voltage transient caused by Technical Specification required RPS testing revealed the voltage regulator failure. Appropriate actions were taken in accordance with Abnormal Operating Procedure (AOP)-59, Loss of RPS Bus. All equipment operated as designed as a result of the loss of power to the RPS bus.

"At 1744, the 'A' RPS bus was placed on the alternate power supply and the half scram was reset. The Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) isolation signal was reset at 1805 and restoration of the various isolated systems commenced shortly thereafter. The reactor remained at 100% reactor power throughout the event and Limiting Conditions for Operation were entered for the affected equipment as required.

"The above event meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(a) since the loss of RPS bus resulted in general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system. The following systems or components isolated as a result of the loss of RPS bus:

"Reactor Water Cleanup, Reactor Building Ventilation, 'A' Containment Atmosphere Dilution, Torus Vent and Purge, Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain Sumps, 'A' Drywell Containment Atmospheric Monitors, Recirculation System Sample Line, Main Steam Line Drains, Residual Heat Removal drain valve to radwaste, Standby Gas Treatment (auto Initiated).

"Since the signal was invalid (the result of loss of power vs, an actual containment isolation condition), this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1) for being reported as a 60 day telephone notification In lieu of a written LER.

"The event was entered into the corrective action program. The loss of the 'A' RPS bus was caused by the failure of a uni-junction transistor (UJT) in the voltage regulator of the 'A' RPS motor generator, which resulted in an overvoltage condition and resultant protective trip. The voltage regulator was replaced with a spare from stock with a UJT from a different manufacturer. Other corrective actions include changing manufacturer's of the UJT (the former vendor no longer makes this UJT), and replacing the 'B' motor generator and alternate power supply voltage regulators with ones having new UJTs."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the state Public Service Commission.