Event Notification Report for June 02, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
06/01/2005 - 06/02/2005
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 41823
Rep Org: H AND G INSPECTION COMPANY
Licensee: H AND G INSPECTION COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EVANSTON State: WY
County:
License #: 42-26838-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG KONIECZNY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: H AND G INSPECTION COMPANY
Region: 4
City: EVANSTON State: WY
County:
License #: 42-26838-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: CRAIG KONIECZNY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 07/06/2005
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2005
Notification Time: 15:15 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [MDT]
Last Update Date: 07/06/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(a)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 25 REM
Person (Organization):
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
THOMAS FARNHOLTZ (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE
The dosimeter (film badge) for a dismissed employee at H and G Industrial Company, an industrial radiographer, was read and indicated 1000 Rads exposure. 1000 Rads is the maximum dose this type of dosimeter can read. The employee was dismissed on 06/02/05. The dosimeter was sent for reading on about 06/17/05 and the readings were reported today 07/06/05. The employee was contacted and has agreed to take a blood test. The employee shows no signs of receiving this amount of exposure. The employee thinks that another employee took his dosimeter and exposed it. Self reading dosimeters used for this time period indicate an exposure of 200 millirem. None of the assistants who worked with this employee received an abnormal exposure. The licensee continues to investigate.
The dosimeter (film badge) for a dismissed employee at H and G Industrial Company, an industrial radiographer, was read and indicated 1000 Rads exposure. 1000 Rads is the maximum dose this type of dosimeter can read. The employee was dismissed on 06/02/05. The dosimeter was sent for reading on about 06/17/05 and the readings were reported today 07/06/05. The employee was contacted and has agreed to take a blood test. The employee shows no signs of receiving this amount of exposure. The employee thinks that another employee took his dosimeter and exposed it. Self reading dosimeters used for this time period indicate an exposure of 200 millirem. None of the assistants who worked with this employee received an abnormal exposure. The licensee continues to investigate.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41742
Facility: DUANE ARNOLD
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HANS OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Region: 3 State: IA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: HANS OLSON
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 06/02/2005
Notification Time: 21:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: 17:49 [CST]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2005
Notification Time: 21:51 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: 17:49 [CST]
Last Update Date: 06/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
SONIA BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 94 | Power Operation | 94 | Power Operation |
APPENDIX R ASSESSMENT ON REMOTE SHUTDOWN PANEL
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"On 6/2/05, while performing an Appendix 'R' assessment, it was determined that the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, as required by Appendix 'R', has not been adequately demonstrated. Specifically, a postulated fire requiring the evacuation of the Control Room could also cause a spurious hot short in the protective relaying circuitry for the credited division of essential electrical power and subsequent loss of that division. It was recently determined that the hot short could occur at anytime during the transient, whereas previous evaluations had assumed any such hot short would be associated with the initiating event. Consequently, existing compensatory measures would only be implemented if the adverse consequences were apparent, and therefore might not be implemented within the timeframe required to assure satisfactory results. The result is that Appendix 'R' requirements are not met, and an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety may exist.
"A 30 day LCO was entered at 1749 per Tech Spec LCO 3.3.3.2 Function 4.e for the Remote Shutdown Panel 'B' Essential 4160 Instrumentation transfer and control."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"On 6/2/05, while performing an Appendix 'R' assessment, it was determined that the capability to achieve and maintain safe shutdown conditions, as required by Appendix 'R', has not been adequately demonstrated. Specifically, a postulated fire requiring the evacuation of the Control Room could also cause a spurious hot short in the protective relaying circuitry for the credited division of essential electrical power and subsequent loss of that division. It was recently determined that the hot short could occur at anytime during the transient, whereas previous evaluations had assumed any such hot short would be associated with the initiating event. Consequently, existing compensatory measures would only be implemented if the adverse consequences were apparent, and therefore might not be implemented within the timeframe required to assure satisfactory results. The result is that Appendix 'R' requirements are not met, and an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety may exist.
"A 30 day LCO was entered at 1749 per Tech Spec LCO 3.3.3.2 Function 4.e for the Remote Shutdown Panel 'B' Essential 4160 Instrumentation transfer and control."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 42503
Rep Org: KANSAS DEPT OF HEALTH & ENVIRONMENT
Licensee: ROSEL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: State: KS
County: CLARK COUNTY
License #: 27-C057-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WHITFILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Licensee: ROSEL COMPANY
Region: 4
City: State: KS
County: CLARK COUNTY
License #: 27-C057-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: DAVID WHITFILL
HQ OPS Officer: MARK ABRAMOVITZ
Notification Date: 04/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2006
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 06/02/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 04/14/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - ABANDONED WELL LOGGING SOURCE
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"06/03/05: High Bluff Operating, LLC reported The Rosel Company of Liberal, Kansas lost a logging tool downhole in Clark County, Kansas. The logging cable broke, and the tool dropped to a depth of 5866 feet. The tool was 'fished' from the hole, but the density pad broke off the tool and stayed in the hole. An experienced 'fishing tool expert' recommended that cement the possible source in place.
"[High Bluff] proposes: 75' of red dyed cement on top of the pad with a 'whipstock' device preventing reentry of the hole. Set 5740 feet of production casing to prevent deepening. Post at the wellhead a plaque noting the required Information.
"06/04/05: [Kansas] replied to [High Bluff] and concurred with his plan.
"11/01/05: [High Bluff] sent in his final report. Correct the final depth to 5856'. Modified the plan of action to be 5710 feet of casing and 146 feet of red dyed cement by Allied Cement. The plaque was still awaiting production and placement.
"11/11/05: [High Bluff] reported the plaque was unacceptable, and a new plaque was being made.
"03/22/06: Received cd-rom of digital pictures taken of well site, time stamped 03/13/2006. Plaque meets general requirements. Event considered closed."
Source: 2 Curie Cs-137, Serial Number CSV-K98 manufactured by Gulf Nuclear
Kansas Report Number: KS050022
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"06/03/05: High Bluff Operating, LLC reported The Rosel Company of Liberal, Kansas lost a logging tool downhole in Clark County, Kansas. The logging cable broke, and the tool dropped to a depth of 5866 feet. The tool was 'fished' from the hole, but the density pad broke off the tool and stayed in the hole. An experienced 'fishing tool expert' recommended that cement the possible source in place.
"[High Bluff] proposes: 75' of red dyed cement on top of the pad with a 'whipstock' device preventing reentry of the hole. Set 5740 feet of production casing to prevent deepening. Post at the wellhead a plaque noting the required Information.
"06/04/05: [Kansas] replied to [High Bluff] and concurred with his plan.
"11/01/05: [High Bluff] sent in his final report. Correct the final depth to 5856'. Modified the plan of action to be 5710 feet of casing and 146 feet of red dyed cement by Allied Cement. The plaque was still awaiting production and placement.
"11/11/05: [High Bluff] reported the plaque was unacceptable, and a new plaque was being made.
"03/22/06: Received cd-rom of digital pictures taken of well site, time stamped 03/13/2006. Plaque meets general requirements. Event considered closed."
Source: 2 Curie Cs-137, Serial Number CSV-K98 manufactured by Gulf Nuclear
Kansas Report Number: KS050022