Event Notification Report for May 13, 2005

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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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MEDIA INQUIRY RESPONSE - CONCURRENT EVENT

"This concurrent report is being made to the NRC as a result of a media inquiry response concerning BWXT site security that was provided to [reporter representing] the Lynchburg News & Advance."

See Headquarters Operations Officer for additional details.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 05/11/08 BY H. Crouch * * *

THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.

This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
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UNANALYZED CONDITION - ELECTRICAL CONTAINMENT PENETRATION

"On March 23, 2005, with the plant at 100% power, an issue was discovered questioning the design of an approximately 3-inch diameter module of containment electrical penetration (PBP5D) used to feed a non-safety related lighting panel (L49E1) inside the containment building. Specifically, it was identified that this penetration module was protected from overcurrent by a single 30-amp breaker (BF503). Action was taken at that time to open the supply breakers de-energizing the lighting panel to prevent any potential fault on the subject penetration module while the issue was being evaluated.

"Evaluations were initiated to determine the potential for the containment electrical penetration module to be thermally or mechanically damaged by a postulated fault. During this evaluation, no weak link upstream of the penetration module could be found that could be credited for preventing a fault in the penetration module in the event of a random failure of the breaker. The next breaker upstream of this circuit is too large to provide adequate overcurrent protection if the 30-amp breaker fails to open. Furthermore, it could not be shown that the electrical penetration module could withstand the maximum possible fault current while maintaining its containment integrity function. Therefore, it is now assumed that this postulated fault current could have damaged the penetration module to the extent that it would no longer have performed its containment integrity function.

"This condition is being reported within 8 hours of discovery in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) as the nuclear power plant being in an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety. Specifically, it was discovered that a system required to meet the single failure criterion does not do so."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE

A CPN moisture density gauge fell off the back of the company pickup truck. The case was not secured to the truck, the case was not locked, and the gauge handle was not locked. The truck drove 40 miles to the next job site and the truck tailgate was found down and the gauge was discovered missing. Upon return to the original job site (Notting Hill development in Edgewood, KY), the case was found but the gauge was missing. The licensee contacted local law enforcement, the fire department and ambulances to help recover the gauge. A reward has been offered.

CPN Moisture Density Gauge model MC1DR, Serial #MD50402557
Sources: CS-137 10 milliCuries, Am-241:Be 50 milliCuries

RECOVERY OF STRONTIUM-90 SOURCE (APPROXIMATELY 4 MILLICURIES) FROM SCRAP YARD

Radioactive material was detected in scrap metal waste delivered to a scrap yard (Shredded Products, Montvale VA) on 5/13/05. The scrap yard notified the State of Virginia Department of Health. The State Department of Health, with the assistance of a contractor (Physics Associates) located the radioactive material. The radioactive material was a sealed source of Strontium-90 used in a thickness measuring gauge.

Identification marking on the Strontium-90 source indicate that it was a 10 millicurie source in 1967. Based on current radiation measurements, the source strength is estimated at about 4 millicuries. The source has been verified to be intact and not leaking and is safely in possession of Physics Associates (licensed to posses this material).

Region 1 (Ragland) provided additional information on the Sr-90 source based on information received from the State of Virginia. The gauge is believed to be a Model 32-19-001, Serial Number 384-41044, manufactured by Avionics Corporation. The origin of the scrap shipment is reported to be from a scrap yard in Salem, Virginia.