Event Notification Report for May 12, 2005

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST AND RECOVERED SOURCE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"On the evening of May 12, 2005, Superior Energy Services lost a tool string with a 150 mCi [millicuries] source of Am-241 downhole at about 11,000 feet. Superior's slickline division fished for the tool and recovered the tool string and source on May 14, 2005 with no damage to the source housing. The onsite technician surveyed the tool and did not find any radiation leakage from the housing. The source was returned to the storage location and surveyed again before putting the source in the bunker. No radiation leakage was detected.

"Louisiana Event Report ID No.: LA050005"

AGREEMENT STATE - STOLEN TROXLER GAUGE

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"The SC Department of Health and Environmental Control was notified on May 12, 2005, by the Corporate RSO of PSI [Professional Service Industries, Inc.] that a portable gauging device had been stolen from the back of a pick-up truck at the Residence Inn Marriot in Spartanburg, South Carolina. The gauge was located in its transportation case chained to the bed of the truck. The chain had been cut and the gauge and transportation case had been removed. The technician discovered the gauge missing at 7:45 am on May 12, 2005 and notified the police. The gauge is a Troxler Model 3430 containing 9 mCi of Cesium-137 and 44 mCi of Am-241:Be. The local media has also been notified. Updates to this event will be made through the national NMED system."

South Carolina State Event Report ID No.: SC050005

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - NUCLEAR GAUGE FAILS TO FUNCTION AS DESIGNED

The State provided the following information via facsimile:

"The RSO contacted the DHFS, Radiation Protection Section on May 12, 2005 to report a damaged shutter on a fixed gauge at their facility. The gauge is a Berthold Model LB7400D containing 350 mCi of Cs-137, SN DW954A.

"The licensee discovered the problem when they were preparing to do some maintenance work on the gauge. The detector was giving erroneous readings. The licensee observed higher radiation levels (12 Mr/hr on contact with the source holder) with the shutter in the 'closed' position than the 'open' position, (6 Mr/hr on contact with the source holder.) The licensee assumed that the shutter had failed.

"Berthold has been contacted and will provide a service visit on May 17 or 18. The gauge is in the same configuration as in operations. Access is restricted by a fence around the area, including a lock with keypad entry. The inspector who recently visited the licensee confirms that access is restricted. The gauge is on Line 5 at the Superior Terminal, Enbridge Pipeline.

"The licensee will send the required report following the service visit."

* * * RETRACTION FROM M. WELLING TO W. GOTT AT 1515 ON 07/18/05 * * *

"Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section would like to retract event number EN41696, Enbridge Pipeline, LLC. After reviewing the in-question housing, Berthold states that there is nothing wrong with the source housing. It appears to be an error on the licensee determining if the shutter was open or closed."

Notified NMSS (M. Burgess) and R3DO (P. Louden)

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO LOSS OF EMERGENCY BUS E1

"On May 12, 2005, at 0411 hours, electrical power was lost to the 4160 VAC Emergency Bus E1. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was inoperable for maintenance at the time of the electrical power loss. This power loss to Emergency Bus E1 affected both Units 1 and 2.

Unit 1

"The loss of power to E1 resulted in Division 1 Primary Containment Isolation Valve (PCIV) actuations. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 2 (i.e., Drywell Equipment and Floor Drain, Traversing In-core Probe, Residual Heat Removal (RHR) Discharge to Radwaste, and RHR Process Sample), Group 3 (i.e., Reactor Water Cleanup), and Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, as well as the Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation) and the automatic start of Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System train B. The actuations of PCIVs and Reactor Building Ventilation System isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System train B started and functioned successfully.

"Loss of power to E1 also resulted in entry into LCO 3.0.3 (i.e., be in Mode 2 within 7 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 37 hours) due to all required reactor coolant leakage detection instrumentation/systems being inoperable.

"At 0440 hours, it was discovered that all three Control Room Air Conditioning (AC) subsystems became inoperable due to failure of the control building air compressors and Technical Specification LCO 3.0.3 was entered. At 0515 hours, it was determined that both Control Room Emergency Ventilation (CREV) subsystems became inoperable when the dampers drifted shut. At 0546 hours, a control building air compressor was started and the control room air conditioning and CREV subsystems were returned to operable status.

"Operators initiated a plant shutdown for Unit 1, as required by Technical Specifications at 0948 hours.

Unit 2

"Conditions and activities associated with the Control Room AC and CREV systems apply to Unit 2 as well as Unit 1.

Reporting Requirements Met by this Notification

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(2)(1), the initiation of any nuclear plant shutdown required by the plant's Technical Specifications, applies to Unit 1.

"10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D), a condition that, at the time of discovery, could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of systems that are needed to mitigate the consequences of an accident (i.e., Control Room AC and CREV), applies to both Units 1 and 2.

"10 CFR 50.73(a)(i), invalid actuation of general containment isolation signals affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system, applies to Unit 1.

INITIAL SAFETY SIGNIFICANCE EVALUATION

"Currently Unit 2 is operating at steady state with Unit 1 being shut down. Specified systems actuated as designed. No adverse impact to the control room environment occurred during the period (i.e., one hour and 35 minutes) the affected ventilation system was inoperable. The other redundant emergency busses are operable. Prior to the event reactor coolant leakage level for Unit 1 was well within operating limits. The actions as required by the applicable Technical Specifications have been established.

CORRECTIVE ACTIONS

"Activities are currently under way to determine the cause of the E1 power loss and restore electrical power to Emergency Bus E1. Causes and actions to preclude recurrence will be addressed in accordance with the corrective action program and provided to the NRC in the associated licensee event report."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * UPDATE ON 05/13/05 @ 0952 BY LEONARD BELLER TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * *

"On May 12, 2005, at 0411 hours, electrical power was lost to the 4160 VAC Emergency Bus E1. Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was inoperable for maintenance at the time of the electrical power loss. This power loss to Emergency Bus E1 affected both Units 1 and 2. A non-emergency notification (Event Number 41692) was made to the NRC Operations Center at 112:2 hours. This follow-up notification discusses plant recovery from the Emergency Bus E1 power loss.

"Unit 1

"Loss of power to E1 resulted in entry, into LCO 3.0.3 (i.e., be in Mode 2 within 7 hours, Mode 3 within 13 hours, and Mode 4 within 39 hours) due to all required reactor coolant system (RCS) leakage detection instrumentation being inoperable. Operators initiated a plant shutdown for Unit 1, as required by Technical Specifications at 0948 hours. A Notice of Enforcement Discretion (NOED) was requested from the NRC to waive compliance with the shutdown requirements associated with RCS leakage detection instrumentation in order to provide more time for an orderly plant shutdown. In lieu of the RCS leakage detection shutdown requirements (i.e., be in Mode 2 by 1111 hours), Unit 1 would adhere to the shutdown requirements associated with loss of Emergency Bus E1 (i.e.,, be in Mode 3 by May 13, 2005, at 0011 hours). The requested NOED was verbally granted by the NRC on May 12, 2005 at 1050 hours, so shutdown activities for Unit 1 continued versus the insertion of a manual reactor scram, with the unit at approximately 65 percent of rated thermal power.

"Power was restored to Emergency Bus E1 and the LCO associated with RCS leakage detection instrumentation was exited on May 12, 2005 at 1740 hours. The LCO associated with loss of power to Emergency Bus E1 was exited at 2015 hours.

"Unit 2

"The LCO associated with loss of power to Emergency Bus E1 also applied to Unit 2, and was exited at 2015 hours,

"CORRECTIVE ACTIONS
Emergency Diesel Generator 1 was made available, but not operable, on May 13, 2005, at 0117 hours."


The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Reg 2 RDO (Moorman) was notified.

INVALID ACTUATION OF THE DIVISION 2 SHUTDOWN SERVICE WATER (SX) SYSTEM PUMP.


"The following 60-day report is being made under 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Division 2 Shutdown Service Water (SX) system pump that occurred at 1548 hours on May 12, 2005. As allowed by 10CFR50.73(a)(1) this notification is being made via telephone. NUREG-1022, Revision 2 identifies the information that needs to be reported as follows:

"(a) The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.

"On May 12, 2005, the Division 2 SX system pump automatically started during the performance of surveillance testing procedure, 9069.01, SX Operability, while preparing to secure the pump and restore the Plant Service Water (WS) system feed to the Division 2 SX piping. As part of the restoration of the system to its normal standby lineup, the handswitch for the 1SX014B (WS to SX cross-tie) valve was being held in the Open position while the handswitch for the Division 2 SX pump was held in the Off position. While monitoring system pressure to allow releasing the handswitch for the SX pump, system pressure had not increased above the automatic initiation setpoint when the operator's hand relaxed on the grip of the handswitch of the pump enough to allow the pump to start. The inadvertent actuation of the Division 2 SX pump was not in response to plant conditions requiring the pump to automatically start.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.

"The automatic start of the Division 2 SX pump was complete, but was limited to Division 2 only. Divisions 1 and 3 were in standby and were not affected by the opening of the Division 2 WS to SX cross-tie valve.

"(c) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"The automatic start of the Division 2 SX pump was a successful start and functioned successfully.

"The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this notification."