Event Notification Report for May 06, 2005

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO STEAM FLOW/ FEED FLOW MISMATCH SIGNAL

"On May 6, 2005, at 10:32 hours, an automatic reactor trip occurred due to a Main Steam Flow/Feedwater Flow mismatch on the 32 Steam Generator (SG). All control rods fully inserted and safety equipment operated as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater started as expected. The Emergency Diesel Generators did not start as offsite power remained available. The plant is in Hot Shutdown at Normal Temperature and Pressure and there was no radiation release. The condition is under investigation and a post trip review is being conducted."

No primary or secondary relief valves lifted during the reactor trip. Decay heat is being discharged to the main condenser via the high pressure steam dumps. Auxiliary feedwater is being used to maintain SG level. The electrical grid is stable. There was no affect on Unit 2.

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State of New York.

LOSS OF SAFETY FUNCTION ON REACTOR WATER CLEAN UP INSTRUMENTATION

"Report - Loss of Safety Function

"On 5/5/06 at 1130 [EDT] it was discovered test equipment was left installed in the Reactor Water System instrumentation that rendered both system delta flow isolation instruments inoperable.

"The test equipment was removed and both instruments were declared operable at 1455."

The system was in service at the time.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified.

* * * RETRACTION FROM K. RUSSELL TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1115 HRS. EDT ON 6/7/05 * * *

"Update to Event Notification (ENF 41675) Retraction:

"An 8-hour notification was made on May 6, 2005, in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v), for the loss of the safety function for the control of radiation release. This report was made when it was discovered that test equipment (a pressure gauge) had been left attached to the Reactor Water Cleanup System (RWCU) differential flow isolation piping. The gauge was removed and the system aligned for proper operation.

"An engineering evaluation determined the temporary tubing and gauge would have maintained their structural integrity during a seismic event. Therefore, there was no impact on the piping for the leak detection capability of the RWCU differential flow isolation. Since there was no loss of function for the RWCU differential flaw isolation there was no loss of safety function for the control of radiation release. Because there is no loss of safety function, this condition is not reportable. Since the condition is not reportable, ENF 41675 is retracted."

The licensee will be notifying the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R3DO (Lara).

DEGRADED PIPE RESTRAINT ON HPCI DISCHARGE PIPING

"This non-emergency 8-hour report is pursuant, to 10CFR50.72(b)(3). On 05/06/05 at 21:36, [High Pressure Coolant Injection] HPCI was declared inoperable based on a degraded pipe restraint and a degraded snubber associated with the Unit 3 HPCI discharge piping. The degraded pipe restraint and snubber were discovered on 05/05/05 at 17:05.

"The subsequent engineering evaluation determined that HPCI is inoperable until the supports are repaired. Reactor operation is unaffected and Unit 3 remains at 100% power. The inoperability of the HPCI system places the plant in a 14 day Limiting Condition of Operation, per [Technical Specification] TS 3.5.1. Further investigation of the cause is in progress."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION ON 6/14/05 AT 1659 EDT FROM D. FOSS TO A. COSTA * * *

"The purpose of this notification is to retract a previous report made on 5/7/05 at 0016 hours (EN# 41676). Notification of this issue to the NRC was initially made as a result of declaring the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) system inoperable on 5/6/05 at 2136 hours. This declaration was based on a preliminary Engineering evaluation concerning degraded pipe supports associated with the Unit 3 HPCI discharge piping.

"Since the initial report, it was determined that two HPCI discharge pipe supports required additional Engineering analysis to assess the as-found condition of the pipe supports. One support (S300) had loose base plate bolts while the other support (S46) had cracked welds. Engineering has determined that the S46 HPCI pipe support in the as-found condition was capable of performing its design function. A piping stress analysis was performed to address the as-found condition of the S300 pipe support. This analysis determined that the HPCI system would remain operable with the S300 support out of service. Therefore, during the period of pipe support degradation, the HPCI system was considered as available and capable of performing its safety function.

"Maintenance was planned and repairs were performed to HPCI system pipe supports. These repairs were complete and the HPCI system was restored to full compliance on 5/9/05 by approximately 0430 hours. A root cause evaluation is being performed in accordance with the Corrective Action Program (CR 332355).

"The NRC resident has been informed of the retraction."

Notified R1DO (Krohn).

LOSS OF COMMUNICATION

"At approximately 5:45 AM, [EDT], the Harris Nuclear Plant (HNP) Control Room was informed by Chatham County that the county had lost the ability to receive communication due to the loss of a major fiber ring that services the area. The county would not have been able to receive notification from HNP via the Selective Signaling System or the public phone lines from approximately 0415 to 0539 hours. HNP verified that communications are presently available for the State of North Carolina and all four counties within the 10-mile emergency planning zone. Only the Selective Signaling System to Chatham County remains inoperable and under investigation for repair. This requires an 8 hour non-emergency notification per 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(xiii) due to the loss of a significant portion of the offsite notification system. The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was informed."

Since the phones are now operable, the licensee would notify Chatham County via the public phone system if required.