Event Notification Report for April 26, 2005

AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP WITH AFW ACTUATION

"The DC Cook Unit 1 Reactor automatically tripped during normal plant startup preparations to synchronize the Main Generator with the offsite electrical GRID. Indicated Reactor power at the time of trip was 8 % power and stable. Preliminary review indicates the trip was caused by an Intermediate Range high flux reactor trip signal. The Intermediate Range High Flux Reactor trip occurred below the Reactor Protection System actuation setpoint. This is a one-out-of-two logic and the trip is active below interlock Permissive P-10 (10% reactor power). The cause of the Reactor Trip is under investigation. This event is reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B), RPS actuation, as a four (4) hour report and under 10CFR50,72(b)(3)(iv)(A), Specified system actuation of the Auxiliary Feedwater System, as an eight (8) hour report. Preliminary evaluation indicates all plant systems functioned normally following the Reactor Trip. DC Cook Unit 1 remains stable in Mode 3 while conducting the Post Trip Review. No radioactive release is in progress as a result of this event. The DC Cook Senior Resident NRC Inspector was notified 04/26/05 at approximately 00:30 [hrs. EDT]."

The electrical grid is stable and Unit 1 is being supplied by offsite power. Unit 2 is not affected. All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being removed via steam dumps to the main condenser.

SPDS (SAFETY PARAMETER DISPLAY SYSTEM) IS DOWN FOR PLANNED MAINTENANCE

"At 0731 hours [EDT] on 04/26/2005 the Unit 2 SPDS system was removed from service for planned maintenance. The duration of work is expected to be 48 hours (scheduled for completion at 0700 hours [EDT] on 04/28/2005).

"ERDS will remain operable during the work window but several points will not be available. For example 23 of 58 ERDS points will be unavailable while SPDS is out of service. However, the ERDS system will still be operable and transmit the remaining points.

"Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability - A review of the ability of the emergency organization to function without SPDS was performed. Alternate sources for many of the points in SPDS were identified and are contained on an Emergency Plan format in PICSY (plant integrated computer system). Those points not available from PICSY can be obtained from the control room. With these compensatory actions and the communications in place between the facilities, there will not be a major loss of emergency assessment capability.

"Since the Unit 2 SPDS computer system will be unavailable for greater than 8 hours, this is considered a Loss of Emergency Assessment Capability and reportable under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii)."

The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.

* * * UPDATE ON 4/28/05 AT 1412 EDT FROM RON FRY TO A. COSTA * * *

"This is a followup courtesy notification to EN#4160. The Unit 2 SPDS system as noted below [above] has been restored to normal at 13:52 [EDT] on 4/28/05"

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R1DO (Barkley).

THE LICENSEE MADE AN OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO A FIRE

The licensee reported that there was a small fire lasting for 15-20 minutes in the wiring of a manlift on the charging floor of the Containment Building. It was a smoldering fire with lots of smoke. Offsite fire department was called for assistance. There were two minor injuries to licensee personnel due to smoke inhalation requiring them to be taken to a clinic. Damage was restricted to the manlift.

The NRC Resident Inspector along with State and Local Agencies were notified.

OIL SPILL OUTSIDE OF THE TURBINE BUILDING

There was an oil spill of between 10 - 25 gallons of 90 weight oil outside of the turbine building. Cleanup has begun and the State of Connecticut and Department of environmental protection were notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector, State and local agencies were notified.


* * * UPDATE on 04/26/05 by Mike Baldarelli to C Gould * * *

The source of the Hydraulic oil leak was a crane that had undergone maintenance the night before. The oil and soil have been removed.

Reg 1 RDO(Barkley) informed.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - CRITICAL POWER DETERMINATION FOR GE14 AND GE12 FUEL WITH ZIRCALOY SPACERS

The following is a portion of a facsimile received on June 24, 2005 from GE Energy, reference - MFN 05-058 Rev 1:

ATTACHMENT 2 - 60-Day interim Report Notification per §21.21(a)(2), and Transfer of Information per §21.21(b)

(i) Name and address of the individual informing the Commission: J. S. Post, Manager, Engineering Quality &Safety Evaluations, GE Energy - Nuclear, 3901 Castle Hayne Road, Wilmington, NC 28401.

(ii) Identification of the facility, the activity, or the basic component supplied for such facility or such activity within the United States, which may fail to comply or contain a defect: The affected and potentially affected plants are identified in Attachment 1. This concern is limited to plants that have fresh or once-burned GE14 or GE12 fuel with Zircaloy spacers. GE12 fuel with Inconel spacers is not affected.

(iii) Identification of the firm constructing the facility or supplying the basic component, which may fail to comply or contain a defect: Global Nuclear Fuel-Americas, LLC, Wilmington, NC.

(iv) Nature of the defect or failure to comply and safety hazard, which could be created by such defect or failure to comply: During review of GE14 ATLAS critical power tests results, it was discovered that springs on the Zircaloy test spacers used in the GE14 and GE12 critical power testing were deformed, possibly during the testing. This resulted in a potentially non-conservative critical power determination for fuel bundle corner pin locations. This non-conservatism potentially impacts the calculated margin to the Operating Limit Minimum Critical Power Ratio (OLMCPR), the Safety Limit MCPR (SLMCPR), the Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) analysis, and the R-factors used in the on-line 3D core simulator. GE has completed the evaluation of the impact on the critical power determination, and has completed the evaluation of the impact on the R-factors. GE has performed a preliminary evaluation of the impact on the margin to the OLMCPR, the impact on the SLMCPR, and the impact on the RWE event. Potentially affected plants have been informed and have taken appropriate compensatory actions.

(v) The date on which the information of such a potential defect or failure to comply was obtained: This concern was identified in the GE safety evaluation program on April 26, 2005.

(vi) In the case of a basic component which may contain a defect or failure to comply, the number and locations of all such components in use at, supplied for, or being supplied for one or more facilities or activities subject to the regulations in this part: The basic component that may contain a defect is the critical power determination for fresh and once-burned GE14 and GE12 fuel with Zircaloy spacers. GE12 fuel with Inconel spacers and other GNF fuels are not affected. In the US, only GE14 is affected since all GE12 designs in the US have Inconel spacers.

(vii) The corrective action which has been, is being, or will be taken: the name of the individual or organization responsible for the action; and the length of time that has been or will be taken to complete the action (note, these are actions specifically associated with the identified Potential Reportable Condition evaluation): GE has completed the evaluation of the impact on the critical power determination and has completed the evaluation of the impact on the R-factors. GE has performed a preliminary evaluation of the impact on the margin to the OLMCPR, the impact on the SLMCPR, and the impact on the RWE event.

Plants that may have non-conservative process computer calculated OLMCPR margins have taken compensatory action as necessary based on the magnitude of the non-conservatism to prevent inadvertently exceeding the OLMCPR during plant operating maneuvers.

Additional corrective actions planned are as follows:

1. Complete the current-cycle analyses to confirm the non-conservative MFLCPR impact (September 20, 2005).

2. Complete the analysis for previous cycle(s) extending to the previous three years of operation to determine which plants may have a non-conservative MFLCPR (December 15, 2005).

3. Complete the analyses to confirm that no plant has a SLMCPR impact greater than or equal to the reportable threshold of 0.01 (September 20, 2005).

4. Determine and provide the necessary data for plants that perform their own SLMCPR calculations, or that operate with fresh fuel batches of non-GE fuel along with second cycle affected GE14 fuel (September 30, 2005).

5. Complete the evaluation to confirm that the RWE analyses do not impact the OLMCPR (September 20, 2005).

6. Provide bundle R-factor and software updates for the on-line 30 core simulator (beginning in August 2005, and extending through the balance of 2005).

(viii) Any advice related to the potential defect or failure to comply about the facility, activity, or basic component that has been, is being, or will be given to purchasers or licensees: Affected plants should continue to work with their GE Customer Account Leader to obtain information as plant-specific calculations are completed.

ATTACHMENT 1 - Affected and Potentially Affected Plants for Current Operating Cycle [ABSTRACTED]

(a) Impact on MFLCPR: Transfer of Information; preliminary analysis indicates MFLCPR impact, GE does not have sufficient information to determine if the OLMCPR could have been exceeded

Clinton, Brunswick 1 & 2, Nine Mile Point 2, Fermi 2, FitzPatrick, Dresden 2, LaSalle 1 & 2, Limerick 1 & 2, Peach Bottom 2 & 3, Quad Cities 2, Perry 1, Cooper, Duane Arnold, Monticello, and Hope Creek.

(b) Impact on SLMCPR: Transfer of Information; GE does not have sufficient information to determine if there is an impact on the SLMCPR greater than or equal to 0.01

Browns Ferry 2 & 3

(c) Impact of Rod Withdrawal Error (RWE) on OLMCPR: Transfer of Information; GE does not do the analysis for RWE (info provided via telephone during notification to Ops Center)

Browns Ferry 2 & 3