Event Notification Report for April 07, 2005

POTENTIAL INABILITY TO SAFE SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE EMERGENCY DIESEL GENERATORS

The following information was provided by the licensee (licensee text in quotes):

"All three divisions of Emergency Diesel Generators were declared inoperable due to performing at risk design changes on the operable diesel. The design change was removed from the division one diesel and it was declared available at 2045 on 4/7/05. All three diesels remain inoperable."

Perry 1 is currently shutdown in refueling mode 5 and no core alterations are in progress. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM KEN MEADE TO PETE SNYDER AT 0852 EDT ON 4/24/05 * * *

"Update to Event Notification (ENF 41575) Retraction:

"An 8-hour notification was made on April 7, 2005 under 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v) for the loss of the safety function. The report was made due to declaring division 1 diesel generator inoperable at 2028 hours on April 7, 2005 with Division 2 and 3 inoperable for unrelated refuel outage activities. Division 1 diesel generator was declared inoperable as a result of performing an at-risk design change on the exhaust system, i.e., installing insulation blankets on the exhaust piping. The at-risk design change was removed from the division one diesel generator by 2045 hours on April 7, 2005. No other actions were taken during the course of events that would have otherwise rendered the Division 1 diesel generator inoperable.

"An evaluation was completed on April 8, 2005 confirming that the additional weight of the insulation on the exhaust piping had no impact on diesel generator operability. Division 1 diesel generator was subsequently declared operable at 0534 hours on April 9, 2005.

"Since there was no loss of safety function, there is no reportable condition. Since there was no reportable condition. ENF 41575 is retracted."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Headquarters Operations Officer notified R3DO (Hills).

PART 21 NOTIFICATION - THERMO ELECTRON DATA ACQUISITION RECORDERS

The following information was provided by the manufacturer via facsimile:

On April 7, 2005, Thermo Electron engineers determined that the potential exists that the nuclear safety-related series of paperless data acquisition recorders (SV10C, SV18C and SV28C series recorders) may exhibit failure to start up due to a deficiency in a power supply module. Cycling of power to the recorder may be required to ensure the boot up sequence of the recorder. The power supply module is a commercial grade dedicated item.

Thermo Electron has determined that the cause of the anomaly is the rise time variation of the installed commercial power supply module. The module is a generic switching power supply used in a multitude of commercial applications. This module is mounted on a power supply carrier printed circuit assembly (PCA).

This anomaly only occurs when a recorder has been turned off and then restarted. Should the recorder fail to boot up, the anomaly can be corrected by cycling power to the recorder until the recorder re-boots. This startup failure may occur on recorder units where the power supply carrier PCA contains a power supply module that does not have a Made in the USA mark. Recorder units that utilize a power supply carrier PCA containing a power supply module labeled with Made in USA do not exhibit the anomaly and are not the subject of this notification.

There have been no failures reported in any nuclear safety-related applications of SV10C, SV18C or SV28C recorders. Should the failure occur, it is detectable and will not cause the recorder to present or record any erroneous data.

Thermo Electron engineers have redesigned the power supply carrier PCA to accommodate a wider variation in rise times associated with the power supply modules manufactured in the US, China or India as described above. Affected PCA part numbers are CB100492, CB100505, CB100511 and CB100531 which have a power supply module that does not have a Made in USA mark.

While there have been no failures reported of recorders in nuclear safety-related applications, as a precaution, Thermo Electron is recommending the replacement of any affected PCA as previously noted with a redesigned PCA for recorders which are used as the primary instrument for recording or reporting critical data and/or functions; are not backed up by a UPS system; and contain the affected PCA.

Nuclear utilities that have purchased nuclear safety-related SV10C, SV18C or SV28C recorders potentially affected by this notification (listed individually by Part/Serial Number in the notification):

Tennessee Valley Authority - Watts Bar Nuclear Plant
First Energy Corporation - Beaver Valley Power Station
Duke Energy Corporation - McGuire Site
Tennessee Valley Authority - Browns Ferry Nuclear Plant
Entergy Operations - River Bend
Progress Energy CP&L - Brunswick Nuclear Plant

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST FLUORESCENCE ANALYZER

The State provided the following information via email:

"During an inspection at Thomas Wood Preserving on April 7, 2005, it was determined that a generally licensed device, Asoma Model LCA x-ray fluorescence analyzer, Serial No. 466, containing 30 millicuries of Curium-244, was missing. The plant manager of the treatment plant stated that the device had been returned to Spectro Analytical, the device distributor, several years ago. [The Division of Radiation Health] DRH contacted Spectro Analytical on May 2, 2005, and learned that they had never received the device from the company. The plant manager stated that he would continue looking for the device and inform DRH if it was located. It is assumed that the treatment plant purchased a new fluorescence analyzer and the other device was put in storage and/or misplaced. Thomas Wood Preserving, holder of General License No. GL-266 was cited violations for failure to secure radioactive material from authorized removal and failure to report the lost device to the Agency. The licensee is also required to provide a written report to DRH in accordance with State Regulations. It is not known when the device was lost or the event occurred."