Event Notification Report for April 05, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
04/04/2005 - 04/05/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41564
Rep Org: DAVID BLACKMORE AND ASSOCIATES
Licensee: DAVID BLACKMORE AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: POTTSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: 37-28297-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE HUGHES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: DAVID BLACKMORE AND ASSOCIATES
Region: 1
City: POTTSTOWN State: PA
County:
License #: 37-28297-01
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JOE HUGHES
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 04/05/2005
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2005
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2005
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2005
Event Time: 11:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
30.50(b)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
JAMES NOGGLE (R1)
MELVYN LEACH (NMSS)
DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GAGE DURING CONSTRUCTION
During construction at the Providence Regency residential construction site in Lower Providence Township, a CPN MCMDR moisture density gage was damaged when run over by a bulldozer. The gage was a model MC3, Serial number 300405564, containing 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241: Be. The external case of the gage was damaged and the rod snapped off. The radioactive sources were intact and stored in the locked position of the gage and not damaged. No leakage was detected. The gage will be shipped to the manufacturer for repair.
During construction at the Providence Regency residential construction site in Lower Providence Township, a CPN MCMDR moisture density gage was damaged when run over by a bulldozer. The gage was a model MC3, Serial number 300405564, containing 10 millicuries of Cs-137 and 50 millicuries of Am-241: Be. The external case of the gage was damaged and the rod snapped off. The radioactive sources were intact and stored in the locked position of the gage and not damaged. No leakage was detected. The gage will be shipped to the manufacturer for repair.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41565
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MIKE FERRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: MIKE FERRY
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/05/2005
Notification Time: 19:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2005
Event Time: 16:12 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2005
Notification Time: 19:59 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2005
Event Time: 16:12 [PST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2005
Emergency Class: UNUSUAL EVENT
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
10 CFR Section:
50.72(a) (1) (i) - EMERGENCY DECLARED
Person (Organization):
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (IRD)
CHRIS LIGGETT (FEMA)
ED HOISINGTON (DHS)
LINDA HOWELL (R4)
JAMES LYONS (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (IRD)
CHRIS LIGGETT (FEMA)
ED HOISINGTON (DHS)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
UNUSUAL EVENT DECLARED UNDER E.A.L. 9-3.U.1
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"Columbia Generating Station has declared an unusual event ([EAL] 9-3.U.1) due to an unintentional vehicle crash into the Radwaste Building (Safe-Shutdown Bldg) roll-up door during the normal course of plant activities. Damage to the door has prevented normal closure of the door. Efforts to close the door are on-going.
"Terminated the event @ 1655 [PDT] due to determination that an unusual event did not exist."
A plant employee was using a plant-owned vehicle to move a sea-land container into the Radwaste Building when he struck the bottom of the roll-up door. There were no injuries to plant personnel and no other damage to plant equipment.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM PAM ANKRUM TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 2133 EDT ON 4/5/05 * * *
The following retraction was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"At 1912 EDT on April 5, 2005, NRC was notified of an Unusual Event at Columbia Generating Station (EN #41565). This notification also informed the NRC that the event was terminated at 1955 EDT (1655 PDT) on April 5, 2005.
"This is a follow-up to inform the NRC that Columbia Generating Station is retracting its Unusual Event Declaration due to the following reason. Columbia Generating Station Procedure 13.1.1A requires entry into Unusual Event EAL 9.3.U.1 if 'the impact is of such force that damage to structures or equipment inside a Safe Shutdown Building may have occurred.' Upon further evaluation, the impact was not of sufficient force to have caused damage to structures or equipment inside a Safe Shutdown Building. Based on this information, the Unusual Event criteria was not met.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local, State, and other Government Agencies of this update."
Notified IRD (Kennedy), R4DO (Howell), NRR EO (Lyons), FEMA (Liggett) and DHS (Frost) and HQPAO (Brenner).
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"Columbia Generating Station has declared an unusual event ([EAL] 9-3.U.1) due to an unintentional vehicle crash into the Radwaste Building (Safe-Shutdown Bldg) roll-up door during the normal course of plant activities. Damage to the door has prevented normal closure of the door. Efforts to close the door are on-going.
"Terminated the event @ 1655 [PDT] due to determination that an unusual event did not exist."
A plant employee was using a plant-owned vehicle to move a sea-land container into the Radwaste Building when he struck the bottom of the roll-up door. There were no injuries to plant personnel and no other damage to plant equipment.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM PAM ANKRUM TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 2133 EDT ON 4/5/05 * * *
The following retraction was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"At 1912 EDT on April 5, 2005, NRC was notified of an Unusual Event at Columbia Generating Station (EN #41565). This notification also informed the NRC that the event was terminated at 1955 EDT (1655 PDT) on April 5, 2005.
"This is a follow-up to inform the NRC that Columbia Generating Station is retracting its Unusual Event Declaration due to the following reason. Columbia Generating Station Procedure 13.1.1A requires entry into Unusual Event EAL 9.3.U.1 if 'the impact is of such force that damage to structures or equipment inside a Safe Shutdown Building may have occurred.' Upon further evaluation, the impact was not of sufficient force to have caused damage to structures or equipment inside a Safe Shutdown Building. Based on this information, the Unusual Event criteria was not met.
"The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and local, State, and other Government Agencies of this update."
Notified IRD (Kennedy), R4DO (Howell), NRR EO (Lyons), FEMA (Liggett) and DHS (Frost) and HQPAO (Brenner).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41567
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SCHREIFELS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: ROBERT SCHREIFELS
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 04/05/2005
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2005
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2005
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 04/05/2005
Event Time: 16:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 04/05/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
KENNETH O'BRIEN (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
POTENTIAL VULNERABILITY WITH ALTERNATE SHUTDOWN SYSTEM (ASDS) ISOLATION DESIGN
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"On April 5, 2005 at 1600 [hrs. CDT], Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant during a review of the Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) as part of the corrective actions for LER 2005-01, submitted on April 4, 2005 (Event Notification #41436) discovered a second breaker affected by a similar cause as identified in the LER. The Bus 16 source (Breaker 152-609) to Load Center #104 has a similar potential vulnerability with the ASDS isolation design that could result in Load Center #104 being locked out in the event of a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire. The Monticello Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room/Cable Spreading [Room] fire assumes a loss of control of Division I and II equipment from the Control room, however safe shutdown is achieved remotely from the ASDS panel. ASDS design is such that a Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire would not impede the ability to safely shutdown and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition.
"Contrary to the ASDS design, it was discovered that an unisolated metering circuit could result in Load Center #104 being locked out in the event of a Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire. The bus lockout is not isolated by the ASDS transfer switches, therefore, this condition could result in failure of Load Center #104 to re-energize during the implementation of the Shutdown Outside Control Room procedure. ASDS is not required to be operable at this time.
"As a result of this determination, MNGP will issue a revision to LER 2005-01 to the NRC to reflect the new information.
"This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B, and D) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC [Resident Inspector] has been notified."
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"On April 5, 2005 at 1600 [hrs. CDT], Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant during a review of the Alternate Shutdown System (ASDS) as part of the corrective actions for LER 2005-01, submitted on April 4, 2005 (Event Notification #41436) discovered a second breaker affected by a similar cause as identified in the LER. The Bus 16 source (Breaker 152-609) to Load Center #104 has a similar potential vulnerability with the ASDS isolation design that could result in Load Center #104 being locked out in the event of a Control Room or Cable Spreading Room fire. The Monticello Appendix R Safe Shutdown Analysis for Control Room/Cable Spreading [Room] fire assumes a loss of control of Division I and II equipment from the Control room, however safe shutdown is achieved remotely from the ASDS panel. ASDS design is such that a Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire would not impede the ability to safely shutdown and maintain the plant in a shutdown condition.
"Contrary to the ASDS design, it was discovered that an unisolated metering circuit could result in Load Center #104 being locked out in the event of a Control Room/Cable Spreading Room fire. The bus lockout is not isolated by the ASDS transfer switches, therefore, this condition could result in failure of Load Center #104 to re-energize during the implementation of the Shutdown Outside Control Room procedure. ASDS is not required to be operable at this time.
"As a result of this determination, MNGP will issue a revision to LER 2005-01 to the NRC to reflect the new information.
"This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A,B, and D) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). The NRC [Resident Inspector] has been notified."