Event Notification Report for March 16, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
03/15/2005 - 03/16/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41498
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: ROB DORMAN
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 03/16/2005
Notification Time: 10:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2005
Event Time: 05:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2005
Notification Time: 10:22 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2005
Event Time: 05:40 [EST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
BOB DENNIG (EO)
PAT HILAND (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (IRD)
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
BOB DENNIG (EO)
PAT HILAND (NRR)
KRISS KENNEDY (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | N | 0 | Cold Shutdown | 0 | Cold Shutdown |
DISCOVERY OF AFTER-THE FACT EMERGENCY CONDITION UNUSUAL EVENT
The licensee provided the following information about the event via facsimile (licensee test in quotes):
"On 3/16/2005 at approximately 0540 preparations were being made to drain down the RCS. A tagout needed to be released to support aligning the RCS for drain down. The tagout was not completely released prior to opening the intermediate leg loop drain valves. When the intermediate leg loop drain valves were opened, a flow path was created which resulted in draining the RCS. The Control Room noted approximately 70 gpm mismatch between letdown flow and charging. Personnel in containment manipulating the valves discovered that water was flowing unexpectedly to a trough in containment when they went to position the last set of intermediate leg loop drain valves and they quickly isolated the flow path. The time frame that the flow path existed was approximately 10 minutes. When the Shift Manager evaluated the event for Emergency classification the flow path had been isolated. The Shift Manager was not clear on if this event met the guidance for an NOUE declaration and asked for assistance from the Outage Control Center. Corporate licensing and Emergency preparedness were contacted for additional assistance.
"At 0930 it was decided to report the event per 50.72 (a) General Requirements even though it is not clear that the threshold for an EAL was met. Per NUREG-1022 the NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the Emergency Class to be necessary when the event has rapidly terminated and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists."
The licensee stated that the threshold for an Unusual Event declaration per the Vogtle EALs is 25 gpm identified RCS leakage.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified as well as courtesy notifications to state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE TO NRC (HUFFMAN) FROM LICENSEE (DORMAN) AT 10:58 ON 3/16/05 * * *
After further consideration, the licensee decided that this event should have been classified as an Unusual Event at the time of the occurrence. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this classification.
The licensee provided the following information about the event via facsimile (licensee test in quotes):
"On 3/16/2005 at approximately 0540 preparations were being made to drain down the RCS. A tagout needed to be released to support aligning the RCS for drain down. The tagout was not completely released prior to opening the intermediate leg loop drain valves. When the intermediate leg loop drain valves were opened, a flow path was created which resulted in draining the RCS. The Control Room noted approximately 70 gpm mismatch between letdown flow and charging. Personnel in containment manipulating the valves discovered that water was flowing unexpectedly to a trough in containment when they went to position the last set of intermediate leg loop drain valves and they quickly isolated the flow path. The time frame that the flow path existed was approximately 10 minutes. When the Shift Manager evaluated the event for Emergency classification the flow path had been isolated. The Shift Manager was not clear on if this event met the guidance for an NOUE declaration and asked for assistance from the Outage Control Center. Corporate licensing and Emergency preparedness were contacted for additional assistance.
"At 0930 it was decided to report the event per 50.72 (a) General Requirements even though it is not clear that the threshold for an EAL was met. Per NUREG-1022 the NRC staff does not consider actual declaration of the Emergency Class to be necessary when the event has rapidly terminated and the basis for the emergency class no longer exists."
The licensee stated that the threshold for an Unusual Event declaration per the Vogtle EALs is 25 gpm identified RCS leakage.
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified as well as courtesy notifications to state and local authorities.
* * * UPDATE TO NRC (HUFFMAN) FROM LICENSEE (DORMAN) AT 10:58 ON 3/16/05 * * *
After further consideration, the licensee decided that this event should have been classified as an Unusual Event at the time of the occurrence. The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector of this classification.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41499
Facility: COLUMBIA GENERATING STATION
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DARIN MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 4 State: WA
Unit: [2] [] []
RX Type: [2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: DARIN MATTHEWS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 03/16/2005
Notification Time: 19:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2005
Event Time: 09:43 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2005
Notification Time: 19:55 [ET]
Event Date: 03/16/2005
Event Time: 09:43 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
TOM FARNHOLTZ (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE CORE SPRAY SYSTEM INOPERABLE DUE TO DEGRADED PUMP MOTOR AIR DEFLECTOR
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"At 0943 with Columbia Generating Station operating at 100% power the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was taken out of service for maintenance. During the maintenance activity, severe cracking and degradation was discovered on the upper air deflector of the HPCS pump motor. This component functions to direct air into the motor housing to provide cooling while the system is operating. A preliminary evaluation determined this represents a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of the HPCS system to mitigate the consequence of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Upon discovery of this condition plant operators fulfilled the action required by Technical Specifications LCO 3.5.1 condition B to verify by administrative means that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is operable and took action to restore the HPCS system to operable status within 14 days. No other systems were required to function in response to this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):
"At 0943 with Columbia Generating Station operating at 100% power the High Pressure Core Spray (HPCS) system was taken out of service for maintenance. During the maintenance activity, severe cracking and degradation was discovered on the upper air deflector of the HPCS pump motor. This component functions to direct air into the motor housing to provide cooling while the system is operating. A preliminary evaluation determined this represents a condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented fulfillment of the safety function of the HPCS system to mitigate the consequence of an accident and is reportable pursuant to 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D). Upon discovery of this condition plant operators fulfilled the action required by Technical Specifications LCO 3.5.1 condition B to verify by administrative means that the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling (RCIC) system is operable and took action to restore the HPCS system to operable status within 14 days. No other systems were required to function in response to this event."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.