Event Notification Report for March 01, 2005

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM FROM 15% POWER DUE TO HIGH TURBINE VIBRATION

The following details were provided by the licensee via fax as part of their telephonic notification:

"Manual reactor scram due to high turbine generator vibration during a planned Unit 1 power reduction to Mode 2 to perform maintenance to replace the vent line piping on 11 MSR drain tank. The manual reactor scram was initiated per AOP-7E, section V, 'High Turbine Vibration' trip criteria when bearing #5 exceeded 12 mils vibration. This event meets NUREG-1022 Rev. 2, Section 3.2.6 'System Actuation' Part 50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) 'Any event or condition that results in actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) when the reactor is critical except when the actuation results from and is part of a pre-planned sequence during testing or reactor operation.'"

All rods fully inserted and no ECCS or relief valve actuations occurred. Heat sink is the condenser and turbine bypass valves.

The NRC resident inspector was notified.

MANUAL REACTOR TRIP DURING A RAPID SHUTDOWN FOR STEAM LEAK REPAIR

The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):

"[The licensee] reduced power on Unit 2 due to a steam leak on a moisture separator reheater vent line. The reactor was manually tripped at 20% reactor power per normal shutdown sequence. All systems and components operated correctly. Unit restart will commence following completion of a planned refueling outage."

All rods fully inserted. One steam line secondary PORV lifted and reseated. Decay heat removal is via AFW and steam bypass valves to the main condenser. The steam leak was reported to be on a 2-inch MSR vent line elbow.

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * RETRACTION FROM GRADY PICKLER TO HOWIE CROUCH @ 1501 EST ON 3/17/05 * * *

The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile (licensee text in quotes):

"On March 1, 2005, McGuire Unit 2 experienced a steam leak on a two-inch pipe in the heater bleed steam system. In consideration of that leak, Unit 2 was shutdown by manually tripping the reactor. This was reported as an unplanned valid actuation of the reactor protection system [10CFR 50.72 (b) (2)(iv)(B)]. Reference Event Report 41453.

"The manual reactor trip of Unit 2 was not required to mitigate the steam leak. However, in consideration of the steam leak, a decision was made to perform a shutdown of Unit 2 using the normal reactor shutdown procedure. This procedure requires that the control rods be inserted by manually tripping the reactor. As per guidance provided in NUREG-1022, the above actions do not satisfy the criteria for reporting under the requirements of 10CFR 50.72 (b) (2)(iv)(B) or any other reporting criteria. Therefore, McGuire is retracting Event Report 41453."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Cahill).

DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA DEPARTMENT OF TRANSPORTATION REPORTED A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE WAS FOUND MISSING DURING INVENTORY

The licensee reported that during inventory an old (20 years old) Troxler gauge model 3411-B serial # 7520 was found missing from its case which was stored in the storage area at their office. This gauge had not been used for a number of years since it was broken. It contains 8 millicuries Cs-137 and 40 millicuries Am-241-Be. The last inventory was 12/06/04 and at that time it is believed the device was in the case, but they are not sure the case was opened to verify. They are continuing the search and have reported it to the DC Police Dept (report # 029650).

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST GAUGE CONTAINING RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

The following report was received from the State of Alabama Department of Public Health via facsimile:

"On March 19, 2013, the Environmental Health & Services [representative] for International Paper of Pine Hill, Alabama notified the Alabama Office of Radiation Control that they had lost accountability of a fixed gauge. The gauge is a Kay Ray model 7062BP serial 27137, containing 100 mCi of Cs-137.

"During a routine inspection on February 7, 2013, it was noticed by the inspector that the device had been missing since the March 2005 inventory. The inspector requested that [the] Radiation Safety Officer investigate the incident due to several changes within the department and inconsistencies in record keeping. The licensee was issued two violations, one involving the loss of the accountability of radioactive material.

"The [licensee's response to the] notification [of violation] letter included both the response to the violations and a attachment. The attachment was a memorandum dated September 12, 2010, referencing losing the gauge, and indicating the loss had been discussed with the [Alabama of Public Health] Director of Licensing. This was discussed with [Director] and he does not recall this conversation nor could this memorandum be found in any of the [Alabama of Public Health] International Paper files. Due to this, the [Alabama of Public Health] considers the response letter the notification of the device being lost.

"As of today [March 20, 2013], at 7:15 AM CDT, the device containing radioactive material has not been recovered. This incident remains open until further investigation can be completed."

Alabama Incident 13-06

THIS MATERIAL EVENT CONTAINS A "LESS THAN CAT 3" LEVEL OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIAL

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks. For additional information go to http://www-pub.iaea.org/MTCD/publications/PDF/Pub1227_web.pdf