Event Notification Report for February 19, 2005

AGREEMENT STATE - LOST TROXLER THIN LAYER DENSITY GAGE

The following was received from the state via e-mail:

"On Saturday, 02/19/2005, 1430 CST, the licensee's representative received notification that a technician had lost a Troxler Model 4640-B, Thin layer Density Gauge, S/N 1880. The device contains a double encapsulated source of 10mCi of Cs-137 that was last leak tested on 12/09/04. The source rod handle was padlocked and key was removed according to the technician. The shipping/transport case was lost in the Brownsville, TX area where it was being used at a temporary jobsite.

"Per company protocol and as discussed during loss notification to TX DSHS, a $500.00 'no-questions-asked' reward for the recovery of the device to be issued to area media outlets."

Texas Incident No: I-8213

* * * UPDATE FROM R. JISHA TO J. KNOKE AT 12:41 EST ON 2/23/05 * * *

"The gauge was apparently lost off the back of a pick-up truck at a job site in the vicinity of FR511 and EXPWY. 77 an incorporated area northwest of Brownsville proper. Since the gauge was not secured in the case which was secured to the vehicle, it was not lost but presumably the device had bounced off the truck on a rough section of road. Multiple attempts were made to retrace the route but none were successful in recovering the device. The manufacture (Troxler) has been notified."

Notified R4DO (D. Powers) and NMSS (S. Moore) and CNSNS Mexico via fax.

TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO INOPERABLE AUXILIARY FEEDWATER PUMPS

"During continuing evaluation of the operability of the Auxiliary Feedwater (AFW) Pump discharge pressure switches, engineering determined that a high energy line break had the potential to affect the AFW Pump Suction line from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) due to the inability of the discharge pressure switches to protect the AFW pumps from a loss of suction from the CST. At 1910 CST on 02/19/2005 it was determined that all three AFW Pumps were inoperable as a result of the condition discovered by engineering. Due to the high energy line break, there is the potential for damage to the CST supply line to the AFW Pumps (due to pipe whip resulting from a feedwater line circumferential break). Damage to the CST supply line may result in air entrainment in the AFW Pump supply and potential AFW pump damage following an automatic AFW Pump Start.

"Technical Specification 3.4.b.7 allows AFW Pumps to be placed in "pull-out" at less than 15% power because analysis shows that there is at least 10 minutes available for an operator to manually initiate AFW flow if needed. At 2003 CST a power reduction to <15% power was initiated to restore the operability of an AFW Pump. When power is less than 15%, the Turbine Driven AFW Pump will be placed in "pull-out" and Service Water will be aligned to the suction of the Turbine Driven AFW Pump to restore Operability of the Turbine Driven AFW Pump. When operability is restored to one AFW pump, the plant will enter a 4 hour LCO as a result of two AFW Pumps remaining out of service. Since operability of the two motor driven pumps will not be restored within the 4 hour LCO time, plant cooldown to less than 350 deg F will continue in accordance with Technical Specification 3.4.b.6."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

24-HOUR CRITICALITY CONTROL REPORT - FAILURE TO OBTAIN REQUIRED POWDER SAMPLES

The licensee provided the following information via email:

"Facility: Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia, SC, low enriched (less than or equal to 5.0 wt% U 235) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors.

"Time and Date of Event: February 19, 2005, 1604 hours.

"Reason for Notification: Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and then by preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers.

"Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder container is assured through application of tiered layers of controls, such as limiting materials allowed to be utilized in the bulk powder blending room, requiring a double roof on the bulk powder room, and by rigorous controls on the handling of polypaks to be transferred into the bulk powder container.

"Rigorous controls are instituted on the moisture content of each polypak to ensure that the contents are less than 0.3 wt% moisture. Each filled polypak coming off of the Fitzmill is transferred to a polypak cart for handling and storage prior to transfer into a bulk powder container. Each polypak cart is capable of handling up to 56 polypaks. Prior to storage on the cart, each polypak is required to be sampled, with the sample material obtained being combined into a single composite sample for the entire cart. In addition, three additional polpaks on the cart are randomly chosen and sampled. These three additional samples are completely independent of the composite sample. Thus the composite sample and the three random samples comprise the double contingency protection for the moisture content of the polpaks to be transferred to a bulk powder container.

"During an audit of the operation, it was observed that the composite sample was not being taken in several instances. Thus the sample being analyzed may not have been representative of polypaks on the cart. This compromised a loss of one leg of double contingency for polpaks to be transferred into the bulk powder NFG. All of the random individual samples have been taken and analyzed properly, and thus no material has been observed that exceed the allowed moisture content.

"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'"

"As Found Condition: During an audit of the Fitzmill operation it was observed that the required samples for generation of the composite sample were not being taken consistently.

"Summary of Activity:
- All impacted operations/equipment affected has been shut down pending confirmation of the moisture content.
- Revised operational methods are being developed and implemented.

"Conclusions:
- At no time was material observed to have a moisture content above the allowed limits.
- At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
- The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
- A causal analysis will be performed."

The licensee is notifying NRC Region 2 and HQ NMSS.

60 DAY INVALID ACTUATION OF SYSTEM REPORT.


"(A): The specific train(s) and system(s) that were actuated.

"This report is being made under 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A). On February 19, 2005 at 05:50 ET the implementation of a clearance to de-energize the Division 1 24/48 VDC battery chargers were being performed using the system operating procedure. The clearance instructions were misinterpreted and the section of the procedure for de-energizing Division 1 24/48 VDC bus was used. Upon de-energizing the bus, a half scram was received, all 4 Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both unit ONE and unit TWO reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown/isolated.

"(b) Whether each train actuation was complete or partial.

"The 1/2 scram was a partial initiation of the RPS system logic. No control rods inserted as a result of this event, nor were they required to insert. The RPS logic functioned as expected during the 1/2 RPS trip.

"The 4 Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) fans auto started and both unit ONE and unit TWO reactor building and refueling floor normal ventilation systems automatically shutdown/isolated. THE SBGT initiation and the ventilation system shutdown were both complete actuations.

"(C) Whether or not the system started and functioned successfully.

"The above systems functioned successfully."

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.