Event Notification Report for February 16, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/15/2005 - 02/16/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
41412414134141441420
Other Nuclear Material
Event Number: 41412
Rep Org: ALCO CORPORATION
Licensee: ALCO CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: GUAYNABO State: PR
County:
License #: 52-24843-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 030-2920
NRC Notified By: DAVID ROHE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: ALCO CORPORATION
Region: 1
City: GUAYNABO State: PR
County:
License #: 52-24843-01
Agreement: N
Docket: 030-2920
NRC Notified By: DAVID ROHE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/16/2005
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 14:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Notification Time: 14:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 14:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
10 CFR Section:
20.2201(a)(1)(i) - LOST/STOLEN LNM>1000X
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
DONNA-MARIE PEREZ (TAS)
CPN NUCLEAR GAUGE STOLEN FROM THE JOBSITE
An employee of the ALCO Corporation was working at a jobsite on Highway PR837 in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico with a CPN nuclear gauge. About 14:55 on 2/16/05 he had walked 40 feet away from the nuclear gauge and when he returned to the area he noticed the gauge missing. The gauge contain two sources, 50 millicuries Am-241and 10 millicuries of Cs-137. A police report was being taken and that information will be provided as a later update.
No reward for the return of the gauge is being offered at this time.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/17/05 AT 0742 FROM DAVID RHOE TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The following information was received via facsimile from Mr. Rhoe:
"RE: Stolen CPN Nuclear Gauge [Serial number] MD20801021
"On February 16, 2005 the above nuclear gauge was stolen from a [deleted] vehicle. The nuclear gauge was located inside the carrying case and the case was secured by chains/padlock to the vehicle. The chain was cut and the nuclear gauge/case/chains were removed. Mr. [deleted] was inspecting the asphalt and the vehicle was temporarily out of sight due to the blind spots around the corner of the road. The handle of the nuclear gauge inside the case was not locked. The incident occurred between 3:30 to 4:00 pm on RP 837 in Guaynabo at the Barrio Camarones site. The police and NRC were immediately notified. The police report number is 05-7-132-02011.
"The following media stations were notified:
Channel 2 WKAQ TV
Channel 4 WAPA TV
University of Puerto Rico TV
"Today the radio stations and newspaper will be notified. There will be a reward offered for the return of the gauge."
Notified TAS DO, R1DO (Eugene Cobey), NMSS (Sandra Wastler)
An employee of the ALCO Corporation was working at a jobsite on Highway PR837 in Guaynabo, Puerto Rico with a CPN nuclear gauge. About 14:55 on 2/16/05 he had walked 40 feet away from the nuclear gauge and when he returned to the area he noticed the gauge missing. The gauge contain two sources, 50 millicuries Am-241and 10 millicuries of Cs-137. A police report was being taken and that information will be provided as a later update.
No reward for the return of the gauge is being offered at this time.
* * * UPDATE ON 02/17/05 AT 0742 FROM DAVID RHOE TO GERRY WAIG * * *
The following information was received via facsimile from Mr. Rhoe:
"RE: Stolen CPN Nuclear Gauge [Serial number] MD20801021
"On February 16, 2005 the above nuclear gauge was stolen from a [deleted] vehicle. The nuclear gauge was located inside the carrying case and the case was secured by chains/padlock to the vehicle. The chain was cut and the nuclear gauge/case/chains were removed. Mr. [deleted] was inspecting the asphalt and the vehicle was temporarily out of sight due to the blind spots around the corner of the road. The handle of the nuclear gauge inside the case was not locked. The incident occurred between 3:30 to 4:00 pm on RP 837 in Guaynabo at the Barrio Camarones site. The police and NRC were immediately notified. The police report number is 05-7-132-02011.
"The following media stations were notified:
Channel 2 WKAQ TV
Channel 4 WAPA TV
University of Puerto Rico TV
"Today the radio stations and newspaper will be notified. There will be a reward offered for the return of the gauge."
Notified TAS DO, R1DO (Eugene Cobey), NMSS (Sandra Wastler)
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41413
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PHILIP NORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: PHILIP NORTH
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/16/2005
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 13:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Notification Time: 21:20 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 13:31 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(A) - DEGRADED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
RUDOLPH BERNHARD (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 18 | Power Operation |
DEGRADED CONDITION - REACTOR BUILDING NORMAL SUMP LEVEL INCREASING
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"Event:
"On February 16, 2005 at 1331 hours EST, Operations discovered that the Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building Normal Sump (RBNS) level was increasing. Chemistry sampled the containment normal sump to determine the water source and could not conclusively rule out Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW). The leak rate into the sump is approximately 1.9 gpm. LPSW is the cooling medium used for the Reactor Cooling Pump (RCP) motor coolers, the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU), and the Reactor Building Auxiliary Cooling Units (RBACU).
"Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.A at 1331. This requires restoring containment to Operable status within 1 hour. The approximately 1.9 gpm leakage is above the leakage allowed in calculation OSC-7005 "LPSW Allowable Leakage Inside Containment". At 1431 Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1 B which requires being in mode 3 in 12 hours.
"Initial Safety Significance:
"By limiting the amount of LPSW leakage inside containment then containment operability is ensured. Above the calculated LPSW leakage as stated in OSC-7005, containment operability is in question. The LPSW system pressure could be less than containment LOCA peak pressure. Therefore containment atmosphere has the potential to leak through the LPSW system, during a LOCA, and out the return line resulting in a containment leak path.
"Collective Action(s):
"Additional sampling and process indications suggest that the cause of the Reactor Building Normal Sump rate increase is feedwater or main steam. A power reduction to 18% has been completed and a reactor building entry is in progress to confirm the source of the leakage. If the source is confirmed to be feedwater or main steam, Technical Specification 3.6.1 will be exited."
The turbine is still loaded and the electrical grid was not affected by the power decrease to 18%. All systems functioned as required and other units at Oconee were not affected by this event.
NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/17/05 @ 0018 BY JOHN COLLINS TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * UPDATE
They entered the containment and verified a steam leak off the impulse line for the "3B" steam generator main steam pressure transmitters. They are currently at 18% power and making a decisions on repair options.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. The Reg 2 RDO(Bernhard) was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/17/05 @ 0139 BY JOHN COLLINS TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION
At 0012 on February 17, 2005 entry into the Unit 3 reactor building confirmed that the source of leakage into the reactor building normal sump was the Main Steam system. Specifically, the location of the leak appears to be a fitting downstream of an instrument root valve off the 3B Main Steam line. Based on this information, Technical Specification 3.6.1 was exited and this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. and therefore being retracted.
A shutdown to MODE 3 will be conducted to facilitate repairing the leak.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. Reg 2 RDO(Bernhard) was notified.
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"Event:
"On February 16, 2005 at 1331 hours EST, Operations discovered that the Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building Normal Sump (RBNS) level was increasing. Chemistry sampled the containment normal sump to determine the water source and could not conclusively rule out Low Pressure Service Water (LPSW). The leak rate into the sump is approximately 1.9 gpm. LPSW is the cooling medium used for the Reactor Cooling Pump (RCP) motor coolers, the Reactor Building Cooling Units (RBCU), and the Reactor Building Auxiliary Cooling Units (RBACU).
"Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1.A at 1331. This requires restoring containment to Operable status within 1 hour. The approximately 1.9 gpm leakage is above the leakage allowed in calculation OSC-7005 "LPSW Allowable Leakage Inside Containment". At 1431 Unit 3 entered Technical Specification 3.6.1 B which requires being in mode 3 in 12 hours.
"Initial Safety Significance:
"By limiting the amount of LPSW leakage inside containment then containment operability is ensured. Above the calculated LPSW leakage as stated in OSC-7005, containment operability is in question. The LPSW system pressure could be less than containment LOCA peak pressure. Therefore containment atmosphere has the potential to leak through the LPSW system, during a LOCA, and out the return line resulting in a containment leak path.
"Collective Action(s):
"Additional sampling and process indications suggest that the cause of the Reactor Building Normal Sump rate increase is feedwater or main steam. A power reduction to 18% has been completed and a reactor building entry is in progress to confirm the source of the leakage. If the source is confirmed to be feedwater or main steam, Technical Specification 3.6.1 will be exited."
The turbine is still loaded and the electrical grid was not affected by the power decrease to 18%. All systems functioned as required and other units at Oconee were not affected by this event.
NRC Resident Inspector was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/17/05 @ 0018 BY JOHN COLLINS TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * UPDATE
They entered the containment and verified a steam leak off the impulse line for the "3B" steam generator main steam pressure transmitters. They are currently at 18% power and making a decisions on repair options.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. The Reg 2 RDO(Bernhard) was notified.
* * * UPDATE ON 2/17/05 @ 0139 BY JOHN COLLINS TO CHAUNCEY GOULD * * * RETRACTION
At 0012 on February 17, 2005 entry into the Unit 3 reactor building confirmed that the source of leakage into the reactor building normal sump was the Main Steam system. Specifically, the location of the leak appears to be a fitting downstream of an instrument root valve off the 3B Main Steam line. Based on this information, Technical Specification 3.6.1 was exited and this event is not reportable per 10CFR50.72. and therefore being retracted.
A shutdown to MODE 3 will be conducted to facilitate repairing the leak.
The NRC Resident Inspector will be informed. Reg 2 RDO(Bernhard) was notified.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41414
Facility: GINNA
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PETER BRAMFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: PETER BRAMFORD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/17/2005
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 21:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Notification Time: 00:18 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 21:12 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/17/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
EUGENE COBEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP AS A RESULT OF FAILED POWER SUPPLY
"Ginna Station received a reactor trip from Turbine Trip at 2112 hrs on 02/16/05. The Turbine Trip signal was generated from the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) related to a failed power supply in the Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3, RCS Pressure 2235 psig, Temperature 540 deg F. AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] did actuate as designed after the trip.
"For the transient, min & max Temperatures, Pressures & Levels are:
RCS Temperature: Max - 561 deg F Min - 538 deg F
RCS Pressure: Max - 2250 psig Min - 2218 psig
Pressurizer Level: Max - 50% Min - 28%"
The electrical grid is stable. Decay heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State Public Service Commission.
"Ginna Station received a reactor trip from Turbine Trip at 2112 hrs on 02/16/05. The Turbine Trip signal was generated from the ATWS Mitigation System Actuation Circuitry (AMSAC) related to a failed power supply in the Advanced Digital Feedwater Control System. All control rods inserted on the reactor trip. The plant is currently stable in Mode 3, RCS Pressure 2235 psig, Temperature 540 deg F. AFW [Auxiliary Feed Water] did actuate as designed after the trip.
"For the transient, min & max Temperatures, Pressures & Levels are:
RCS Temperature: Max - 561 deg F Min - 538 deg F
RCS Pressure: Max - 2250 psig Min - 2218 psig
Pressurizer Level: Max - 50% Min - 28%"
The electrical grid is stable. Decay heat is being rejected to the Main Condenser. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State Public Service Commission.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41420
Rep Org: WISCONSIN RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: MARSHFIELD CLINIC
Region: 3
City: MARSHFIELD State: WI
County:
License #: 141-01162-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL SCHMIDT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Licensee: MARSHFIELD CLINIC
Region: 3
City: MARSHFIELD State: WI
County:
License #: 141-01162-001
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: PAUL SCHMIDT
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 02/18/2005
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2005
Notification Time: 17:04 [ET]
Event Date: 02/16/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/18/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
PATRICK LOUDEN (R3)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE MEDICAL EVENT
The following information was provided by the State of Wisconsin via facsimile:
"On Thursday, February 17, 2005 at approximately 3:45p.m. [CST], the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section (RPS) received a telephone call from the Marshfield Clinic, Marshfield, WI (license number 141-01162-001) informing the section of a medical event involving a therapeutic radiation dose from a gamma knife exposing a site outside the intended treatment volume to a level greater than 50% of the expected dose. (HFS 157.72 (1) (a) 3.)
"Preliminary Information From the Licensee:
"On Wednesday, February 16, 2005, the Marshfield Clinic had scheduled a therapeutic radiation treatment of 18 Gray (1800 Rads) using a gamma knife. During the process of manually programming the positioning system, the y and z coordinates were transposed. The error was not noticed during a double check of the treatment coordinates. As a result, a site outside the intended treatment volume received an estimated dose of 5.06 Gray (506 Rads) instead of the originally estimated 0.4 Gray (40 Rads). The volume of the unintended treatment site was 0.7 cubic centimeters. The treatment duration was 2.42 minutes. The prescribed dose of 18 Gray was delivered and the patient treatment was completed.
"The attending neurosurgeon and radiation oncologist believe there will be no medical consequences to the patient from the unintended exposure. The referring physician has been notified.
"[State of Wisconsin] is reporting this event under:
"HFS 157.72 (1) (a) 3. requires a licensee to report an event where there is 'A dose to an organ outside the intended treatment volume that exceeds the expected dose to that organ by 0.5 Sv (50 Rem) where the excess dose is greater than 50% of the expected dose to that organ. . . '
"DHFS, RPS staff have been dispatched on Friday, February 18, 2005 to investigate.
"Wisconsin Incident No: 20"
The following information was provided by the State of Wisconsin via facsimile:
"On Thursday, February 17, 2005 at approximately 3:45p.m. [CST], the Wisconsin Radiation Protection Section (RPS) received a telephone call from the Marshfield Clinic, Marshfield, WI (license number 141-01162-001) informing the section of a medical event involving a therapeutic radiation dose from a gamma knife exposing a site outside the intended treatment volume to a level greater than 50% of the expected dose. (HFS 157.72 (1) (a) 3.)
"Preliminary Information From the Licensee:
"On Wednesday, February 16, 2005, the Marshfield Clinic had scheduled a therapeutic radiation treatment of 18 Gray (1800 Rads) using a gamma knife. During the process of manually programming the positioning system, the y and z coordinates were transposed. The error was not noticed during a double check of the treatment coordinates. As a result, a site outside the intended treatment volume received an estimated dose of 5.06 Gray (506 Rads) instead of the originally estimated 0.4 Gray (40 Rads). The volume of the unintended treatment site was 0.7 cubic centimeters. The treatment duration was 2.42 minutes. The prescribed dose of 18 Gray was delivered and the patient treatment was completed.
"The attending neurosurgeon and radiation oncologist believe there will be no medical consequences to the patient from the unintended exposure. The referring physician has been notified.
"[State of Wisconsin] is reporting this event under:
"HFS 157.72 (1) (a) 3. requires a licensee to report an event where there is 'A dose to an organ outside the intended treatment volume that exceeds the expected dose to that organ by 0.5 Sv (50 Rem) where the excess dose is greater than 50% of the expected dose to that organ. . . '
"DHFS, RPS staff have been dispatched on Friday, February 18, 2005 to investigate.
"Wisconsin Incident No: 20"