Event Notification Report for February 14, 2005

TECH SPEC REQUIRED SHUTDOWN

The following information was provided by the licensee via e-mail:

"On February 10, 2005, plant operators observed an abnormal flow condition on Unit 2 Train 'B' Component Cooling Water (CCW) from the Shutdown Cooling Heat (SDC) exchanger and, at about 2315 PST, declared Train 'B' of Containment Spray inoperable. This caused Unit 2 to enter a seven-day action statement (TS 3.6.6.1).

"Although it may have been possible to correct the abnormal flow condition on-line, SCE has elected to shutdown Unit 2. Plant Operators initiated the shutdown at about 2155 PST on February 14, 2005. SCE in reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(i).

"At the time the shutdown was initiated, Unit 2 was operating at about 100% power. Unit 3 continues to operate at about 100 % power. The NRC Resident Inspectors have been briefed on the shutdown plans and will be provided with a copy of this report."

INADVERTANT SAFETY SYSTEM ACTUATION DURING MAINTENANCE

The following information was provided by the licensee via fax (licensee text in quotes):

"At 0718 on February 14, 2005, with the James A. FitzPatrick Nuclear Power Plant operating at 100% reactor power, the High Voltage Power Supply (HVPS) for Reactor Building (RB) Radiation Monitor 17RM-452A was inadvertently de-energized.

"At 0724 the HVPS was re-energized and the technician began to adjust the output of the high voltage power supply. This adjustment resulted in an unanticipated voltage spike in the radiation monitor circuit. The voltage spike caused the radiation monitor to see a false Hi-Hi signal resulting in an actuation of the RB ventilation system isolation logic, start-up of the 'A' Standby Gas Treatment (SBGT) System, and a Half PCIS Group II Isolation. AOP-15, Isolation Verification and Recovery, was entered and at 0728 an 'A' train Group II PCIS Isolation was verified for that Channel.

"At 0750 AOP-15 was exited and plant systems were restored from the Half Group II PCIS Isolation.

"The reactor remained at 100% power throughout the event, and short-term LCOs were entered for equipment isolated as a result of the isolation, as applicable. While the Hi-Hi signal was falsely generated by the voltage spike encountered when re-energizing the HVPS the actuation logic functioned properly and the plant equipment responded as designed. There were no equipment failures associated with this event and neither plant operation nor the health and safety of the public were affected by this event.

"The condition meets the reporting criteria of 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(2)(iv)(a) because the invalid RB Radiation Monitor Hi - Hi signal resulted in a general containment isolation signal affecting containment isolation valves in more than one system ('A' SBGT, 'A' H2/02 Exosensors, 'A' Drywell Cam, 'A' Containment Atmosphere Dilution (CAD), 'A' PCP Vent and Purge). Since the signal was invalid this event meets the criteria in 10 CFR 50.73 (a)(1) for being reported as a 60-day phone call rather than as an LER.

"The event has been entered into the corrective action program and the resident inspector has been briefed.

"The apparent cause evaluation identified 1) a failure on the part of the technicians to plan for or provide a barrier to prevent the inadvertent actuation of the HVPS switch resulting in the initial deenergization of the radiation monitor circuit and then 2) failure to recognize that the restoration of the HVPS switch after inadvertent actuation should have been accomplished by entering the site work process and obtaining a work order which would have allowed for proper review and incorporation of barriers to minimize the probability of inadvertent isolations."

The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector and the State.