Event Notification Report for February 06, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/05/2005 - 02/06/2005
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41378
Facility: PADUCAH GASEOUS DIFFUSION PLANT
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TONY HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 2 State: KY
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM ENRICHMENT FACILITY
Comments: 2 DEMOCRACY CENTER
6903 ROCKLEDGE DRIVE
BETHESDA, MD 20817 (301)564-3200
NRC Notified By: TONY HUDSON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/06/2005
Notification Time: 17:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2005
Event Time: 10:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2005
Notification Time: 17:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2005
Event Time: 10:08 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/06/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
10 CFR Section:
76.120(c)(2) - SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
24 HOUR REPORT OF A SAFETY EQUIPMENT FAILURE
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"At 1008, on 2-06-05, the Plant Shift Superintendent [PSS] was notified that at the C-360 Toll and Transfer Facility on autoclave 4, the vent line block valve, XV-434, failed to close when the control switch was operated to the closed position. A check of the valve indicator showed that the valve moved to approximately 75% of the closed position. This valve is a single isolation point (no redundant valve) for two TSR [Technical and Safety Requirements] systems: (1) The Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System and (2) The Autoclave Water Inventory Control System. The autoclave was in mode 5, an applicable TSR mode for both systems. The PSS declared the systems inoperable and TSR LCOs 2.1.3.3 and 2.1.4.3 were implemented to remove the autoclave from service and place it in mode 2 within one hour.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120.c.2.i. It was an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a) The equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b) The equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should be operated on demand, and, c) No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:
"At 1008, on 2-06-05, the Plant Shift Superintendent [PSS] was notified that at the C-360 Toll and Transfer Facility on autoclave 4, the vent line block valve, XV-434, failed to close when the control switch was operated to the closed position. A check of the valve indicator showed that the valve moved to approximately 75% of the closed position. This valve is a single isolation point (no redundant valve) for two TSR [Technical and Safety Requirements] systems: (1) The Autoclave Steam Pressure Control System and (2) The Autoclave Water Inventory Control System. The autoclave was in mode 5, an applicable TSR mode for both systems. The PSS declared the systems inoperable and TSR LCOs 2.1.3.3 and 2.1.4.3 were implemented to remove the autoclave from service and place it in mode 2 within one hour.
"This event is reportable as a 24 hour event in accordance with 10 CFR 76.120.c.2.i. It was an event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed when: a) The equipment is required by a TSR to prevent releases, prevent exposures to radiation and radioactive materials exceeding specified limits, mitigate the consequences of an accident, or restore this facility to a pre-established safe condition after an accident; b) The equipment is required by a TSR to be available and operable and either should have been operating or should be operated on demand, and, c) No redundant equipment is available and operable to perform the required safety function.
"The NRC Senior Resident Inspector has been notified of this event."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41379
Facility: PALO VERDE
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 4 State: AZ
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: STEVE SMITH
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 02/07/2005
Notification Time: 04:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2005
Event Time: 22:19 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2005
Notification Time: 04:41 [ET]
Event Date: 02/06/2005
Event Time: 22:19 [MST]
Last Update Date: 02/07/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
CORNELIUS HOLDEN (NRR)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
CORNELIUS HOLDEN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
EMERGENCY DIESEL START DUE TO BUS DEENERGIZATION
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On February 6, 2005, at approximately 22:19 Mountain Standard Time (MST) a valid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Train `B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred as a result of undervoltage on its respective safety bus (PBB-S04). EDG 'B' started and loaded as designed to energize PBB-S04.
"The loss of power to the safety bus was the result of a fault associated with 13.8KV breaker NAN-SO6J which caused breakers NAN-SO6H (normal power supply), NAN-S06K (alternate power supply), and NAN-SO6J (EOF & TSC Bldg power supply) to all trip open on Overcurrent. This action resulted in the deenergization of NAN-S06, NAN-S04, and PBB-S04. The PVNGS Fire Department and Auxiliary Operators responded to a report of smoke and upon arrival found no fire. The Fire Department verified the fire was completely extinguished and there were no extensions (secondary fires).
"Unit 1 entered Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, Condition 'A', for one (of two) required offsite circuits inoperable. Various other Technical Specifications LCO's were momentarily entered and exited for PBB-S04 being deenergized for approximately 7 seconds. No Emergency Plan declaration was made and none was required.
"Unit 1 was at approximately 100% power, at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to and following the EDG actuation. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the ESF actuation and this ENS notification."
The B EDG is providing power to PBB-S04. Due to loss of power to the TSC, the TSC Diesel started and is providing power to the TSC. The Backup EOF located in Buckeye, AZ will be used in the case of an emergency event. There were no reported injuries. There was damage to the NAN-S06J breaker and it has been isolated. The event has been entered into the site's corrective action program for determining the cause of the breaker trip and damage. This event has no effect on the operation of the other site units.
The following information was provided by the licensee via facsimile:
"The following event description is based on information currently available. If through subsequent reviews of this event, additional information is identified that is pertinent to this event or alters the information being provided at this time, a follow-up notification will be made via the ENS or under the reporting requirements of 10CFR50.73.
"On February 6, 2005, at approximately 22:19 Mountain Standard Time (MST) a valid actuation of the Palo Verde Nuclear Generating Station Unit 1 Train `B' Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) occurred as a result of undervoltage on its respective safety bus (PBB-S04). EDG 'B' started and loaded as designed to energize PBB-S04.
"The loss of power to the safety bus was the result of a fault associated with 13.8KV breaker NAN-SO6J which caused breakers NAN-SO6H (normal power supply), NAN-S06K (alternate power supply), and NAN-SO6J (EOF & TSC Bldg power supply) to all trip open on Overcurrent. This action resulted in the deenergization of NAN-S06, NAN-S04, and PBB-S04. The PVNGS Fire Department and Auxiliary Operators responded to a report of smoke and upon arrival found no fire. The Fire Department verified the fire was completely extinguished and there were no extensions (secondary fires).
"Unit 1 entered Technical Specification LCO 3.8.1, Condition 'A', for one (of two) required offsite circuits inoperable. Various other Technical Specifications LCO's were momentarily entered and exited for PBB-S04 being deenergized for approximately 7 seconds. No Emergency Plan declaration was made and none was required.
"Unit 1 was at approximately 100% power, at normal operating temperature and pressure prior to and following the EDG actuation. No other ESF actuations occurred and none were required. No major equipment was inoperable prior to the event that contributed to the event. The event did not result in any challenges to fission product barriers and there were no adverse safety consequences as a result of this event. The event did not adversely affect the safe operation of the plant or the health and safety of the public.
"The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified of the ESF actuation and this ENS notification."
The B EDG is providing power to PBB-S04. Due to loss of power to the TSC, the TSC Diesel started and is providing power to the TSC. The Backup EOF located in Buckeye, AZ will be used in the case of an emergency event. There were no reported injuries. There was damage to the NAN-S06J breaker and it has been isolated. The event has been entered into the site's corrective action program for determining the cause of the breaker trip and damage. This event has no effect on the operation of the other site units.