Event Notification Report for February 04, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/03/2005 - 02/04/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
413724137341374413754167241411
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41372
Facility: WESTINGHOUSE ELECTRIC CORPORATION
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: M. OWEN CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
NRC Notified By: M. OWEN CONNELLY
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 09:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
24-HOUR NOTIFICATION-BULLETIN 91-01 CRITICALITY CONTROL
The following information was obtained from the licensee via email :
"Facility:
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC,
low enriched ([DELETED]) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
"Time and Date of Event:
February 4, 2005, 0900 hours:
"Reason for Notification:
Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and by then preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers.
"Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder room is assured by controls such as a double roof, restrictions on firefighting combined with limits on combustible materials, limits on moderators for maintenance and cleaning, and rigorous control over powder moisture to ensure that no carts enter the bulk room that have polypaks with moisture above 0.3 wt%.
"Prevention of moderator from entering the bulk container is assured by controls such as procedure requirements to ensure visual inspection of all powder before it is dumped into a bulk container and the polypak dump hood interlock system.
"In order to dump a polypak into a bulk container, the operator must scan the polypak's unique barcode and place the polypak into the polypak dump hood mechanism. After the barcode is scanned, the interlock function checks the moisture data associated with the polypak to ensure it is <0.3 wt%. If the moisture results are not <0.3 wt%, the dump hood locks up, preventing further dumping of powder until the discrepancy is resolved.
"During routine dumping operations, an infrared [s]ensor became misaligned in the polypak dump hood in bulk powder blending room. This resulted in a failure of the polypak dump hood interlock to finish its 'cycle' for that pack. It was expected that this sort of problem would be promptly self revealing, i.e. that the scanning of the next pack would result in an error indicating that the previous pack had not been 'consumed.' While the errors were generated, they were not readily apparent, except to an attentive operator. The barcode scanner sounded the same, the visual cues were subtle, and the dump [hood] interlock did not lock up. The operator was able to scan additional paks and dump them. The moisture database would not have been consulted for any of these paks.
"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'
"As Found Condition:
An operator found the problem after dumping the first polypak of a blend.
"Summary of Activity:
The affected equipment has been shut down.
New programming and other improvements are being developed.
"Conclusions:
There was less than a critical mass of SNM involved.
At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee will be notifying NRC Region II of this incident.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via email :
"Facility:
Westinghouse Electric Company, Commercial Fuel Fabrication Facility, Columbia SC,
low enriched ([DELETED]) PWR fuel fabricator for commercial light water reactors. License: SNM-1107.
"Time and Date of Event:
February 4, 2005, 0900 hours:
"Reason for Notification:
Double contingency protection for non-favorable geometry (NFG) bulk containers is based on preventing moderation from entering the bulk powder blending room and by then preventing the moderator from entering the bulk containers.
"Prevention of moderation from entering the bulk powder room is assured by controls such as a double roof, restrictions on firefighting combined with limits on combustible materials, limits on moderators for maintenance and cleaning, and rigorous control over powder moisture to ensure that no carts enter the bulk room that have polypaks with moisture above 0.3 wt%.
"Prevention of moderator from entering the bulk container is assured by controls such as procedure requirements to ensure visual inspection of all powder before it is dumped into a bulk container and the polypak dump hood interlock system.
"In order to dump a polypak into a bulk container, the operator must scan the polypak's unique barcode and place the polypak into the polypak dump hood mechanism. After the barcode is scanned, the interlock function checks the moisture data associated with the polypak to ensure it is <0.3 wt%. If the moisture results are not <0.3 wt%, the dump hood locks up, preventing further dumping of powder until the discrepancy is resolved.
"During routine dumping operations, an infrared [s]ensor became misaligned in the polypak dump hood in bulk powder blending room. This resulted in a failure of the polypak dump hood interlock to finish its 'cycle' for that pack. It was expected that this sort of problem would be promptly self revealing, i.e. that the scanning of the next pack would result in an error indicating that the previous pack had not been 'consumed.' While the errors were generated, they were not readily apparent, except to an attentive operator. The barcode scanner sounded the same, the visual cues were subtle, and the dump [hood] interlock did not lock up. The operator was able to scan additional paks and dump them. The moisture database would not have been consulted for any of these paks.
"In accordance with Westinghouse Operating License (SNM-1107), paragraph 3.7.3 (c.5b), this event satisfies the criteria for a 24-hour notification, specifically, 'Any nuclear criticality safety incident, in an analyzed system, for which less than previously documented double contingency protection remains (multi-parameter control or single-parameter control) and less than a safe mass is involved.' and 10CFR70, specifically Appendix A.b.2 'Loss or degradation of items relied on for safety that results in failure to meet performance requirements of 10CFR70.61.'
"As Found Condition:
An operator found the problem after dumping the first polypak of a blend.
"Summary of Activity:
The affected equipment has been shut down.
New programming and other improvements are being developed.
"Conclusions:
There was less than a critical mass of SNM involved.
At no time was the health or safety to any employee or member of the public in jeopardy. No exposure to hazardous material was involved.
The Incident Review Committee (IRC) has determined that this is a safety significant incident in accordance with governing procedures.
A causal analysis will be performed."
The licensee will be notifying NRC Region II of this incident.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41373
Facility: CATAWBA
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: THOMAS GARRISON
HQ OPS Officer: JANELLE BATTISTE
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 15:12 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 07:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
CHARLIE PAYNE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
The following information was obtained from the licensee via fax:
"At approximately 0730 on 2/4/05, a radiography safety officer notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC DHEC) of a violation of a radiography boundary. The violation occurred sometime between the hours of 2230 on 2/3/05 and 0030 on 2/4/05. At the time of the breech, the radiography source was stored, so no overexposure of personnel is suspected. However, the individual seen by the radiographers has not been identified to ascertain whether or not they were wearing dosimetry while within the boundary. This requires notification to the offsite agency SC DHEC since it is unknown whether or not they were monitored. The radiation safety officer was unaware and his administrative procedure did not inform him of the need for a 10 CFR 50.72 (b) 2 notification. Thus, licensed personnel did not discover that the notification had been made until 1300 on 2/4/05. At this time, licensed personnel began gathering information on the nature of the call to determine reportability.
The site has assembled an event investigation team in response to the radiography boundary violation."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified as well as the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. State and local authorities will be notified of this event.
The licensee will notify the NRC of any further information obtained from the investigation.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via fax:
"At approximately 0730 on 2/4/05, a radiography safety officer notified the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control (SC DHEC) of a violation of a radiography boundary. The violation occurred sometime between the hours of 2230 on 2/3/05 and 0030 on 2/4/05. At the time of the breech, the radiography source was stored, so no overexposure of personnel is suspected. However, the individual seen by the radiographers has not been identified to ascertain whether or not they were wearing dosimetry while within the boundary. This requires notification to the offsite agency SC DHEC since it is unknown whether or not they were monitored. The radiation safety officer was unaware and his administrative procedure did not inform him of the need for a 10 CFR 50.72 (b) 2 notification. Thus, licensed personnel did not discover that the notification had been made until 1300 on 2/4/05. At this time, licensed personnel began gathering information on the nature of the call to determine reportability.
The site has assembled an event investigation team in response to the radiography boundary violation."
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified as well as the South Carolina Department of Health and Environmental Control. State and local authorities will be notified of this event.
The licensee will notify the NRC of any further information obtained from the investigation.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41374
Facility: MONTICELLO
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRETT WELLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: MN
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3
NRC Notified By: BRETT WELLER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 13:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 17:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 13:37 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(A) - POT UNABLE TO SAFE SD 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 98 | Power Operation | 98 | Power Operation |
4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On February 4, 2005, at 1337 hours, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant discovered a potential vulnerability with 4160 VAC current sensing and protective relaying circuitry that could result in bus lockouts of both safeguards buses (#15 and #16) if a specific equipment fault were to occur. The 1AR Auxiliary Reserve Transformer source to each of the safeguards buses have current transformers used for over-current protective relaying that have common connections to facilitate a single watt-hour meter. The lack of neutral over-current trip relaying limits the event vulnerability to a case (most likely fire) of an outside voltage source contacting one or more CT phase legs that forces current through the over-current trip relays. If this forced current is of sufficient magnitude through both division over-current relays, both safeguards buses will receive lockout signals. This would make both safeguards buses unavailable. Since the 1AR transformer is not required at this time, it has been isolated from the safeguards buses, and their associated over-current relaying isolated to preclude occurrence of this event.
"This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, C, and D)) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)),
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle) #41369 (Quad Cities) and #41370 (Dresden).
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On February 4, 2005, at 1337 hours, Monticello Nuclear Generating Plant discovered a potential vulnerability with 4160 VAC current sensing and protective relaying circuitry that could result in bus lockouts of both safeguards buses (#15 and #16) if a specific equipment fault were to occur. The 1AR Auxiliary Reserve Transformer source to each of the safeguards buses have current transformers used for over-current protective relaying that have common connections to facilitate a single watt-hour meter. The lack of neutral over-current trip relaying limits the event vulnerability to a case (most likely fire) of an outside voltage source contacting one or more CT phase legs that forces current through the over-current trip relays. If this forced current is of sufficient magnitude through both division over-current relays, both safeguards buses will receive lockout signals. This would make both safeguards buses unavailable. Since the 1AR transformer is not required at this time, it has been isolated from the safeguards buses, and their associated over-current relaying isolated to preclude occurrence of this event.
"This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(A, B, C, and D)) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B)),
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle) #41369 (Quad Cities) and #41370 (Dresden).
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Hospital
Event Number: 41375
Rep Org: UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT HEALTH CT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT MEDICAL CTR
Region: 1
City: FARMINGTON State: CT
County:
License #: 06-13022-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN PRICE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF CONNECTICUT MEDICAL CTR
Region: 1
City: FARMINGTON State: CT
County:
License #: 06-13022-02
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KEN PRICE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2005
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/09/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
10 CFR Section:
35.3045(a)(1) - DOSE <> PRESCRIBED DOSAGE
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
MEDICAL EVENT
"At 0900 hours on 2/4/05, a Nuclear Medicine Technician attempted to inject 32.7 milliCuries of Tc-99m into an implanted single lumen port located near the left breast of a female patient. The patient was scheduled for a red blood cell study. After injecting 21.1 mCi, the Tech noticed resistance and could not deliver the rest of the dose. A scan of the patient indicated the material was not metabolizing, and a localized spot was identified near the port. The Nuclear Medicine Physician, after reading the scan, determined that the dose had been delivered to a volume of 15-30 cubic centimeters of tissue around the port. The Radiation Safety Officer estimated that the committed absorbed dose to this tissue volume is on the order of 52.7 to 83.2 Rad, using MIRD dosimetry. The patient was notified by the Nuclear Medicine Physician, and the physician has indicated that there will be no deleterious effects on the patient. The NRC Operations Center was called at 1800 hours on 2/4/05, as of this time it is not certain if the internal line was crimped by the patient or the event was caused by failure of the port."
* * * * RETRACTION OF REPORT ON 02/09/05 AT 1058 EST BY KEN PRICE TO MACKINNON * * * *
Retracting report after discussion with NRC Region 1 Penny Lanzisera. The licensee is retracting this report because it has been determined not to be a reportable event. R1DO (Jim Trapp) and NMSS (Sandra Wastler) notified.
"At 0900 hours on 2/4/05, a Nuclear Medicine Technician attempted to inject 32.7 milliCuries of Tc-99m into an implanted single lumen port located near the left breast of a female patient. The patient was scheduled for a red blood cell study. After injecting 21.1 mCi, the Tech noticed resistance and could not deliver the rest of the dose. A scan of the patient indicated the material was not metabolizing, and a localized spot was identified near the port. The Nuclear Medicine Physician, after reading the scan, determined that the dose had been delivered to a volume of 15-30 cubic centimeters of tissue around the port. The Radiation Safety Officer estimated that the committed absorbed dose to this tissue volume is on the order of 52.7 to 83.2 Rad, using MIRD dosimetry. The patient was notified by the Nuclear Medicine Physician, and the physician has indicated that there will be no deleterious effects on the patient. The NRC Operations Center was called at 1800 hours on 2/4/05, as of this time it is not certain if the internal line was crimped by the patient or the event was caused by failure of the port."
* * * * RETRACTION OF REPORT ON 02/09/05 AT 1058 EST BY KEN PRICE TO MACKINNON * * * *
Retracting report after discussion with NRC Region 1 Penny Lanzisera. The licensee is retracting this report because it has been determined not to be a reportable event. R1DO (Jim Trapp) and NMSS (Sandra Wastler) notified.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41672
Rep Org: LOUISIANA RADIATION PROTECTION DIV
Licensee: BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF NORTHWEST LA
Region: 4
City: SHREVEPORT State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7390-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Licensee: BIOMEDICAL RESEARCH FOUNDATION OF NORTHWEST LA
Region: 4
City: SHREVEPORT State: LA
County:
License #: LA-7390-L01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: SCOTT BLACKWELL
HQ OPS Officer: PETE SNYDER
Notification Date: 05/06/2005
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2005
Notification Time: 11:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 05/06/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
TROY PRUETT (R4)
CHARLES COX (NMSS)
TROY PRUETT (R4)
CHARLES COX (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE - POTENTIAL OVEREXPOSURE
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"This is a notification of a potential overexposure. [A technician] was repairing a leak on a high pressure line on a cyclotron. While testing the pressure line, the target unload line at the bottom of the target came lose. This resulted in a mist of water containing F-18. This mist contaminated [the technician's] lab coat. The lab coat was removed with the personnel monitoring badge attached and put behind some lead shielding for decay. This occurred on a Friday so the lab coat was [resurveyed on Monday morning] and was not contaminated. [The technician and] the rest of his clothes [were] not contaminated. This is how the facility believes the overexposure of 12 Rem occurred. The facility has put the following in place as corrective action: The technician will share his maintenance work with another qualified operator for the next six months. Chirping personal dosimeters will be worn during high dose maintenance. Instruction will be given concerning the hazards of radioactivity under pressure. All personnel will report any worker contamination to the RSO within 4 hours."
LA Event Report ID No.: LA050004
The State provided the following information via facsimile:
"This is a notification of a potential overexposure. [A technician] was repairing a leak on a high pressure line on a cyclotron. While testing the pressure line, the target unload line at the bottom of the target came lose. This resulted in a mist of water containing F-18. This mist contaminated [the technician's] lab coat. The lab coat was removed with the personnel monitoring badge attached and put behind some lead shielding for decay. This occurred on a Friday so the lab coat was [resurveyed on Monday morning] and was not contaminated. [The technician and] the rest of his clothes [were] not contaminated. This is how the facility believes the overexposure of 12 Rem occurred. The facility has put the following in place as corrective action: The technician will share his maintenance work with another qualified operator for the next six months. Chirping personal dosimeters will be worn during high dose maintenance. Instruction will be given concerning the hazards of radioactivity under pressure. All personnel will report any worker contamination to the RSO within 4 hours."
LA Event Report ID No.: LA050004
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41411
Rep Org: NE DIV OF RADIOACTIVE MATERIALS
Licensee: NUCOR STEEL
Region: 4
City: NORFOLK State: NE
County:
License #: 07-04-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIA SCHMITT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Licensee: NUCOR STEEL
Region: 4
City: NORFOLK State: NE
County:
License #: 07-04-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JULIA SCHMITT
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN KNOKE
Notification Date: 02/15/2005
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2005
Notification Time: 18:00 [ET]
Event Date: 02/04/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/15/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JACK WHITTEN (R4)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
FAILURE OF SAFETY EQUIPMENT - FIXED GAUGE
The following information (Report # NE050003) was provided by the State of Nebraska (Julia Schmitt) via facsimile:
"Operators noticed that strand line #2 was showing erratic readings that were not consistent with the other three operating molds. Operations were suspended to investigate the cause. The assistant RSOs responded and observed that the gauge had separated between the top actuator flange and the shield housing. It was determined that the gauge's lead housing had separated from the flange, leaving approximately seven inches of the source rod unshielded. There was no visible exterior damage to the flange or housing. Leak tests and surveys were performed that verified that the gauge's actuator was locked-out. The device was removed from service and placed in an onsite storage vault awaiting analysis as to the cause of the failure."
The licensee reporting this malfunction is Nucor Corporation, located in Norfolk, NE 68702.
The source of radiation is a fixed gauge, model number P2608-100, manufactured by Berthold, and contained 0.003 curies of Co-60. The malfunctioned equipment is a fixed gauge, model number LB300 ML, also manufactured by Berthold.
Ms. Schmitt believed the radiation exposure to personnel was < 2mrem/hr, however, this has not been determined as fact.
The following information (Report # NE050003) was provided by the State of Nebraska (Julia Schmitt) via facsimile:
"Operators noticed that strand line #2 was showing erratic readings that were not consistent with the other three operating molds. Operations were suspended to investigate the cause. The assistant RSOs responded and observed that the gauge had separated between the top actuator flange and the shield housing. It was determined that the gauge's lead housing had separated from the flange, leaving approximately seven inches of the source rod unshielded. There was no visible exterior damage to the flange or housing. Leak tests and surveys were performed that verified that the gauge's actuator was locked-out. The device was removed from service and placed in an onsite storage vault awaiting analysis as to the cause of the failure."
The licensee reporting this malfunction is Nucor Corporation, located in Norfolk, NE 68702.
The source of radiation is a fixed gauge, model number P2608-100, manufactured by Berthold, and contained 0.003 curies of Co-60. The malfunctioned equipment is a fixed gauge, model number LB300 ML, also manufactured by Berthold.
Ms. Schmitt believed the radiation exposure to personnel was < 2mrem/hr, however, this has not been determined as fact.