Event Notification Report for February 03, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/02/2005 - 02/03/2005
EVENT NUMBERS
41368413694137041376
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41368
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: CLAY WILLIAMS
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/03/2005
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 12:27 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2005
Notification Time: 18:02 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 12:27 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO UNIT AUXILIARY TRANSFORMER TRIP
"On February 3, 2005, at about 1227 PST, SONGS Unit 2 tripped from about 100 percent power. Preliminary information indicates that the Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer tripped on high differential current, which caused the main generator to trip and caused the Reactor Protection System to automatically trip the reactor, as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed and the Unit remains stable in Mode 3 on Main Feedwater. SCE's investigation is ongoing.
"SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv).
"At the time of this event, SONGS Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. The NRC resident inspectors are aware of this event and SCE will provide them with a copy of this report."
All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser. All ESF systems are available and the electrical grid is stable.
"On February 3, 2005, at about 1227 PST, SONGS Unit 2 tripped from about 100 percent power. Preliminary information indicates that the Unit 2 Unit Auxiliary Transformer tripped on high differential current, which caused the main generator to trip and caused the Reactor Protection System to automatically trip the reactor, as expected. Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed and the Unit remains stable in Mode 3 on Main Feedwater. SCE's investigation is ongoing.
"SCE is reporting this occurrence in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) and 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(iv).
"At the time of this event, SONGS Unit 3 was at about 100 percent power. The NRC resident inspectors are aware of this event and SCE will provide them with a copy of this report."
All control rods fully inserted. Decay heat is being rejected to the main condenser. All ESF systems are available and the electrical grid is stable.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41369
Facility: QUAD CITIES
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TERRY GALLENTINE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-3,[2] GE-3
NRC Notified By: TERRY GALLENTINE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/03/2005
Notification Time: 23:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 18:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 23:48 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 18:19 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 85 | Power Operation | 85 | Power Operation |
4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY
The licensee provided the following report via facsimile:
"On February 3, 2005 at 1819 hours, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS) confirmed a vulnerability with a 4160 VAC relaying and metering current transformer (CT) associated with the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (i.e., the UAT and RAT) on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Although the CT is currently fully operable, failure of the CT circuitry could cause the neutral overcurrent relay to trip and lockout the circuit breakers supplying feeds to safety related buses 13 (23) and 14 (24), isolating them from their normal and emergency power sources. Emergency power (i.e., the emergency diesel generator) would still be available to supply power to safety related buses 13-1 (23-1) and 14-1 (24-1), but the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system may be without a source of power. If this failure occurred during a LOCA, then the RHRSW pumps may not be started within the ten minute requirement. A modification is in progress to eliminate this vulnerability. This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), and #41370 (Dresden).
The licensee provided the following report via facsimile:
"On February 3, 2005 at 1819 hours, Quad Cities Nuclear Power Station (QCNPS) confirmed a vulnerability with a 4160 VAC relaying and metering current transformer (CT) associated with the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (i.e., the UAT and RAT) on both Unit 1 and Unit 2. Although the CT is currently fully operable, failure of the CT circuitry could cause the neutral overcurrent relay to trip and lockout the circuit breakers supplying feeds to safety related buses 13 (23) and 14 (24), isolating them from their normal and emergency power sources. Emergency power (i.e., the emergency diesel generator) would still be available to supply power to safety related buses 13-1 (23-1) and 14-1 (24-1), but the Residual Heat Removal Service Water (RHRSW) system may be without a source of power. If this failure occurred during a LOCA, then the RHRSW pumps may not be started within the ten minute requirement. A modification is in progress to eliminate this vulnerability. This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)) and as a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), and #41370 (Dresden).
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41370
Facility: DRESDEN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [] [2] [3]
RX Type: [1] GE-1,[2] GE-3,[3] GE-3
NRC Notified By: PAUL SALGADO
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 00:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 19:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 00:23 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 19:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(B) - POT RHR INOP
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 95 | Power Operation | 95 | Power Operation |
| 3 | N | Y | 96 | Power Operation | 96 | Power Operation |
4160 VOLT RELAYING AND METERING SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY
The licensee provided the following report via facsimile:
"On February 3, 2005 at 1915 hours, DNPS confirmed a vulnerability with a 4160 VAC relaying and metering current transformer (CT) associated with the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (i.e., the UAT and RAT) on both Units. Although the CT is currently fully operable, failure of the CT circuitry will cause the neutral overcurrent relay to trip (and lockout) the main, reserve and tie feed breakers. These combined protective relay trips will act to trip and lock out the circuit breakers supplying feeds to buses 23 (33) and 24 (34), essentially isolating them from their normal and emergency power sources. Emergency power (i.e., the emergency diesel generator) would still be available to safety related buses 23-1 (33-1) and 24-1 (34-1), but the Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) system would remain without a power source. If this failure occurred during a LOCA, then the CCSW pumps may not be able to be started within ten minutes. A modification is in progress to eliminate this vulnerability. This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)) and a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), and #41369 (Quad Cities).
The licensee provided the following report via facsimile:
"On February 3, 2005 at 1915 hours, DNPS confirmed a vulnerability with a 4160 VAC relaying and metering current transformer (CT) associated with the Unit and Reserve Auxiliary Transformers (i.e., the UAT and RAT) on both Units. Although the CT is currently fully operable, failure of the CT circuitry will cause the neutral overcurrent relay to trip (and lockout) the main, reserve and tie feed breakers. These combined protective relay trips will act to trip and lock out the circuit breakers supplying feeds to buses 23 (33) and 24 (34), essentially isolating them from their normal and emergency power sources. Emergency power (i.e., the emergency diesel generator) would still be available to safety related buses 23-1 (33-1) and 24-1 (34-1), but the Containment Cooling Service Water (CCSW) system would remain without a power source. If this failure occurred during a LOCA, then the CCSW pumps may not be able to be started within ten minutes. A modification is in progress to eliminate this vulnerability. This event is being reported as a potential loss of safety function (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(v)(B)) and a degraded or unanalyzed condition (10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B))."
The NRC Resident Inspector has been notified.
See similar events #41362 (Crystal River), #41366 (LaSalle), and #41369 (Quad Cities).
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41376
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: ENGEO, INC.
Region: 4
City: VALLEJO State: CA
County:
License #: 3016-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: ENGEO, INC.
Region: 4
City: VALLEJO State: CA
County:
License #: 3016-07
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: KENT PRENDERGAST
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 18:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 16:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Notification Time: 18:53 [ET]
Event Date: 02/03/2005
Event Time: 16:30 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/04/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
The following information was received from California Radiation Health Bureau via facsimile:
"A Troxler Moisture Density gauge (Serial # 27061) was run over at construction site at Mare Island, Vallejo, CA at 4:30 PM on 2/3/05. According to the RSO, the gauge operator was standing 15 feet from the gauge when a loader operated by Gilotti Construction changed course and ran over the gauge. The gauge was damaged severely and the source rod was bent and removed by the operator from it's protective lead shield. The rod and gauge were stored in a shed and CPN (gauge manufacturer) has been contacted this afternoon and will retrieve the gauge and prepare it for transport to Troxler, Inc. The RSO will be investigating this incident"
The gauge contains 8 milliCuries of Cs-137 and 40 milliCuries of Am-241. At this time, there does not appear to be any personnel overexposures or spread of contamination due to this event. The State of California has requested that the worker's film badges be immediately processed as a part of the licensee investigation.
The following information was received from California Radiation Health Bureau via facsimile:
"A Troxler Moisture Density gauge (Serial # 27061) was run over at construction site at Mare Island, Vallejo, CA at 4:30 PM on 2/3/05. According to the RSO, the gauge operator was standing 15 feet from the gauge when a loader operated by Gilotti Construction changed course and ran over the gauge. The gauge was damaged severely and the source rod was bent and removed by the operator from it's protective lead shield. The rod and gauge were stored in a shed and CPN (gauge manufacturer) has been contacted this afternoon and will retrieve the gauge and prepare it for transport to Troxler, Inc. The RSO will be investigating this incident"
The gauge contains 8 milliCuries of Cs-137 and 40 milliCuries of Am-241. At this time, there does not appear to be any personnel overexposures or spread of contamination due to this event. The State of California has requested that the worker's film badges be immediately processed as a part of the licensee investigation.