Event Notification Report for February 02, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
02/01/2005 - 02/02/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41365
Facility: SALEM
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KONOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 1 State: NJ
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: JOHN KONOVALCHICK
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/02/2005
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2005
Event Time: 10:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2005
Notification Time: 14:25 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2005
Event Time: 10:34 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
TODD JACKSON (R1)
TODD JACKSON (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
OFFSITE NOTIFICATIONS DUE TO OIL SHEEN ON THE DELAWARE RIVER
"A report was made to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) and the National Response Center (NRC) when a light sheen of oil was observed on the Delaware River at the south end of Artificial Island. Chemistry personnel first observed the sheen during a routine oil water separator system walk-down at 1034 hours on February 2, 2005. The oil water separator system was immediately shut down. The amount of oil that produced the sheen is estimated to be approximately two ounces. Site personnel responded and deployed an absorbent oil boom. At the present time, site personnel are investigating whether the oil sheen originated from the site oil water separator system or was residual from the November 2004 Delaware River oil spill.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"A report was made to the New Jersey Department of Environmental Protection (NJDEP) and the National Response Center (NRC) when a light sheen of oil was observed on the Delaware River at the south end of Artificial Island. Chemistry personnel first observed the sheen during a routine oil water separator system walk-down at 1034 hours on February 2, 2005. The oil water separator system was immediately shut down. The amount of oil that produced the sheen is estimated to be approximately two ounces. Site personnel responded and deployed an absorbent oil boom. At the present time, site personnel are investigating whether the oil sheen originated from the site oil water separator system or was residual from the November 2004 Delaware River oil spill.
"This event is being reported in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(2)(xi)"
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41366
Facility: LASALLE
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HAROLD VINYARD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 3 State: IL
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-5,[2] GE-5
NRC Notified By: HAROLD VINYARD
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/02/2005
Notification Time: 20:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2005
Event Time: 15:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2005
Notification Time: 20:59 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2005
Event Time: 15:42 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
CORNELIUS HOLDEN (NRR)
BRUCE BURGESS (R3)
CORNELIUS HOLDEN (NRR)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SINGLE FAILURE VULNERABILITY IN AC AUXILIARY POWER SYSTEM
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At 15:42 on 02/02/05 while reviewing Operation Experience from another Nuclear Site, it was discovered that the design of the AC Auxiliary Power System incorporates a common circuit which could result in a bus lockout preventing the re-energization of both the Division 1 and Division 2 Essential Safety Feature (ESF) buses from either onsite or offsite power sources due to a single failure in the common portion of the circuitry. This common circuit includes various metering circuits such as System Auxiliary Transformer Wattmeters and Ammeters. Also connected to these metering loops are ground fault devices that feed breaker lockout relays. Should a failure occur on these common circuits, all breakers supplying power to these ESF Buses would be opened, locked out, and prevented from reclosure onto the buses.
"Due to the loss of the ability to accommodate a single failure, one offsite power source and one onsite Diesel Generator have been declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition A, Condition B, and Condition E entered. Corrective actions are in progress to isolate the common circuit and eliminate the single point vulnerability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"This report is being made pursuant to 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B). At 15:42 on 02/02/05 while reviewing Operation Experience from another Nuclear Site, it was discovered that the design of the AC Auxiliary Power System incorporates a common circuit which could result in a bus lockout preventing the re-energization of both the Division 1 and Division 2 Essential Safety Feature (ESF) buses from either onsite or offsite power sources due to a single failure in the common portion of the circuitry. This common circuit includes various metering circuits such as System Auxiliary Transformer Wattmeters and Ammeters. Also connected to these metering loops are ground fault devices that feed breaker lockout relays. Should a failure occur on these common circuits, all breakers supplying power to these ESF Buses would be opened, locked out, and prevented from reclosure onto the buses.
"Due to the loss of the ability to accommodate a single failure, one offsite power source and one onsite Diesel Generator have been declared inoperable and Technical Specification 3.8.1 Condition A, Condition B, and Condition E entered. Corrective actions are in progress to isolate the common circuit and eliminate the single point vulnerability."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41367
Rep Org: CALIFORNIA RADIATION CONTROL PRGM
Licensee: TRC LOWNEY ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: YORBA LINDA State: CA
County:
License #: 6773-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGOR
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: TRC LOWNEY ASSOCIATES
Region: 4
City: YORBA LINDA State: CA
County:
License #: 6773-30
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ROBERT GREGOR
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 02/03/2005
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2005
Event Time: 12:05 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2005
Notification Time: 15:28 [ET]
Event Date: 02/02/2005
Event Time: 12:05 [PST]
Last Update Date: 02/03/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GARY SANBORN (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
GARY SANBORN (R4)
M. WAYNE HODGES (NMSS)
CALIFORNIA AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - DAMAGED MOISTURE DENSITY GUAGE
At 1205 on February 2, 2005, the licensee called the Brea office to report that one of their moisture density gauges had been run over by construction equipment at 1145 that morning. The gauge was damaged to the extent that they were unable to retract the source rod back into the shielded position (CPN, model 3, # M22054410 - 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am:Be). The incident happened at a construction site located at 3208 Quarter Horse Drive in Yorba Linda at the water reservoir.
The outer gauge casing was in pieces, the rod handle was broken and the source rod was extended into the ground. The maximum dose rate with the source rod extended into the ground was 2 mrem/hr at contact measured with a Bicron microrem instrument. The dose rate when the source rod was extracted from the ground was approximately 30 mrem/hr at one foot from the rod tip. The Cs-137 end of the gauge source rod was placed in a lead pig, which was taped into place to keep the Cs-137 source shielded. The unit remains were placed in a plastic bag which was then placed into the transportation case. The device was transported to the local CPN service representative - Maurer Technical Services. Maurer Technical Services stated the sources appeared to be intact, and they took a wipe for a leak test. The wipe was sent out for counting. Alpha and beta surveys at the accident scene did not detect any contamination. Two wipes of the source housings were collected, which were counted in the Brea office on a Ludlum 3030 alpha-beta counter the next day. No contamination was detected on these two wipes.
The incident apparently occurred when the construction equipment, a front end loader, changed direction to avoid a truck, and there wasn't time for the gauge operator, who was in a safe location about 15 feet from the gauge, to signal the front end loader to stop.
At 1205 on February 2, 2005, the licensee called the Brea office to report that one of their moisture density gauges had been run over by construction equipment at 1145 that morning. The gauge was damaged to the extent that they were unable to retract the source rod back into the shielded position (CPN, model 3, # M22054410 - 10 mCi Cs-137 and 50 mCi Am:Be). The incident happened at a construction site located at 3208 Quarter Horse Drive in Yorba Linda at the water reservoir.
The outer gauge casing was in pieces, the rod handle was broken and the source rod was extended into the ground. The maximum dose rate with the source rod extended into the ground was 2 mrem/hr at contact measured with a Bicron microrem instrument. The dose rate when the source rod was extracted from the ground was approximately 30 mrem/hr at one foot from the rod tip. The Cs-137 end of the gauge source rod was placed in a lead pig, which was taped into place to keep the Cs-137 source shielded. The unit remains were placed in a plastic bag which was then placed into the transportation case. The device was transported to the local CPN service representative - Maurer Technical Services. Maurer Technical Services stated the sources appeared to be intact, and they took a wipe for a leak test. The wipe was sent out for counting. Alpha and beta surveys at the accident scene did not detect any contamination. Two wipes of the source housings were collected, which were counted in the Brea office on a Ludlum 3030 alpha-beta counter the next day. No contamination was detected on these two wipes.
The incident apparently occurred when the construction equipment, a front end loader, changed direction to avoid a truck, and there wasn't time for the gauge operator, who was in a safe location about 15 feet from the gauge, to signal the front end loader to stop.