Event Notification Report for January 27, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/26/2005 - 01/27/2005
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41362
Facility: CRYSTAL RIVER
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: GUY McCALLUM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: FL
Unit: [3] [] []
RX Type: [3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: GUY McCALLUM
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 01/27/2005
Notification Time: 21:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2005
Event Time: 18:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2005
Notification Time: 21:12 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2005
Event Time: 18:30 [EST]
Last Update Date: 01/28/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
SINGLE FAILURE IDENTIFIED THAT COULD PREVENT RE-ENERGIZING BOTH ES BUSSES
"On January 27, 2005, Crystal River - Unit 3 (CR-3) discovered an installation subject to a single failure that could prevent both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGS) and both offsite power sources from supplying power to their respective Engineered Safeguards (ES) Busses. This is a condition contrary to 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The installation involves the 4.16 Kv supply breakers from the offsite power transformer (OPT) and the Back-up Engineered Safeguards Transformer (BEST) which are the two required offsite power sources. From the OPT, one breaker supplies the 'A' ES Bus and a second breaker supplies the 'B' ES Bus. From the BEST, one breaker supplies the 'A' ES Bus and a second breaker supplies the 'B' ES Bus. A traditional (non-nuclear) design for such pairs of supply breakers includes current transformers that are connected to each other for each phase and a watt hour meter from those connections to monitor power. These circuits were installed around 1990 to support the coordination of the new 230 Kv breakers to supply the OPT and the coordination with the 230 Kv supply breakers for the new BEST.
"Should a failure of the wire connecting the current transformers or the watthour meter occur such that the ES Bus supply breakers' lockout relays are actuated, all breakers supplying and receiving power via the ES Busses would be opened and locked out. The result is that neither EDG nor the offsite power source would be able to automatically supply power to its respective ES Bus.
"CR-3 is currently disconnecting and isolating the watthour meters and removing the connection between the respective breakers' current transformers."
Licensee entered Tech Spec 3.8.9.1 at 1830 hours based on single failure but considers both ES busses operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
*** Update on 01/28/05 at 1655 EST from Guy McCallum to MacKinnon ****
"On January 28, 2005, Crystal River - Unit 3 (CR-3) corrected the single failure vulnerability associated with the Engineered Safeguards (ES) Busses.
"A permanent modification which removed the single failure vulnerability for the offsite power transformer (OPT) was completed at (0152), and the modification for the Back-up Engineered Safeguards Transformer (BEST) was completed at (0644). R2DO (T. Decker) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
"On January 27, 2005, Crystal River - Unit 3 (CR-3) discovered an installation subject to a single failure that could prevent both Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGS) and both offsite power sources from supplying power to their respective Engineered Safeguards (ES) Busses. This is a condition contrary to 10CFR50.72 (b)(3)(ii)(B).
"The installation involves the 4.16 Kv supply breakers from the offsite power transformer (OPT) and the Back-up Engineered Safeguards Transformer (BEST) which are the two required offsite power sources. From the OPT, one breaker supplies the 'A' ES Bus and a second breaker supplies the 'B' ES Bus. From the BEST, one breaker supplies the 'A' ES Bus and a second breaker supplies the 'B' ES Bus. A traditional (non-nuclear) design for such pairs of supply breakers includes current transformers that are connected to each other for each phase and a watt hour meter from those connections to monitor power. These circuits were installed around 1990 to support the coordination of the new 230 Kv breakers to supply the OPT and the coordination with the 230 Kv supply breakers for the new BEST.
"Should a failure of the wire connecting the current transformers or the watthour meter occur such that the ES Bus supply breakers' lockout relays are actuated, all breakers supplying and receiving power via the ES Busses would be opened and locked out. The result is that neither EDG nor the offsite power source would be able to automatically supply power to its respective ES Bus.
"CR-3 is currently disconnecting and isolating the watthour meters and removing the connection between the respective breakers' current transformers."
Licensee entered Tech Spec 3.8.9.1 at 1830 hours based on single failure but considers both ES busses operable.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
*** Update on 01/28/05 at 1655 EST from Guy McCallum to MacKinnon ****
"On January 28, 2005, Crystal River - Unit 3 (CR-3) corrected the single failure vulnerability associated with the Engineered Safeguards (ES) Busses.
"A permanent modification which removed the single failure vulnerability for the offsite power transformer (OPT) was completed at (0152), and the modification for the Back-up Engineered Safeguards Transformer (BEST) was completed at (0644). R2DO (T. Decker) notified.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41455
Facility: FRAMATOME ANP RICHLAND
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: JERALD HOLM (VIA FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Region: 2 State: WA
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: LEU CONVERSION
FABRICATION & SCRAP RECOVERY
COMMERCIAL LWR FUEL
NRC Notified By: JERALD HOLM (VIA FAX)
HQ OPS Officer: JEFF ROTTON
Notification Date: 03/02/2005
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2005
Notification Time: 12:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/27/2005
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 03/02/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
10 CFR Section:
21.21 - UNSPECIFIED PARAGRAPH
Person (Organization):
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
CAROLYN EVANS (R2)
CHUCK CAIN (R4)
THOMAS KOZAK (R3)
PART 21 REPORT CONCERNING MCPR LIMITS AND MCPR MONITORING
On 01/27/05, Framatome ANP determined that a deviation exists in the interpolation scheme for the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) within a range of fuel bundle flows for several operating plants. The condition could be experienced during startup, shutdown, or for other generally very infrequent reasons with core flows in the 30-45% range. The error has no impact on reactor operation above 45% flow. The defect involves the MCPR operating limit and the monitoring of that limit.
The plants where the MCPR operating limit was affected are Browns Ferry Unit 3 and Grand Gulf. The plants where the steady state MCPR predicted by the monitoring system was affected are Browns Ferry Unit 3, Columbia Generating Station, Grand Gulf, LaSalle Unit 2, and River Bend. All affected plants have been notified. Recommendations for compensatory actions have been provided to those plants (Grand Gulf and River Bend) where the impact of the error is evident for current and future cycle exposures. Compensatory measures have been provided to the affected plants for use until the incore monitoring code can be updated at each plant.
On 01/27/05, Framatome ANP determined that a deviation exists in the interpolation scheme for the minimum critical power ratio (MCPR) within a range of fuel bundle flows for several operating plants. The condition could be experienced during startup, shutdown, or for other generally very infrequent reasons with core flows in the 30-45% range. The error has no impact on reactor operation above 45% flow. The defect involves the MCPR operating limit and the monitoring of that limit.
The plants where the MCPR operating limit was affected are Browns Ferry Unit 3 and Grand Gulf. The plants where the steady state MCPR predicted by the monitoring system was affected are Browns Ferry Unit 3, Columbia Generating Station, Grand Gulf, LaSalle Unit 2, and River Bend. All affected plants have been notified. Recommendations for compensatory actions have been provided to those plants (Grand Gulf and River Bend) where the impact of the error is evident for current and future cycle exposures. Compensatory measures have been provided to the affected plants for use until the incore monitoring code can be updated at each plant.