Event Notification Report for January 20, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/19/2005 - 01/20/2005
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41351
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: COLORADO SPRINGS State: CO
County:
License #: 392-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Licensee: CARDINAL HEALTH
Region: 4
City: COLORADO SPRINGS State: CO
County:
License #: 392-03
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/24/2005
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2005
Notification Time: 09:27 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2005
Event Time: 10:00 [MST]
Last Update Date: 01/24/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
MIKE RUNYAN (R4)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A PHARMACY SPILL OF SAMARIUM-153
The following information was submitted by the licensee to the State of Colorado in an email dated 1/21/05 at 1137 hours:
"On 1-20-05 at approximately 10:00 Cardinal Health, location 48 (Colorado Springs, CO, License number 392-03) had a Sm-153 spill. Approximately 72 mCi of Sm-153 was spilled on the floor next to the main drawing station in the Lab. Our pharmacist was transferring a vial from the Berlex lead vial shield to our tungsten vial shield when the vial got away from him hitting the floor and breaking. The Pharmacist immediately notified the RSO and they started the decontamination process to minimize the risk of cross contamination into other areas of the lab. The area was segregated and the decontamination process was started. Radiacwash was used to decontaminate the area and all contaminated wipes, shoes, and associated materials were bag[ged] and placed with the Sm-153 waste. After initial decontamination was completed the area was surveyed and readings of 200 Mr/hr were obtained at the surface of the floor. Subsequent rounds of decontamination provided a reading of 50 Mr/hr. After we covered the area with padding and lead the exposure readings went down to 0.2 Mr/hr. Wipes were conducted of areas outside of the lead shielding on the floor and were found to be at background levels. We had a brief staff meeting of the pharmacists to access and evaluate the situation and to go over the proper procedures for transfer and dispensing of Sm-153 so that this incident would not be repeated. The corporate office was notified.
"The material will be allowed to decay for several days, at which point a determination of the levels of impurity contamination will be assessed. The floor will be removed, if needed, to reduce the exposure rate to acceptable levels.
"On 01-21-05 the Radiation Management unit of the State of Colorado, Department of Public Health was notified under section 4.52.2.2 (2) of the state regulations. A written response will be forwarded to the state within 30 days."
The following information was submitted by the licensee to the State of Colorado in an email dated 1/21/05 at 1137 hours:
"On 1-20-05 at approximately 10:00 Cardinal Health, location 48 (Colorado Springs, CO, License number 392-03) had a Sm-153 spill. Approximately 72 mCi of Sm-153 was spilled on the floor next to the main drawing station in the Lab. Our pharmacist was transferring a vial from the Berlex lead vial shield to our tungsten vial shield when the vial got away from him hitting the floor and breaking. The Pharmacist immediately notified the RSO and they started the decontamination process to minimize the risk of cross contamination into other areas of the lab. The area was segregated and the decontamination process was started. Radiacwash was used to decontaminate the area and all contaminated wipes, shoes, and associated materials were bag[ged] and placed with the Sm-153 waste. After initial decontamination was completed the area was surveyed and readings of 200 Mr/hr were obtained at the surface of the floor. Subsequent rounds of decontamination provided a reading of 50 Mr/hr. After we covered the area with padding and lead the exposure readings went down to 0.2 Mr/hr. Wipes were conducted of areas outside of the lead shielding on the floor and were found to be at background levels. We had a brief staff meeting of the pharmacists to access and evaluate the situation and to go over the proper procedures for transfer and dispensing of Sm-153 so that this incident would not be repeated. The corporate office was notified.
"The material will be allowed to decay for several days, at which point a determination of the levels of impurity contamination will be assessed. The floor will be removed, if needed, to reduce the exposure rate to acceptable levels.
"On 01-21-05 the Radiation Management unit of the State of Colorado, Department of Public Health was notified under section 4.52.2.2 (2) of the state regulations. A written response will be forwarded to the state within 30 days."
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41348
Facility: BROWNS FERRY
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Region: 2 State: AL
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4,[2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM BAKER
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 01/21/2005
Notification Time: 08:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2005
Event Time: 23:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2005
Notification Time: 08:19 [ET]
Event Date: 01/20/2005
Event Time: 23:53 [CST]
Last Update Date: 01/21/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION (HPCI) DECLARED INOPERABLE BASED ON INABILITY TO VERIFY HPCI KEEP FILL FUNCTION REQUIRED BY TECHNICAL SPECIFICATIONS
"At 23:53 CST Unit 2 HPCI pump suction automatically transferred from the Condensate Storage Tank to the Suppression Pool. This caused HPCI to be declared inoperable due to not meeting Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.1. HPCI keep fill could not be verified so HPCI was declared inoperable.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'"
HPCI remains inoperable pending venting of the system. The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine the root cause for the automatic transfer.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 23:53 CST Unit 2 HPCI pump suction automatically transferred from the Condensate Storage Tank to the Suppression Pool. This caused HPCI to be declared inoperable due to not meeting Technical Specification Surveillance Requirement 3.5.1.1. HPCI keep fill could not be verified so HPCI was declared inoperable.
"This event is being reported pursuant to 10CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v) as 'Any event or condition that at the time of discovery could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures or systems that are needed to: (D) Mitigate the consequences of an accident.'"
HPCI remains inoperable pending venting of the system. The licensee is conducting an investigation to determine the root cause for the automatic transfer.
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector.