Event Notification Report for January 12, 2005
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
01/11/2005 - 01/12/2005
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41326
Facility: CALLAWAY
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: MO
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAVID LANTZ
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 21:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005
Notification Time: 21:48 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 13:30 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/23/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT REGARDING HALON SYSTEM ACTUATOR PORT CONNECTION ERROR
"At 1330 on January 12, 2005, station personnel identified an error in connection of pilot lines to the manual-pneumatic actuator on halon bottles required for fire suppression. The vendor was contacted to confirm the configuration. The vendor indicated that the halon bottles would not properly discharge if the pilot lines were not properly connected.
"The system engineer inspected the halon systems. It was determined that five of six fire areas protected by halon systems were affected. Fire watches were implemented for the affected fire areas."
Affected areas:
A-27, Load Center/MG set Room, main - correct, reserve - 1 valve correct/1 valve incorrect
A-17, South Electrical Penetration Room, main - correct, reserve - incorrect
A-18, North Electrical Penetration Room, Main - correct, reserve - correct
C-9, ESF Switchgear room 1*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-10, ESF Switchgear room 2*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-27, Control room cable trenches/chases**, bottle 1 - correct, bottle 2 - incorrect
"The main bank is sufficient to suppress a fire in a fire area.
* One halon system protects both of the fire areas.
** One halon bottle will provide general area coverage. The second bottle ensures sufficient halon concentration for upper portions of the cable chases in the control room.
"The design and licensing basis for the fire protection system does not require consideration of a fire in more than one fire area at a time. No degraded fire barriers between the above fire areas were identified which would have allowed a fire to affect more than one of the fire areas at a time.
"Repairs were immediately initiated to correct the condition. As of 2010 CST, the repairs have been completed for the affected fire areas and restored to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM H. BRADLEY TO W. GOTT AT 1225 ON 2/23/05 * * *
"Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, 'Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units,' (Correspondence ULNRC 05-121) that includes the test procedure and results. Halon system function is to establish sufficient halon concentration for sufficient time to suppress a fire. This capability was not lost with the delay in actuation.
"Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022 rev 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73.' This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c) states the following:
The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 15, the Callaway site addendum through Revision 8, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 4, subject to provisions d below.
"Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification number 41326 for this event is to be retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
"At 1330 on January 12, 2005, station personnel identified an error in connection of pilot lines to the manual-pneumatic actuator on halon bottles required for fire suppression. The vendor was contacted to confirm the configuration. The vendor indicated that the halon bottles would not properly discharge if the pilot lines were not properly connected.
"The system engineer inspected the halon systems. It was determined that five of six fire areas protected by halon systems were affected. Fire watches were implemented for the affected fire areas."
Affected areas:
A-27, Load Center/MG set Room, main - correct, reserve - 1 valve correct/1 valve incorrect
A-17, South Electrical Penetration Room, main - correct, reserve - incorrect
A-18, North Electrical Penetration Room, Main - correct, reserve - correct
C-9, ESF Switchgear room 1*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-10, ESF Switchgear room 2*, main - incorrect, reserve - incorrect
C-27, Control room cable trenches/chases**, bottle 1 - correct, bottle 2 - incorrect
"The main bank is sufficient to suppress a fire in a fire area.
* One halon system protects both of the fire areas.
** One halon bottle will provide general area coverage. The second bottle ensures sufficient halon concentration for upper portions of the cable chases in the control room.
"The design and licensing basis for the fire protection system does not require consideration of a fire in more than one fire area at a time. No degraded fire barriers between the above fire areas were identified which would have allowed a fire to affect more than one of the fire areas at a time.
"Repairs were immediately initiated to correct the condition. As of 2010 CST, the repairs have been completed for the affected fire areas and restored to operable status."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * RETRACTION FROM H. BRADLEY TO W. GOTT AT 1225 ON 2/23/05 * * *
"Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, 'Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units,' (Correspondence ULNRC 05-121) that includes the test procedure and results. Halon system function is to establish sufficient halon concentration for sufficient time to suppress a fire. This capability was not lost with the delay in actuation.
"Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022 rev 2, 'Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73.' This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c) states the following:
The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 15, the Callaway site addendum through Revision 8, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 4, subject to provisions d below.
"Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(c). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification number 41326 for this event is to be retracted."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41327
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LANCE LANE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Region: 4 State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: LANCE LANE
HQ OPS Officer: BILL GOTT
Notification Date: 01/12/2005
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 19:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2005
Notification Time: 22:26 [ET]
Event Date: 01/12/2005
Event Time: 19:45 [CST]
Last Update Date: 02/16/2005
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
24 HOUR CONDITION OF LICENSE REPORT REGARDING HALON SYSTEM- ACTUATOR CONNECTION ERROR
The following information was received via facsimile from the licensee:
"Based upon information provided by Callaway on 1/12/05, it was determined that the manual pneumatic actuators on the Halon suppression systems are piped incorrectly which may result in the inability to actuate the Halon suppression systems manually or automatically.
"Each manual pneumatic actuator has clearly marked "A" and "B" ports. Per the M-658 vendor manual series & drawing M-658-00025, the "A" port shall be connected to the actuation pilot manifold or top of cylinder valve and the "B" port shall be connected to the solenoid valve. A field walk down was performed and in all but one case, the manual pneumatic actuator has been piped in the opposite configuration.
"This effects the Halon suppression system protecting the ESF switchgear rooms, the Rod Drive MG Set room, the North Electrical Penetration room, the South Electrical Penetration Room, the Switchgear & Switchboard rooms, and the Control Room cable trenches & chases.
"Based upon preliminary evaluation, it appears that the Halon suppression systems are inoperable."
Fire watches were implemented for the affected areas.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
**** UPDATE AT 11:42 ON 02/16/05, E. TAYLOR TO J. KNOKE ****
This event report is retracted based on the following information provided from Wolf Creek by facsimile:
"Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, "Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units," (Wolf Creek correspondence 05-00072) that includes the test procedure and results.
"Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73." This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a) states the following:
The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, subject to provisions b & c below.
"Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification number 41327 for this event is to be retracted.
Notified R4DO (Whitten).
NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.
The following information was received via facsimile from the licensee:
"Based upon information provided by Callaway on 1/12/05, it was determined that the manual pneumatic actuators on the Halon suppression systems are piped incorrectly which may result in the inability to actuate the Halon suppression systems manually or automatically.
"Each manual pneumatic actuator has clearly marked "A" and "B" ports. Per the M-658 vendor manual series & drawing M-658-00025, the "A" port shall be connected to the actuation pilot manifold or top of cylinder valve and the "B" port shall be connected to the solenoid valve. A field walk down was performed and in all but one case, the manual pneumatic actuator has been piped in the opposite configuration.
"This effects the Halon suppression system protecting the ESF switchgear rooms, the Rod Drive MG Set room, the North Electrical Penetration room, the South Electrical Penetration Room, the Switchgear & Switchboard rooms, and the Control Room cable trenches & chases.
"Based upon preliminary evaluation, it appears that the Halon suppression systems are inoperable."
Fire watches were implemented for the affected areas.
The licensee notified the NRC resident inspector.
**** UPDATE AT 11:42 ON 02/16/05, E. TAYLOR TO J. KNOKE ****
This event report is retracted based on the following information provided from Wolf Creek by facsimile:
"Investigation - Informational tests conducted by the Vendor (Chemetron) and witnessed by Wolf Creek, Callaway, and NRC personnel on January 26, 2005 determined that the Halon systems would have properly actuated in the as-found incorrect configuration (port 'A' and 'B' connections reversed). The only identified difference in the actuation sequence between the tests conducted in the incorrect configuration versus the correct configuration is a delay of less than 2 seconds from the time the solenoid received the discharge signal until the first cylinder actuated. There is no regulatory or National Fire Protection Association standard or guideline that places a time requirement on this interval. This very slight time delay would have had no effect on the designed function of the Halon suppression system to extinguish a fire. Additional details are provided in the Chemetron report, "Report on Actuation Arrangements for Halon Extinguishing System Units," (Wolf Creek correspondence 05-00072) that includes the test procedure and results.
"Regulatory Evaluation - Guidance for reporting to the criterion of 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii) is provided in section 3.2.4 of NUREG 1022, "Event Reporting Guidelines 10 CFR50.72 and 50.73." This guidance states that an LER is required for a seriously degraded principal safety barrier or an unanalyzed condition that significantly degrades plant safety.
"Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a) states the following:
The Operating Corporation shall maintain in effect all provisions of the approved fire protection program as described in the SNUPPS Final Safety Analysis Report for the facility through Revision 17, the Wolf Creek site addendum through Revision 15, and as approved in the SER through Supplement 5, subject to provisions b & c below.
"Conclusion: - Based upon the information provided, the Halon suppression system would have operated to extinguish a fire. This condition is not considered reportable to the requirements of 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B), 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(ii), nor is it a violation of the Operating License Condition 2.C(5)(a). Consistent with this conclusion, ENS notification number 41327 for this event is to be retracted.
Notified R4DO (Whitten).
NRC Resident Inspector will be notified.