Event Notification Report for January 06, 2005

MODIFICATION TO PROCESS COMPUTER THAT WILL IMPACT ERDS AND SPDS

"The Plant Process Computer System (PPCS) will be taken out of service for an approximate 2 week period to implement a planned modification. The current PPCS is being replaced and the computer outage is required to allow cutover to the new PCCS. During this time period ERDS and SPDS will not be available. Also, a small portion of the plant annunciator system (Trouble Light Alarms) will not be available. Regulatory Guide 1.97 Category 2D Containment Temperature and Category 3D Component Cooling Water Temperature indicators will not be available in the Control Room, although other instrumentation is available to monitor these parameters.

"This is an 8-hour reportable event per 10 CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii) Major Loss of Assessment Capability. The operation of plant systems will not be affected due to this planned action. ERDS and SPDS parameters will be monitored by control board indications. Compensatory actions have been developed."

The PPCS outage is expected to commence around 0700 CST on 1/6/05. The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.

* * * UPDATE ON 1/20/05 AT 1724 FROM J. ROBB TO W. GOTT * * *

The Plant Process Computer System was restored at 0005 CST on 01/20/05. ERDS and SPDS are now available. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

Notified R3DO (A.M. Stone).

MANUAL REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO REACTOR RECIRCULATION PUMP TRIP

"At approximately 0106 on 1-6-05, Reactor Recirculation Pumps A and B down-shifted from fast to slow speed which resulted in reactor power decreasing from 100% to approximately 46%. As operators started to reduce power using control rod insertion, Reactor Recirculation Pump A tripped to 'off.' At 0112 on 1-6-05, a manual reactor scram was inserted due to operating under undesirable power to flow conditions. At approximately 0119, the operators were unable to start the Motor Feedwater Pump, Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system was manually started. Level control was established using a Reactor Feed Pump Turbine and Reactor Core Isolation Cooling. The Main Steam Isolation Valves were closed to limit cooldown. Reactor level is being controlled with the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System and safety relief valves are available for reactor pressure control.

"The cause of the Reactor Recirculation Pumps down-shifting and the subsequent trip of Reactor Recirculation Pump A is still under investigation. The cause of the Motor Feedwater Pump failure to start is likewise under investigation."

All control rods fully inserted. The lowest reactor level reached was 154 inches above TAF. The electrical grid is stable and ESF systems remain available. Reactor pressure and level are being maintained by the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling system. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

LOSS OF POWER TO OFFSITE SIRENS GREATER THAN 1 HOUR DUE TO INCLEMENT WEATHER

"At about 07:45 hours CST on January 6, 2005, greater than 25% of the Clinton Power Station (CPS) offsite sirens were out of service. 17 of 44 sirens were not available for greater than 1 hour due to inclement weather.

"DeWitt County was notified of the sirens being unavailable. At approximately 09:11 hours on 1/6/2005, 10 sirens were returned to service when power was restored to the area."

The licensee is investigating the actual cause for the sirens being out of service. The seven sirens remaining out of service are in the process of being restored.

The licensee has notified LLEA and the NRC Resident Inspector.

PART 21 NOTIFICATION CONCERNING MALFUNCTION OF A HIGH DOSE RATE BRACHYTHERAPY REMOTE AFTERLOADER DEVICE

The RSO at the Rapid City Regional Hospital reported a malfunction of a high dose rate brachytherapy remote afterloader manufactured by Nucletron - Old Delft (Headquarters in Maryland). The unit was a Microselect V-2 with 18 channels. While treating a patient, the source had been deployed successfully through 16 channels. When attempting to deploy the source into the 17th channel, an alarm was received indicating a problem and locked-out the source in its safe shielded position. Attempts to correct the problem were unsuccessful and the treatment was terminated. No excess exposure resulted from the problem.

A service representative from Nucletron serviced and repaired the device on January 7, 2005. The "Flag" wire on the device was determined to be broken and the "V" block was replaced. The device flag is a component that monitors the position of the source and will lock out the device when it does not respond properly. It was noted by the RSO that the device had been in service for about 5 years without any problem of this nature.

This problem was discussed with NRC Region 4 inspector (Rick Munoz) on 7/13/05 during a routine inspection of the hospital. Additional discussions were conducted with NRC HQ (Greg Morell) on 7/19/05.

The hospital RSO will followup this verbal notification with a written report.