Event Notification Report for December 13, 2004

CONTAINMENT PENETRATIONS NOT CLOSED DURING FUEL HANDLING OPERATIONS

Event:
"During refueling operations, containment penetrations providing direct access from the containment atmosphere to the outside atmosphere, closed by manual valves, was not maintained during fuel movement.
- On 12/4/04 the five containment closure valves in question were verified closed during the initial establishment of conditions to perform refueling.
- On 12/7/04 a steam drain valve checklist was performed in preparation for establishing vacuum which opened the five valves required to be closed by containment closure for fuel handling.
- On 12/12/04 during performance of the 100 hour refueling containment closure checklist five containment closure valves were found in the OPEN position. These five valves are to be tagged closed during the time when refueling containment closure is required.
- On 12/12/04 at approx 2100 a question as to if refueling containment closure was established on the steam generators was raised. It was investigated. And determined at 1245 on 12/13/04 that refueling containment closure was not established on the inside or outside of containment for the steam generators. "

Initial Safety Significance:
"This event is being reported as a condition which could have prevented the fulfillment of the safety function of structures that are needed to control the release of radioactive material. The requirements on containment penetration closure ensure that a release of fission product radioactivity within containment will be restricted from escaping to the environment.

"Section 15.11.2.2 of the Oconee UFSAR addresses a Fuel Handling Accident inside Containment. The 1977 analysis concludes that the worst case release is appropriately within 10 CFR 100 limits but does not take any credit for containment. For this event the potential flow rate would be restricted due to the size of the open valves, the diameter of the piping from one open 3/4 inch valve in the Containment building to the four open 2 inch valves and one 3 inch valve in the Turbine Building, and the absence of a significant differential pressure.

"Oconee wishes to note that a TS amendment incorporating Alternate Source Terms has been approved, but is currently awaiting implementation, which would only require refueling containment closure during movement of recently irradiated fuel (i.e. fuel moved within 72 hours of criticality). This event began on day 59 of the current refueling outage. Thus the potential for a significant release of radioactive material as a result of a postulated fuel handling accident during this time period was greatly reduced."

Corrective Actions:
"At the time of discovery fuel handling operations were no longer in effect. On 12/13/2004 at 1245 it was determined that refueling containment closure was not established, fuel handling operations were complete at 0358 on 12/13/2004."

The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.

CRITICALITY MONITORING DOSIMETERS NOT CONFIGURED CORRECTLY

"On December 13, 2004, in preparations for new fuel receipt inspection activities, it was determined that the Electronic Dosimeters (Eds) that were previously used to meet criticality monitoring requirements of 10 CFR 70.24, were not configured correctly. Specifically, the dose rate alarm function of the Eds had been disabled. It is unknown at this time if the Eds had previously been used in this in-correct configuration during two previous new fuel receipt inspection activities. Based on the potential that the requirements of part 70.24 were not met, this event is being reported pursuant of part 70.50(b)(2), 'An event in which equipment is disabled or fails to function as designed.'"

The Electronic Dosimeters were immediately re-configured correctly and new fuel receipt inspection activities will recommence. The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


* * * RETRACTION ON 01/05/05 AT 1039 EST BY ROBERT URRELL TAKEN BY MACKINNON * * *

"The licensee performed an analysis that concluded that a monitoring system capable of detecting a criticality per 10 CFR 70.24 (a)(2) was in place during new fuel receipt. Specifically, the analysis demonstrated that the electronic dosimeters worn by the radiological workers involved adequately monitored for a criticality event." Therefore the licensee retracts the above event notification. R3DO (Sonia Burgess) & NMSS (Linda Gersey) notified.

The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this retraction by the licensee.

INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION

The following information was provided by the licensee:

"On December 13, 2004, at 1615 hours, during clearance restoration activities following 24V DC battery maintenance, Battery 22B-1 output breaker located on 24/48V DC Distribution Panel 22B, Circuit 5 was inadvertently opened resulting in the invalid actuation of the Unit 1 logic associated with the 24V DC bus. The actuations included the Primary Containment Isolation System (PCIS) Group 6 (i.e., Containment Atmosphere Control/Dilution, Containment Atmosphere Monitoring, and Post Accident Sampling Systems) valves, the Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolation (i.e., Secondary Containment isolation), and the automatic start of both Standby Gas Treatment (SGT) System trains A and B. The actuations of PCIS Group 6 valves and Reactor Building Ventilation System Isolation were complete and the affected equipment responded as designed to the invalid signal (i.e., the valves and dampers that were open, at the time of the event, closed). Additionally, SGT System trains A and B started and functioned successfully. After verification of the expected equipment responses, the breaker was reset, the actuation logic was reset, and the equipment/systems were returned to the status required by plant conditions.

"Discussion of the causes and corrective actions associated with this event are documented in the corrective action program in action request 145898. The [NRC] resident inspector has been notified."

AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING A LOST/MISSING SOURCE

The following information was received via facsimile:

"NY-06-004

"Lost/missing Am-241, 250 nano-curie source, 12/13/2004 Vassar College, Poughkeepsie, NY 12604, RML # 410

"College staff called to report that they had lost a 250 nCi Am-241 source. The source is a button source, approximately 2 cm in diameter. The source was discovered missing about 3 months ago, but they failed to report to NYS DOH because they were trying to locate it. The source may have been moved from its storage space in the physics department to a location in the biology department in December 2003 when they were preparing a 10 mCi Am-241 source for shipment to NSSI for disposal at Los Alamos. They think they may have shipped this source along with the 10 mCi Am-241 source. The last time they actually saw the source was when it was leak tested in 2002. Los Alamos is preparing to go through shipments stored at NSSI for repackaging and disposal. Los Alamos will look for the missing source in the shipment. Vassar College will send a written report.

"An acknowledgement of their written report was sent and it asked them to keep us apprised of the results of the search at NSSI/LANL. A Notice of Violation was issued for missing quarterly inventories, late reporting of the missing source, no record of transfer/disposal of source."

Sources that are "Less than IAEA Category 3 sources," are either sources that are very unlikely to cause permanent injury to individuals or contain a very small amount of radioactive material that would not cause any permanent injury. Some of these sources, such as moisture density gauges or thickness gauges that are Category 4, the amount of unshielded radioactive material, if not safely managed or securely protected, could possibly - although it is unlikely - temporarily injure someone who handled it or were otherwise in contact with it, or who were close to it for a period of many weeks.

This source is not amongst those sources or devices identified by the IAEA Code of Conduct for the Safety & Security of Radioactive Sources to be of concern from a radiological standpoint. Therefore is it being categorized as a less than Category 3 source