Event Notification Report for December 10, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
12/09/2004 - 12/10/2004
EVENT NUMBERS
41251412524125341255
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41251
Rep Org: COLORADO DEPT OF HEALTH
Licensee: GROUND ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: 586-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Licensee: GROUND ENGINEERING CONSULTANTS
Region: 4
City: DENVER State: CO
County:
License #: 586-01
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ED STROUD
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 12/10/2004
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 07:06 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2004
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 07:06 [MST]
Last Update Date: 12/10/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
COLORADO AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - LOST SOURCE FROM A TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received a report from a licensee, Ground Engineering Consultants, that they had possibly lost a Model 3440 Troxler Moisture Density Gauge containing an 8 milliCurie Am: Be source and an 8 milliCurie Cs-137 source. The technician transporting the gauge failed to properly secure the gauge in the back of his vehicle.
When the technician discovered the gauge missing, he backtracked and found pieces of the gauge on Arapahoe Road in metropolitan Denver. At the time of discovery, the licensee determined that the sources were intact in the shielding base on radiation surveys. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the Cs-137 source was missing.
The licensee and technicians from the State of Colorado are currently searching the area for the lost source. The State of Colorado will provide an update on the results of the search.
* * * UPDATE FROM STROUD TO CROUCH ON 12/10/04 @ 1744 HRS EST * * *
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) informed the Operations Center that attempts to locate the missing source have proven unsuccessful. CDPHE Public Affairs has issued a press release to inform the public of the missing source and how to proceed if the source was found. CDPHE will provide an update to this event as necessary.
Notified R4DO (Smith), NMSS EO (Giitter), HQPAO (Burnell and Brenner). R4PAO (Dricks) and DHS..
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment received a report from a licensee, Ground Engineering Consultants, that they had possibly lost a Model 3440 Troxler Moisture Density Gauge containing an 8 milliCurie Am: Be source and an 8 milliCurie Cs-137 source. The technician transporting the gauge failed to properly secure the gauge in the back of his vehicle.
When the technician discovered the gauge missing, he backtracked and found pieces of the gauge on Arapahoe Road in metropolitan Denver. At the time of discovery, the licensee determined that the sources were intact in the shielding base on radiation surveys. Upon further investigation, it was discovered that the Cs-137 source was missing.
The licensee and technicians from the State of Colorado are currently searching the area for the lost source. The State of Colorado will provide an update on the results of the search.
* * * UPDATE FROM STROUD TO CROUCH ON 12/10/04 @ 1744 HRS EST * * *
Colorado Department of Public Health and Environment (CDPHE) informed the Operations Center that attempts to locate the missing source have proven unsuccessful. CDPHE Public Affairs has issued a press release to inform the public of the missing source and how to proceed if the source was found. CDPHE will provide an update to this event as necessary.
Notified R4DO (Smith), NMSS EO (Giitter), HQPAO (Burnell and Brenner). R4PAO (Dricks) and DHS..
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41252
Facility: RIVER BEND
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Region: 4 State: LA
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-6
NRC Notified By: GARY HUSTON
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 12/10/2004
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 13:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2004
Notification Time: 17:34 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 13:17 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/16/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL
Person (Organization):
LINDA SMITH (R4)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
LINDA SMITH (R4)
MICHAEL TSCHILTZ (NRR)
SUSAN FRANT (IRD)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR SCRAM DUE TO LOSS OF VITAL INSTRUMENT BUS
"At 1317 [hrs CST] on December 10, 2004, an automatic actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) occurred resulting in a reactor scram. The apparent cause of the event was loss of a vital instrument bus due to a fault in a nonsafety related vital inverter. This inverter provides power to selected control room instrumentation and controls. This resulted in the loss of feed water level control.
"Reactor level is being maintained by the High Pressure Core Spray System. The feed water system is not available. Reactor pressure is being controlled through the main turbine steam bypass system to the condenser. The condenser is available and being used as the heat sink. The residual heat removal system was operated in suppression pool cooling mode to provide a means of rejecting water from the suppression pool [water input from High Pressure Core Spray System minimum flow line]. The plant is currently stable, and being maintained in hot shutdown. Systems responded as expected based on the initiating event. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling is not being used pending evaluation of a system alarm that is currently being investigated. Investigation of the initiating fault is being pursued in order to recover the vital bus and feed water level control."
It has been preliminarily determined that the loss of instrument power resulted in the Main Feedwater regulating valve failing as-is and the "B" Reactor Recirculation Pump shifting down in speed. The reduction in reactor power with constant feed flow resulted in a high reactor vessel water level, producing a direct reactor scram signal at the High Level 8 setpoint.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM G. HUSTON TO M. RIPLEY AT 2025 EST 12/10/04 * * *
"At 1657 CST [on 12/10/04], reactor level control was restored to the normal Feedwater and Condensate Systems. The High Pressure Core Spray System was restored to the normal standby lineup. Investigation into the cause of the reported RPS actuation continues. Investigation into the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System alarms has resulted in declaring this system inoperable."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (L. Smith), NRR EO (M. Tschiltz) and IRD Manager (S. Frant)
* * * UPDATE TO W GOTT AT 0016 EST ON 12/12/04 * * *
"The final determination of the cause of the scram was determined to be due to the B recirc pump downshift and subsequent power to flow scram on APRM flux."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (L Smith)
* * * UPDATE TO JOHN MACKINNON FROM HUSTON AT 1332 EST ON 12/16/O4 * * *
"The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was returned to available status at 0343 on 12/11/2004 and was restored to operable status at 2200 on 12/11/2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Kriss Kennedy).
"At 1317 [hrs CST] on December 10, 2004, an automatic actuation of the reactor protection system (RPS) occurred resulting in a reactor scram. The apparent cause of the event was loss of a vital instrument bus due to a fault in a nonsafety related vital inverter. This inverter provides power to selected control room instrumentation and controls. This resulted in the loss of feed water level control.
"Reactor level is being maintained by the High Pressure Core Spray System. The feed water system is not available. Reactor pressure is being controlled through the main turbine steam bypass system to the condenser. The condenser is available and being used as the heat sink. The residual heat removal system was operated in suppression pool cooling mode to provide a means of rejecting water from the suppression pool [water input from High Pressure Core Spray System minimum flow line]. The plant is currently stable, and being maintained in hot shutdown. Systems responded as expected based on the initiating event. Reactor Core Isolation Cooling is not being used pending evaluation of a system alarm that is currently being investigated. Investigation of the initiating fault is being pursued in order to recover the vital bus and feed water level control."
It has been preliminarily determined that the loss of instrument power resulted in the Main Feedwater regulating valve failing as-is and the "B" Reactor Recirculation Pump shifting down in speed. The reduction in reactor power with constant feed flow resulted in a high reactor vessel water level, producing a direct reactor scram signal at the High Level 8 setpoint.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE FROM G. HUSTON TO M. RIPLEY AT 2025 EST 12/10/04 * * *
"At 1657 CST [on 12/10/04], reactor level control was restored to the normal Feedwater and Condensate Systems. The High Pressure Core Spray System was restored to the normal standby lineup. Investigation into the cause of the reported RPS actuation continues. Investigation into the Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System alarms has resulted in declaring this system inoperable."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R4 DO (L. Smith), NRR EO (M. Tschiltz) and IRD Manager (S. Frant)
* * * UPDATE TO W GOTT AT 0016 EST ON 12/12/04 * * *
"The final determination of the cause of the scram was determined to be due to the B recirc pump downshift and subsequent power to flow scram on APRM flux."
The licensee will notify the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (L Smith)
* * * UPDATE TO JOHN MACKINNON FROM HUSTON AT 1332 EST ON 12/16/O4 * * *
"The Reactor Core Isolation Cooling System was returned to available status at 0343 on 12/11/2004 and was restored to operable status at 2200 on 12/11/2004."
The licensee notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
Notified R4DO (Kriss Kennedy).
Hospital
Event Number: 41253
Rep Org: GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED CTR
Licensee: GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED CTR
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-00216-22
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASTRA BAIN-DOWELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Licensee: GEORGE WASHINGTON UNIV. MED CTR
Region: 1
City: WASHINGTON State: DC
County:
License #: 08-00216-22
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ASTRA BAIN-DOWELL
HQ OPS Officer: CHAUNCEY GOULD
Notification Date: 12/13/2004
Notification Time: 08:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2004
Notification Time: 08:49 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 12/13/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
LINDA GERSEY (NMSS)
POSSIBLE INCORRECT READING OF WIPE SAMPLES FROM A SCINTILLATION COUNTERS
A radiation safety technologist on the licensee's staff recorded the liquid scintillation counting results of two package inspection wipe samples when the scintillation counter could not have produced this data. The technologist had no credible explanation for this, and has resigned to pursue a different career unrelated to radiation safety or radioactive material.
In this circumstance, it is highly unlikely that any measurable dose was received by anyone, since the lab staff handles each radioactive vial with great care, and stores it safely after pickup from the RSO lab or delivery by the RSO staff. Also, not one package received from 1/1/01 on, was contaminated above DOT's safety limit, or even 2% of that limit. Any box that is contaminated is kept in radwaste.
To prevent any recurrence of such undocumented records, the licensee has increased the direct supervision of the package opening procedure by the Radiation Safety Officer, who will also sign or initial the scintillation counter printout sheets of the wipe test results henceforward.
The licensee believes that the technologist's resignation, and the RSO review of the wipe test printout sheets, will prevent any inaccurate or undocumented entries in these important NRC records in the future.
A radiation safety technologist on the licensee's staff recorded the liquid scintillation counting results of two package inspection wipe samples when the scintillation counter could not have produced this data. The technologist had no credible explanation for this, and has resigned to pursue a different career unrelated to radiation safety or radioactive material.
In this circumstance, it is highly unlikely that any measurable dose was received by anyone, since the lab staff handles each radioactive vial with great care, and stores it safely after pickup from the RSO lab or delivery by the RSO staff. Also, not one package received from 1/1/01 on, was contaminated above DOT's safety limit, or even 2% of that limit. Any box that is contaminated is kept in radwaste.
To prevent any recurrence of such undocumented records, the licensee has increased the direct supervision of the package opening procedure by the Radiation Safety Officer, who will also sign or initial the scintillation counter printout sheets of the wipe test results henceforward.
The licensee believes that the technologist's resignation, and the RSO review of the wipe test printout sheets, will prevent any inaccurate or undocumented entries in these important NRC records in the future.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41255
Rep Org: TEXAS DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH
Licensee: STORK SOUTHWESTERN LABS
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L05269-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Licensee: STORK SOUTHWESTERN LABS
Region: 4
City: HOUSTON State: TX
County:
License #: L05269-000
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: JAMES OGDEN
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 12/13/2004
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 16:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2004
Notification Time: 15:35 [ET]
Event Date: 12/10/2004
Event Time: 16:15 [CST]
Last Update Date: 12/23/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
GREG PICK (R4)
TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS)
AARON DANIS (TAS)
FAX TO CNSNS MEX
GREG PICK (R4)
TRISH HOLAHAN (NMSS)
AARON DANIS (TAS)
FAX TO CNSNS MEX
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT - STOLEN TROXLER MOISTURE DENSITY GAUGE
On December 10, 2004, (Friday), the Licensee had dispatched operator [deleted], for a job with a Troxler 3440, Serial No. 33733, containing two sealed Special Form sources: 8.0 mCi (nominal) Cs-137, Serial No 750-9391, and 40.0 mCi (nominal) Am-241/Be, Serial No 47-22867. Upon completion of the job the operator was returning to the company office, he decided to stop by the Wal Mart store in Harris County, Texas. Upon returning to his company truck, Ford F150 fleetside, License Plate No. [deleted], he determined that the gauge was missing from the tiedown location. Looking into the bed of the truck he noted that the cable securing the gauge to the truck had been cut and was laying in the bottom of the truck bed near the tailgate, still locked into place. The operator reported the incident to his supervisor and was advised to report the incident to the Harris County Constable's Office - Precinct #4. While he was making the report, Case No 0412101909, the company R.S.O. reported the incident to the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) on-call duty officer. Due to the R.S.O. being at home, he did not have the source Serial Numbers. The source serial numbers were reported to the Agency on Monday afternoon at 1:15 p.m.
Licensee is considering offering a reward and announcing the loss to local media.
Texas Incident No.: I-8191
* * * UPDATE FROM RAY JISHA TO W GOTT AT 1517 ON 12/23/04 * * *
A technician from another company was offered the gauge for sale. The technician consulted his supervisor who told him to purchase the gauge. The gauge was determined to be the stolen gauge from Stork. The gauge was intact and was returned to Stork. An update will be provided to the local law enforcement.
Notified NMSS (T Essig), R4DO (Spitzberg), TAS (J Foster) (email), and faxed to Mexico.
On December 10, 2004, (Friday), the Licensee had dispatched operator [deleted], for a job with a Troxler 3440, Serial No. 33733, containing two sealed Special Form sources: 8.0 mCi (nominal) Cs-137, Serial No 750-9391, and 40.0 mCi (nominal) Am-241/Be, Serial No 47-22867. Upon completion of the job the operator was returning to the company office, he decided to stop by the Wal Mart store in Harris County, Texas. Upon returning to his company truck, Ford F150 fleetside, License Plate No. [deleted], he determined that the gauge was missing from the tiedown location. Looking into the bed of the truck he noted that the cable securing the gauge to the truck had been cut and was laying in the bottom of the truck bed near the tailgate, still locked into place. The operator reported the incident to his supervisor and was advised to report the incident to the Harris County Constable's Office - Precinct #4. While he was making the report, Case No 0412101909, the company R.S.O. reported the incident to the Texas Department of State Health Services (DSHS) on-call duty officer. Due to the R.S.O. being at home, he did not have the source Serial Numbers. The source serial numbers were reported to the Agency on Monday afternoon at 1:15 p.m.
Licensee is considering offering a reward and announcing the loss to local media.
Texas Incident No.: I-8191
* * * UPDATE FROM RAY JISHA TO W GOTT AT 1517 ON 12/23/04 * * *
A technician from another company was offered the gauge for sale. The technician consulted his supervisor who told him to purchase the gauge. The gauge was determined to be the stolen gauge from Stork. The gauge was intact and was returned to Stork. An update will be provided to the local law enforcement.
Notified NMSS (T Essig), R4DO (Spitzberg), TAS (J Foster) (email), and faxed to Mexico.