Event Notification Report for November 19, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/18/2004 - 11/19/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41212
Facility: POINT BEACH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 3 State: WI
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-2-LP,[2] W-2-LP
NRC Notified By: MIKE MEYER
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 19:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 16:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 19:01 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 16:22 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(i) - PLANT S/D REQD BY TS
Person (Organization):
JAMES CREED (R3)
JAMES CREED (R3)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
TECHNICAL SPECIFICATION REQUIRED SHUTDOWN DUE TO A STEAM LEAK ON AN INSTRUMENT ISOLATION VALVE INSIDE CONTAINMENT
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On November 9, 2004, NMC personnel performed a containment entry for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 to locate and identify the source of a secondary steam leak. A leak was suspected due to increased pumping of the Unit 2 containment sump 'A'. A steam leak was identified on the body of valve 2MS-465D. This valve is an isolation valve for main steam flow transmitter 2FT-465. For containment isolation considerations, the main steam system is considered to be a closed system inside containment. The steam leak discovered on 2MS-465D cannot be isolated from containment penetration P-1, the main steam line penetration. Accordingly, we declared Technical Specification Condition 3.6.3.C not met. (This condition is applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system) and entered TSAC [Technical Specification Action Condition] C.1. The required action for this condition is to isolate the affected penetration flow path with a completion time of 72 hours. In order to repair this valve wall leak, it will be necessary to shutdown and cooldown PBNP Unit 2. Accordingly, at 1622 CST we initiated a reactor shutdown of PBNP Unit 2. Since we anticipate that we would be unable to [meet] the allowed completion time for this TSAC, we have determined that this reactor shutdown is required by the Technical Specifications and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(2)(i)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On November 9, 2004, NMC personnel performed a containment entry for Point Beach Nuclear Plant Unit 2 to locate and identify the source of a secondary steam leak. A leak was suspected due to increased pumping of the Unit 2 containment sump 'A'. A steam leak was identified on the body of valve 2MS-465D. This valve is an isolation valve for main steam flow transmitter 2FT-465. For containment isolation considerations, the main steam system is considered to be a closed system inside containment. The steam leak discovered on 2MS-465D cannot be isolated from containment penetration P-1, the main steam line penetration. Accordingly, we declared Technical Specification Condition 3.6.3.C not met. (This condition is applicable to penetration flow paths with only one containment isolation valve and a closed system) and entered TSAC [Technical Specification Action Condition] C.1. The required action for this condition is to isolate the affected penetration flow path with a completion time of 72 hours. In order to repair this valve wall leak, it will be necessary to shutdown and cooldown PBNP Unit 2. Accordingly, at 1622 CST we initiated a reactor shutdown of PBNP Unit 2. Since we anticipate that we would be unable to [meet] the allowed completion time for this TSAC, we have determined that this reactor shutdown is required by the Technical Specifications and is reportable in accordance with 10 CFR 50.72.(b)(2)(i)."
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
General Information or Other
Event Number: 41208
Rep Org: KENTUCKY DEPT OF RADIATION CONTROL
Licensee: H&H X-RAY SERVICES INCORPORATED
Region: 1
City: EAST POINT State: KY
County:
License #: 201-34205
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT MacKINLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Licensee: H&H X-RAY SERVICES INCORPORATED
Region: 1
City: EAST POINT State: KY
County:
License #: 201-34205
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: MATT MacKINLEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 10:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 11:37 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 10:03 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRD)
JANNIE EVERETTE (DHS)
KENNETH JENISON (R1)
SCOTT MOORE (NMSS)
JIM WHITNEY (TAS)
RICHARD WESSMAN (IRD)
JANNIE EVERETTE (DHS)
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT OF A STOLEN RADIOGRAPHY CAMERA
The State of Kentucky Radiation Control Branch reported a stolen radiography camera AEA Model 880D with a 40 Curie Ir-192 source (Camera Serial#D1121; Source Model 424-9; Source Serial #16663-B). The Camera is owned and licensed to H&H X-Ray Services that has an office located in East Point, Kentucky. The camera was located in the radiographer's truck which was in the town of Corbin, Kentucky in preparation for a job. The radiographer lent the truck to the assistant radiographer on Wednesday night (11/17/04). The assistant radiographer did not return with the truck all day Thursday. Without any contact with the assistant radiographer since Wednesday night, the radiographer reported the truck and camera stolen this morning (11/19/04). The local police believe they saw the truck parked at a home in the Corbin area. The camera was locked in the truck but the assistant radiographer has a key to the camera so the current status is unknown.
The State has notified NRC Region 1 (Sheri Minnick). In addition to the other Federal agencies notified above, contacted the National Response Center (Ms. Jones).
* * * UPDATE 1420 EST ON 11/21/04 FROM CLYDE SLAUGHTER (RSO - H&H X-RAY SERVICES, INC.) TO S.SANDIN * * *
The abandoned vehicle containing the radiography camera was recovered in Wise, VA after the assistant radiographer contacted another company employee providing information as to its location. Mr. Slaughter inspected the camera and found no indication of tampering. The camera is enroute to the East Point, KY office and will later be returned to the West Monroe, LA main facility. The licensee informed the KY Department of Homeland Security (Lt. Joe England).
Notified R1DO(Dimitriadas), NMSS(Gillen), IRD(Wessman), TAS Duty Officer(Whitney), NSIR(Weber, Zimmerman), Chairman Diaz(Fragoyannis), EDO(Hsia), DHS(Evans), DOE(Smith), EPA(Baumgartner), USDA(Comeau), HHS(Miller), FEMA(Caldwell) and FBI.
The State of Kentucky Radiation Control Branch reported a stolen radiography camera AEA Model 880D with a 40 Curie Ir-192 source (Camera Serial#D1121; Source Model 424-9; Source Serial #16663-B). The Camera is owned and licensed to H&H X-Ray Services that has an office located in East Point, Kentucky. The camera was located in the radiographer's truck which was in the town of Corbin, Kentucky in preparation for a job. The radiographer lent the truck to the assistant radiographer on Wednesday night (11/17/04). The assistant radiographer did not return with the truck all day Thursday. Without any contact with the assistant radiographer since Wednesday night, the radiographer reported the truck and camera stolen this morning (11/19/04). The local police believe they saw the truck parked at a home in the Corbin area. The camera was locked in the truck but the assistant radiographer has a key to the camera so the current status is unknown.
The State has notified NRC Region 1 (Sheri Minnick). In addition to the other Federal agencies notified above, contacted the National Response Center (Ms. Jones).
* * * UPDATE 1420 EST ON 11/21/04 FROM CLYDE SLAUGHTER (RSO - H&H X-RAY SERVICES, INC.) TO S.SANDIN * * *
The abandoned vehicle containing the radiography camera was recovered in Wise, VA after the assistant radiographer contacted another company employee providing information as to its location. Mr. Slaughter inspected the camera and found no indication of tampering. The camera is enroute to the East Point, KY office and will later be returned to the West Monroe, LA main facility. The licensee informed the KY Department of Homeland Security (Lt. Joe England).
Notified R1DO(Dimitriadas), NMSS(Gillen), IRD(Wessman), TAS Duty Officer(Whitney), NSIR(Weber, Zimmerman), Chairman Diaz(Fragoyannis), EDO(Hsia), DHS(Evans), DOE(Smith), EPA(Baumgartner), USDA(Comeau), HHS(Miller), FEMA(Caldwell) and FBI.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41209
Facility: SAN ONOFRE
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JON BRAISTED
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 4 State: CA
Unit: [] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] CE,[3] CE
NRC Notified By: JON BRAISTED
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 08:07 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004
Notification Time: 12:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/19/2004
Event Time: 08:07 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/19/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
KRISS KENNEDY (R4)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 2 | A/R | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 0 | Hot Standby |
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO TURBINE TRIP ON MAIN GENERATOR TRIP
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"1. SYSTEMS AFFECTED: Reactor trip, Aux feed water actuation.
"2. ACTUATIONS AND THEIR INITIATING SIGNALS: Reactor trip - Loss of Load Turbine Trip, Aux Feed Water (AFW) - 21% [on the narrow range indication] in Steam Generators.
"3. CAUSES: Reactor tripped due to an undetermined cause in the main generator end of the secondary plant. AFW started as expected on EFAS [Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal] at 21% from a trip at 100%.
"4. EFFECT OF EVENT ON PLANT: Plant is stable at 545F [and] 2250 [psi] hot standby conditions and will remain here until cause determination made as to cause of trip.
"5. ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED: Maintain hot standby conditions for post trip review.
"CONTINUATION SHEET: 1) Remain in Mode 3 for cause determination post-trip review to provide actual mode required. 2) Estimate restart date pending cause determination and any repairs required. 3) All rods inserted, no primary or secondary reliefs lifted, electrical grid stable, all safety systems performed as expected, no effect on Unit 3. Electrical power supplied from offsite power."
Decay heat removal is via steam dump to condenser.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"1. SYSTEMS AFFECTED: Reactor trip, Aux feed water actuation.
"2. ACTUATIONS AND THEIR INITIATING SIGNALS: Reactor trip - Loss of Load Turbine Trip, Aux Feed Water (AFW) - 21% [on the narrow range indication] in Steam Generators.
"3. CAUSES: Reactor tripped due to an undetermined cause in the main generator end of the secondary plant. AFW started as expected on EFAS [Emergency Feedwater Actuation Signal] at 21% from a trip at 100%.
"4. EFFECT OF EVENT ON PLANT: Plant is stable at 545F [and] 2250 [psi] hot standby conditions and will remain here until cause determination made as to cause of trip.
"5. ACTIONS TAKEN OR PLANNED: Maintain hot standby conditions for post trip review.
"CONTINUATION SHEET: 1) Remain in Mode 3 for cause determination post-trip review to provide actual mode required. 2) Estimate restart date pending cause determination and any repairs required. 3) All rods inserted, no primary or secondary reliefs lifted, electrical grid stable, all safety systems performed as expected, no effect on Unit 3. Electrical power supplied from offsite power."
Decay heat removal is via steam dump to condenser.
The licensee has notified the NRC Resident Inspector.