Event Notification Report for November 15, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/14/2004 - 11/15/2004
Fuel Cycle Facility
Event Number: 41197
Facility: NUCLEAR FUEL SERVICES INC.
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: SCOTT KIRK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: TN
Unit: [] [] []
RX Type: URANIUM FUEL FABRICATION
Comments: HEU CONVERSION & SCRAP RECOVERY
NAVAL REACTOR FUEL CYCLE
LEU SCRAP RECOVERY
NRC Notified By: SCOTT KIRK
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/15/2004
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2004
Event Time: 18:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Notification Time: 19:00 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2004
Event Time: 18:15 [EST]
Last Update Date: 05/11/2008
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
10 CFR Section:
70.74 APP. A - ADDITIONAL REPORTING REQUIREMENTS
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
MIKE WEBER (NSIR)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
JOSEPH HOLONICH (NMSS)
MIKE WEBER (NSIR)
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THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
WET OFFGAS (WOG) LINE CALCULATION WAS NOT PERFORMED.
"Raffinate column WOG Vent [DELETED] is not sized appropriately to handle flow in the event of overflowing of [DELETED] combined with a loss of DI water pressure and a failure of DI water valve when transferring SNM material from sump columns ([DELETED] or [DELETED] using [DELETED]). This would prevent transferring SNM material into an unfavorable geometry tank. The WOG line is specified as IROFS [DELETED] and is listed as [DELETED] in the Recovery Deionized Water Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation Risk Indexing Supplement. Setpoint analysis was believed to be completed on all Recovery WOG lines. It was determined that this WOG line calculation was not performed at November 15, 2004. As such, IROFS [DELETED] was not reliable and available on [DELETED] and [DELETED] transfers to [DELETED] which occurred on October 28, November 2 and November 11, 2004. [DELETED] has been taken out of service. A follow-up memo to Operations will be provided to prevent the use of the pump and [DELETED]."
Defense in-depth measures that were available are as follows:
1. Pumping operations did not overflow [DELETED].
2. Deionized water line to [DELETED] was pressurized [DELETED].
3. Administrative Control listed in the NCSE specified that the operator shut valve [DELETED] upon a loss of DI water pressure. This control is flowed down into the operating procedure.
4. Valve [DELETED] listed as a configuration controlled item was available to be closed upon a loss of pressure in the DI water line.
5. The WOG line was positioned lower than the DI water input line and listed as a configuration controlled item as such.
There are no actual potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment due to defense in depth and configuration control items in place. In additional, overflow [DELETED] did not occur [DELETED].
What is the safety significance of the event?
Not in compliance with 10CFR70.61. However criticality was not a concern due to defense-in-depth controls and configuration control equipment installed at the time.
Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur:
Transfer of SNM during a backflow scenario into DI water line and subsequent unfavorable geometry tankxx-001.
What is the control(s) or control system(s) and the failure(s) or deficiencies?
IROFS[DELETED] WOG line on [DELETED].
What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?
[DELETED] has been taken out of service on 11/15/04.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
* * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * * *
WET OFFGAS (WOG) LINE CALCULATION WAS NOT PERFORMED.
"Raffinate column WOG Vent [DELETED] is not sized appropriately to handle flow in the event of overflowing of [DELETED] combined with a loss of DI water pressure and a failure of DI water valve when transferring SNM material from sump columns ([DELETED] or [DELETED] using [DELETED]). This would prevent transferring SNM material into an unfavorable geometry tank. The WOG line is specified as IROFS [DELETED] and is listed as [DELETED] in the Recovery Deionized Water Nuclear Criticality Safety Evaluation Risk Indexing Supplement. Setpoint analysis was believed to be completed on all Recovery WOG lines. It was determined that this WOG line calculation was not performed at November 15, 2004. As such, IROFS [DELETED] was not reliable and available on [DELETED] and [DELETED] transfers to [DELETED] which occurred on October 28, November 2 and November 11, 2004. [DELETED] has been taken out of service. A follow-up memo to Operations will be provided to prevent the use of the pump and [DELETED]."
Defense in-depth measures that were available are as follows:
1. Pumping operations did not overflow [DELETED].
2. Deionized water line to [DELETED] was pressurized [DELETED].
3. Administrative Control listed in the NCSE specified that the operator shut valve [DELETED] upon a loss of DI water pressure. This control is flowed down into the operating procedure.
4. Valve [DELETED] listed as a configuration controlled item was available to be closed upon a loss of pressure in the DI water line.
5. The WOG line was positioned lower than the DI water input line and listed as a configuration controlled item as such.
There are no actual potential health and safety consequences to workers, the public or the environment due to defense in depth and configuration control items in place. In additional, overflow [DELETED] did not occur [DELETED].
What is the safety significance of the event?
Not in compliance with 10CFR70.61. However criticality was not a concern due to defense-in-depth controls and configuration control equipment installed at the time.
Brief scenario(s) of how criticality could occur:
Transfer of SNM during a backflow scenario into DI water line and subsequent unfavorable geometry tankxx-001.
What is the control(s) or control system(s) and the failure(s) or deficiencies?
IROFS[DELETED] WOG line on [DELETED].
What are the corrective actions taken and when was each implemented?
[DELETED] has been taken out of service on 11/15/04.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
* * * UPDATE 05/11/08 BY P. SNYDER * * *
THIS IS NOT A NEW REPORT.
This event report was originally withheld from public release under the NRC's policy for protecting sensitive unclassified information. The NRC has reevaluated this policy and is now making this event report available to the public with suitable redactions.
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41199
Facility: VOGTLE
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL CHANCE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Region: 2 State: GA
Unit: [1] [2] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP,[2] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: MICHAEL CHANCE
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/15/2004
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2004
Event Time: 16:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2004
Notification Time: 21:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/15/2004
Event Time: 16:11 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
10 CFR Section:
26.73 - FITNESS FOR DUTY
Person (Organization):
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
THOMAS DECKER (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 1 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
| 2 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
RANDOM DRUG TEST: CONFIRMED POSITIVE
On 11/08/04, a contractor on his last day of work at the site was given a random drug test. November 15, at 1611 EST a confirmed positive drug screen results for the contractor was received. The contractor worked at the Vogtle site from 07/15/04 through 11/08/04. He held unescorted access for inside the Protected are but as far as the licensee knows this person never entered any vital areas. No action taken since his badge was terminated on his last day of work which was 11/08/04. This information will be entered into the PAD system.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.
On 11/08/04, a contractor on his last day of work at the site was given a random drug test. November 15, at 1611 EST a confirmed positive drug screen results for the contractor was received. The contractor worked at the Vogtle site from 07/15/04 through 11/08/04. He held unescorted access for inside the Protected are but as far as the licensee knows this person never entered any vital areas. No action taken since his badge was terminated on his last day of work which was 11/08/04. This information will be entered into the PAD system.
The NRC Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.