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Event Notification Report for November 05, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
11/04/2004 - 11/05/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
41174411754118242364

Power Reactor
Event Number: 41174
Facility: INDIAN POINT
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [2] [3] []
RX Type: [2] W-4-LP,[3] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: DAN LYON
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/05/2004
Notification Time: 12:03 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2004
Event Time: 07:05 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(xiii) - LOSS COMM/ASMT/RESPONSE
Person (Organization):
DAVID SILK (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
2 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
3 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
EMERGNECY SIRENS FOUND INOPERABLE DUE TO EQUIPMENT MALFUNCTION


"Indian Point Emergency Center (IPEC) Units 2 & 3 are making an eight-hour non-emergency notification in accordance with 10CFR50.72(b)(3)(xiii). On November 5, 2004, at 0705 hours during a routine daily check it was discovered that 88 of 156 sirens were in communication failure due to equipment malfunction that occurred at approximately 1950 hours on November 4, 2004. At 0710 hours on November 5, 2004 the equipment malfunction was corrected and all but one siren was returned to service. The one siren out of service is unrelated to the event." State and Local counties were notified of the loss of the emergency sirens.

The licensee has been notified the NRC Resident Inspector.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 41175
Facility: FARLEY
Region: 2     State: AL
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-3-LP,[2] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHRIS THORNELL
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/05/2004
Notification Time: 14:22 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2004
Event Time: 09:11 [CST]
Last Update Date: 11/05/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
STEPHEN CAHILL (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
INADVERTENT LOSS OF "B" TRAIN SITE POWER DURING TESTING

"At 09:11 a.m. CST on November 5, 2004, an inadvertent "B" Train Loss of Site Power occurred when the normal power supply breaker to the 1G 4160V bus opened during testing. The 1B Emergency Diesel Generator started and powered up the 1G 4160V Bus as required and the Loss of Site Power Sequencer started all "B" Train LOSP Loads as required. Abnormal Operating Procedures for the LOSP and Loss of Train "A" or "B" Train RHR were completed as required for the event. The "A" Train RHR pump was manually started to provide core cooling and circulation flow as required for Mode 6. Core alterations were in progress for reload which were suspended immediately upon the event

"Systems which did not function as required:
Upon the auto start signal for the 1B Motor Driven Auxiliary Feedwater Pump, the 4160V power supply breaker tripped open. The flag on the breaker indicated it was due to a time delay over current on one of the phases. Investigation into this problem is in progress."

Spent Fuel Pool cooling was not lost because it was being powered from "A" Train. Site power was restored to "B" Train 4160V bus at 0959 CST. An event investigation is being performed by the licensee.

The NRC Resident Inspector has been informed of this event by the licensee.


General Information or Other
Event Number: 41182
Rep Org: WA DIVISION OF RADIATION PROTECTION
Licensee: UNIVERSITY OF WASHINGTON
Region: 4
City: SEATTLE   State: WA
County:
License #: WN-C001-1
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: ARDEN C. SCROGGS
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/09/2004
Notification Time: 11:10 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [PST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY GODY (R4)
TOM ESSIG (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT DUE TO LOSS OF IODINE-125 CALIBRATION SEEDS

"On Monday morning, 8 November 2004, the licensee reported a loss of 16 Iodine-125 calibration seeds, Amersham Model 6711, total of 193 mega Becquerel (5.216 milliCi), packaged in 2 vials. The vials contained 6 and 10 seeds respectively. Each vial was inside a lead shield.

"The missing calibration seeds had been received on 5 November. They arrived in the same package as medical therapy seeds. The licensee's medical physicist removed the therapy seeds and placed them into secured storage assuming that the calibration and therapy seeds were all contained in the vials the physicist was removing. However, the calibration seeds were reported by the vendor to have been in additional vials associated with the foam packing material. The cardboard package and packing foam is routinely sent to the licensee's recycle center once the licensed material has been removed. This probably happened (including the calibration seeds) some time shortly after the physicist opened the package on 5 November.

"On 8 November, the medical physicist realized the calibration seeds were not with the therapy seeds. The physicist reported their loss to the licensee's Radiation Safety Officer. Licensee staff surveyed the receipt area, the recycle center as well as the corridors connecting the areas and other likely spots. The lost material has not been located. The waste material had apparently been removed from the facility on 7 November. It is likely the lost material went to the landfill on 7 November. The licensee is still investigating. The licensee will send the department a formal report when their investigation is complete.

"Contributing factor: The licensee failed to perform an acceptable package receipt survey.
"Corrective actions: Will be addressed during the department's investigation.

"No media contact: None yet. "

WA Event Report # WA-04-066


General Information or Other
Event Number: 42364
Rep Org: NEW YORK STATE DEPT. OF HEALTH
Licensee: NOT DISCLOSED BY STATE LAW
Region: 1
City:   State: NY
County:
License #:
Agreement: Y
Docket:
NRC Notified By: R. DANSEREAU (via fax)
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 02/22/2006
Notification Time: 15:25 [ET]
Event Date: 11/05/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EST]
Last Update Date: 02/22/2006
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
Person (Organization):
PAMELA HENDERSON (R1)
GREG MORELL (NMSS)
Event Text
AGREEMENT STATE REPORT INVOLVING AN I-131 RADIOPHARMACEUTICAL MISADMINISTRATION

The following information was received via facsimile:

"NY-06-007

"Radiopharmaceutical therapy misadministration involving Iodine-131 (NYS DOH Internal Tracking Nos. 265 & 342)

"Date 11/5/2004

"New York law prohibits the release of any identities in cases of medical events. Therefore the facility name, etc., is not contained in this report.

"A 150 mCi therapeutic dose (capsule) of lodine-131 was prescribed for a patient, however the patient received only one of two 75-mCi capsules. The capsule was eventually retrieved after a waste container tripped a radiation monitor at a waste transfer station. Patient has been notified and the hospital is conducting clinical follow-up. The following is a summary of the incident:

"The Bureau of Environmental Radiation Protection (BERP) received a request to issue a DOT exemption to allow BFI of Buffalo, NY to return a contaminated municipal solid waste in a compactor container from American Ref-Fuel to the Hospital. DOH staff went to the site to conduct a radiological survey of the trash compactor. The maximum reading at contact was 15 mR/hr (bkg = 0.02 mR/hr). Driver side reading was background. The DOT exemption was issued and the trash container was returned to the hospital. Upon return of the waste compactor it was isolated behind the utility building and the workers, plant engineering staff, were informed of the precautions - stay away.

"On 11/17/04 DOH participated in a conference call with hospital staff (Radiation Safety Officer, the treating MD and the Chief Nuclear Medicine Tech). The patient was prescribed a dosage of iodine 131, which was contained in 2 capsules supplied by a radiopharmacy. The treating MD stated that he saw the patient put each of the two capsules in the mouth, one at a time followed by water. Each capsule was in a separate cup. They claim that the patient stated that she took both.

"A post administration rad survey reading was taken, as per their routine procedure, and the results were within the range of what was expected, given the activity of the material. This reading apparently was measuring the exposure from the material administered as well as the capsule in the trash next to the patient. In this geometry, the measurement appeared to indicate that the patient had taken the full dose - both capsules. One of the capsules was either not taken or was spit out into the cup. This was then discarded in the normal trash.

"The capsule was isolated intact on 11/12/04 by a person who works for an asbestos firm. He did not have a personal rad monitoring device and the hospital was not aware of his level of radiation safety training. This unqualified person apparently sifted through the waste in the presence of the Chief CNMT - she had the survey meter. The capsule activity on the day of treatment was 75 mCi and about 40 mCi on the date of recovery. Hospital staff were aware that a capsule was lost and that a significant misadministration occurred but they did not immediately report either event to the Department as required by 10 NYCRR 16.15 and 16.25.

"On 11/22/04, DOH staff performed an onsite investigation. Hospital staff including the RSO; Performance Improvement Manager; Chief CNMT; radiation therapy physicist; Radiology Manager; and the authorized user that administered the I-131 were interviewed. The Director of Facilities was unavailable as he had an emergency surgery the day before this scheduled investigation. Hospital staff informed us that the Director of Facilities was primarily involved with this incident because he manages the hospital's waste. Hospital staff could not explain why the RSO or RSC were not more involved in this incident. They were informed of the immediate reporting requirements for lost sources and misadministrations. It was also strongly suggested that they evaluate why the RSO and RSC did not take a greater role in responding to this incident.

"A consultant provided conservative dose estimates as follows: Housekeeper who emptied the waste container - 35 mrem, in-house waste handler 63 [mrem] and the asbestos contractor 101 mrem. DOH staff interviewed housekeeping staff and reconstructed the handling times for this person, and determined the handling time assumptions used by the consultant were greatly overestimated so the dose estimates were likely lower. The contractor that entered the dumpster was not available to be interviewed.

"Due to the nature of the violations and manner in which the facility mishandled the event including allowing an unqualified person to retrieve the capsule and lack of RSO and RSC involvement/oversight, enforcement action was pursued and the facility was fined."