Event Notification Report for October 09, 2004
U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center
EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/08/2004 - 10/09/2004
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41107
Facility: PEACH BOTTOM
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM DALTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 1 State: PA
Unit: [] [3] []
RX Type: [2] GE-4,[3] GE-4
NRC Notified By: WILLIAM DALTON
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/09/2004
Notification Time: 05:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2004
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2004
Notification Time: 05:13 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2004
Event Time: 01:15 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | Y | 100 | Power Operation | 100 | Power Operation |
HIGH PRESSURE COOLANT INJECTION SYSTEM CONDENSATE STORAGE TANK SUCTION VALVE FAILED TO AUTO-CLOSE DURING SURVEILLANCE
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"During the performance of scheduled instrument surveillance testing it was discovered that the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump suction valve from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) would not automatically close. This valve is designed to automatically close when both Torus suction valves are fully open. The CST suction valve is required to close to support operability of the HPCI System. The CST suction valve was subsequently closed with the Torus suction valves open to allow performance of the HPCI instrumentation testing. After the completion of scheduled instrumentation testing, the HPCI system will be restored to an operable status with pump suction remaining from the Torus and isolated from the CST. The failure of the CST suction valve to auto close is being investigated."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"During the performance of scheduled instrument surveillance testing it was discovered that the Unit 3 High Pressure Coolant Injection (HPCI) pump suction valve from the Condensate Storage Tank (CST) would not automatically close. This valve is designed to automatically close when both Torus suction valves are fully open. The CST suction valve is required to close to support operability of the HPCI System. The CST suction valve was subsequently closed with the Torus suction valves open to allow performance of the HPCI instrumentation testing. After the completion of scheduled instrumentation testing, the HPCI system will be restored to an operable status with pump suction remaining from the Torus and isolated from the CST. The failure of the CST suction valve to auto close is being investigated."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
!!!!! THIS EVENT HAS BEEN RETRACTED !!!!!
Power Reactor
Event Number: 41108
Facility: OCONEE
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MOSES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Region: 2 State: SC
Unit: [] [] [3]
RX Type: [1] B&W-L-LP,[2] B&W-L-LP,[3] B&W-L-LP
NRC Notified By: KEVIN MOSES
HQ OPS Officer: HOWIE CROUCH
Notification Date: 10/10/2004
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2004
Event Time: 19:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2004
Notification Time: 00:51 [ET]
Event Date: 10/09/2004
Event Time: 19:45 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 11/18/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
| Unit | SCRAM Code | RX Crit | Initial PWR | Initial RX Mode | Current PWR | Current RX Mode |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| 3 | N | N | 0 | Hot Shutdown | 0 | Hot Shutdown |
REACTOR BUILDING PRESSURE DECREASED BELOW SPECIFIED LIMITS
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On October 9, 2004 at 1945 hrs. EST, Operators discovered that Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure decreased to less than the limit specified in Oconee Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13, 'Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Operability'. This initial Reactor Building Pressure is used in the NPSH Analysis for the LPI Pumps in the Sump Recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation. In addition to effecting LPl, this condition also affects the Reactor Building Spray system. Engineering Evaluation performed on May 25, 2004 identified that guidance contained within the Selected Licensee Commitment may be inadequate and as a result, the Reactor Building Spray and Low Pressure Injection systems were determined to be Operable But Degraded/Nonconforming. For the interim, until appropriate changes are made to the Selected Licensee Commitment, Engineering recommended that Oconee Operations enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 any time that the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 are exceeded.
"At the time of discovery, Oconee Unit 3 was cooling down for refueling outage. Unit 3 was in Mode 4 at approximately 235 degrees, 275 psig with one train of Reactor Building Spray deactivated per the Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown. When it was identified that the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 were exceeded, Operations began increasing Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure. Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure was restored to within the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 on October 9, 2004 at 2023 hrs. EST.
"Initial Safety Significance:
"The NPSH analysis for the Low Pressure Injection pumps in the sump recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation credit reactor building overpressure of 2.2 psig as permitted by a license amendment granted July 19, 1999 and supplemented August 19, 1999. Operation with Reactor Building pressure less than the limits specified in Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 cannot ensure that 2.2 psig overpressure will always be available.
"Corrective Action(s):
"Actions were taken by Operations to restore Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure to within the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13. These actions were successful in restoring Reactor Building Pressure to within limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 approximately 38 minutes from time of discovery."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1849 EST ON 11/18/04 FROM R.P. TODD TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"Event: Withdrawal of Event Number 41108
"On October 9, 2004 at 1945 hrs. EST, Operators discovered that Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 Reactor Building (RB) pressure decreased to less than the limit specified in Oconee Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.6.13, 'Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Operability'. This initial RB Pressure (Containment overpressure) is credited in the NPSH Analysis for the LPI and RB Spray Pumps in the Sump Recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation. Engineering recommended that Oconee Operations enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 any time that the limits of SLC 16.6.13 are exceeded. Operations exited the condition after taking actions which raised RB pressure within the SLC limit. The ENS was reported as a loss of safety function under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION.
"Justification for conclusion that there was no loss of safety functions:
"An engineering analysis determined that, at the time of this event, the worst case post-LOCA RB sump temperature would be approximately 170F. From a July 19, 1999 SER for the license amendment which credited containment overpressure, the NRC Staff concurred that containment overpressure credit was only needed for sump temperatures above 208F. Therefore, for the conditions which existed during this event, there was adequate NPSH, and no reportable loss of safety function existed."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Tom Decker).
The following information was obtained from the licensee via facsimile:
"On October 9, 2004 at 1945 hrs. EST, Operators discovered that Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure decreased to less than the limit specified in Oconee Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13, 'Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Operability'. This initial Reactor Building Pressure is used in the NPSH Analysis for the LPI Pumps in the Sump Recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation. In addition to effecting LPl, this condition also affects the Reactor Building Spray system. Engineering Evaluation performed on May 25, 2004 identified that guidance contained within the Selected Licensee Commitment may be inadequate and as a result, the Reactor Building Spray and Low Pressure Injection systems were determined to be Operable But Degraded/Nonconforming. For the interim, until appropriate changes are made to the Selected Licensee Commitment, Engineering recommended that Oconee Operations enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 any time that the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 are exceeded.
"At the time of discovery, Oconee Unit 3 was cooling down for refueling outage. Unit 3 was in Mode 4 at approximately 235 degrees, 275 psig with one train of Reactor Building Spray deactivated per the Controlling Procedure for Unit Shutdown. When it was identified that the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 were exceeded, Operations began increasing Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure. Oconee Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure was restored to within the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 on October 9, 2004 at 2023 hrs. EST.
"Initial Safety Significance:
"The NPSH analysis for the Low Pressure Injection pumps in the sump recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation credit reactor building overpressure of 2.2 psig as permitted by a license amendment granted July 19, 1999 and supplemented August 19, 1999. Operation with Reactor Building pressure less than the limits specified in Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 cannot ensure that 2.2 psig overpressure will always be available.
"Corrective Action(s):
"Actions were taken by Operations to restore Unit 3 Reactor Building pressure to within the limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13. These actions were successful in restoring Reactor Building Pressure to within limits of Selected Licensee Commitment 16.6.13 approximately 38 minutes from time of discovery."
The licensee has informed the NRC Resident Inspector.
* * * UPDATE 1849 EST ON 11/18/04 FROM R.P. TODD TO HOWIE CROUCH * * *
This report is retracted based on the following:
"Event: Withdrawal of Event Number 41108
"On October 9, 2004 at 1945 hrs. EST, Operators discovered that Oconee Nuclear Station Unit 3 Reactor Building (RB) pressure decreased to less than the limit specified in Oconee Selected Licensee Commitment (SLC) 16.6.13, 'Additional Requirements to Support Low Pressure Injection (LPI) Operability'. This initial RB Pressure (Containment overpressure) is credited in the NPSH Analysis for the LPI and RB Spray Pumps in the Sump Recirculation phase of post-LOCA operation. Engineering recommended that Oconee Operations enter Technical Specification 3.0.3 any time that the limits of SLC 16.6.13 are exceeded. Operations exited the condition after taking actions which raised RB pressure within the SLC limit. The ENS was reported as a loss of safety function under 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION.
"Justification for conclusion that there was no loss of safety functions:
"An engineering analysis determined that, at the time of this event, the worst case post-LOCA RB sump temperature would be approximately 170F. From a July 19, 1999 SER for the license amendment which credited containment overpressure, the NRC Staff concurred that containment overpressure credit was only needed for sump temperatures above 208F. Therefore, for the conditions which existed during this event, there was adequate NPSH, and no reportable loss of safety function existed."
The licensee informed the NRC Resident Inspector. Notified R2DO (Tom Decker).