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Event Notification Report for October 07, 2004

U.S. Nuclear Regulatory Commission
Operations Center

EVENT REPORTS FOR
10/06/2004 - 10/07/2004

EVENT NUMBERS
411844121441099411004110141102

Power Reactor
Event Number: 41184
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: A. J. HALLIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: JOHN MacKINNON
Notification Date: 11/09/2004
Notification Time: 15:45 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 02:44 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/09/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
JOHN ROGGE (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
INVALID SYSTEM ACTUATION

"The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10 CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for invalid actuation of emergency AC electrical power systems. As allowed by 10 CFR50.73(a)(1), this telephone is being made in lieu of submitting a written LER.

"On October 7, 2004, James A. FitzPatrick was in a refueling outage with the reactor cavity flooded and the spent fuel pool gates removed. At approximately 0244, Surveillance testing was in progress on the LOCA initiation logic for the 'A' and 'B' RHR Pumps. Technicians had aligned the initiation circuit for testing in accordance with Surveillance Test ST-2F. When the test signal was applied to the circuit the 'A' and 'B' RHR pumps started as expected. The 'A' and 'C' Emergency Diesel Generators (EDGs) unexpectedly auto started but did not load onto the emergency bus. There was no loss of power to the emergency busses and thus no need for the EDGs to load and power the emergency busses. Operations personnel verified plant conditions and secured the EDGs.

"Condition Report CR-JAF-2004-04426 was initiated and an investigation into the unexpected start of the EDGs was conducted. It was determined that a relay malfunction in the test circuitry resulted in the failure to 'block' the EDG auto start signal. The EDGs started as designed based on the response to the unblocked test signal in the start logic. Since there was no actual need for the EDGs to start and the start was the result of a test signal that should have been blocked by the failed relay it was determined that the EDG start was based on an invalid signal. This notification is being made pursuant to 10 CFR 50.73(a)(2)(iv) and 10 CFR 50.73(a)(1)." The state of New York will be notified of this event by the licensee.

The NRC Senior Resident Inspector was notified of this event by the licensee.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 41214
Facility: FITZPATRICK
Region: 1     State: NY
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] GE-4
NRC Notified By: ANDY HALLIDAY
HQ OPS Officer: STEVE SANDIN
Notification Date: 11/22/2004
Notification Time: 14:38 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 20:55 [EST]
Last Update Date: 11/22/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.73(a)(1) - INVALID SPECIF SYSTEM ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
ANTHONY DIMITRIADIS (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Refueling 0 Refueling
Event Text
60-DAY REPORT DUE TO AN INVALID ACTUATION OF ECCS AND EDGs DURING SURVEILLANCE ACTIVITIES

"The purpose of this report is to provide a telephone notification under 10CFR50.73(a)(2)(iv)(A) for an invalid actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems and the Emergency AC Electrical Power Systems. As allowed by 10CFR50.73(a)(1) this notification is being made via an ENS phone call.

"On October 7, 2004, James A. Fitzpatrick (JAF) was in a refueling outage with the reactor cavity flooded and the spent fuel pool gates removed. At approximately 2055, during the performance of an instrument surveillance procedure (ISP-5-7) for 'Remote Shutdown Reactor Vessel Pressure Indicator Calibration' a pressure perturbation was introduced to the sensing lines while returning 02-3PI-60A to service. The pressure perturbation resulted in an invalid actuation of the Emergency Core Cooling Systems (ECCS) and Emergency Diesel Generator (EDG) initiation logic. The initiation logic functioned as designed, 'A' and 'B' Core Spray Pumps and 'A', 'B', 'C', and 'D' RHR pumps started and injected into core, and EDGs 'A', 'B', 'C' and 'D' started but did not close to the emergency buses since there was no loss of off site power.

"Operations personnel verified plant conditions, secured ECCS injection and secured the EDGs. The event was entered in the plant corrective action program via Condition Report CR-JAF-04-04457. Preliminary investigation has identified valve manipulation to restore pressure indicator 02-3PI-60A to service as the cause of a pressure perturbation in a shared sensing line, which caused the level transmitters sharing the same line to detect a low reactor water level condition. All systems that actuated operated per their design.

"As a result of the injection, water overflowed to the skimmer surge tanks and into the reactor building drain system as designed, resulting in contamination of sections of the reactor building. No personnel contaminations or unexpected exposures occurred as a result. A recovery plan was developed and implemented to minimize the impact and to recover the affected plant areas.

"In addition, signals were received for HPCI and RCIC initiation, SBGT initiation, Recirc pump trip and Alternate Rod Insertion (ARI). Due to outage activities, these systems were removed from service and protective tagged, and thus the systems did not respond. Although not required by 10 CFR 50.73 JAF will submit a voluntary LER to address this event in greater detail.

"The NRC Sr. Resident Inspector was notified."

The licensee also informed the State of New York.


Hospital
Event Number: 41099
Rep Org: UPMC-MCKEESPORT
Licensee: UPMC-MCKEESPORT
Region: 1
City: MCKEESPORT   State: PA
County:
License #: 37-00896-03
Agreement: N
Docket:
NRC Notified By: NICHOLAS SMARRA
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 10/07/2004
Notification Time: 13:37 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 00:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/15/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
20.2202(b)(1) - PERS OVEREXPOSURE/TEDE >= 5 REM
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
JOHN HICKEY (NMSS)
SANDRA WASTLER (NMSS)
Event Text
POSSIBLE PERSONNEL OVEREXPOSURE

The licensee reported that the exposure results received 10/07/04 for a female Nuclear Medicine Technician at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center indicated a whole body dose of 10,857 millirem by film badge and a shallow dose of 25,100 millirem by ring badge for the period 08/01/04 through 08/31/04. Based on the actual work performed by the technician, the licensee Radiation Safety Officer suspects that the reported dose may not be valid.

* * * Update on 10/13/04 at 1044 EDT JERRY ROSEN (RSO) TO MACKINNON * * *

This incident occurred at the University of Pittsburgh Medical Center located in McKeesport, PA. The license number for the Medical Center is 37-00896-03. This incident did not take place at the University of Pittsburgh. R1DO (McDermott) & NMSS EO (Michele Burgess) notified.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 41100
Facility: WOLF CREEK
Region: 4     State: KS
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] W-4-LP
NRC Notified By: CHARLES SIBLEY
HQ OPS Officer: MIKE RIPLEY
Notification Date: 10/07/2004
Notification Time: 15:03 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 11:48 [CDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(iv)(B) - RPS ACTUATION - CRITICAL 50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION 50.72(b)(3)(iv)(A) - VALID SPECIF SYS ACTUATION
Person (Organization):
RUSSELL BYWATER (R4)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 A/R Y 100 Power Operation 0 Hot Standby
Event Text
AUTOMATIC REACTOR TRIP DUE TO MAIN TURBINE TRIP

"At 1148 CDT on 10-7-2004, Wolf Creek Generating Station experienced on automatic reactor trip as a result of a turbine trip. Initial indications are that the trip was associated with a lightning strike in the switchyard.

"All control rods fully inserted. The 'A' train of the Residual Heat Removal system and the 'A' train Class IE Safety Related Switchgear Air Conditioning Unit were out of service for scheduled maintenance at the time of this event. All other safety related equipment operated as expected. The Auxiliary Feedwater system actuated as designed.

"The plant is currently stable in Mode 3 at Normal Operating Temperature and Pressure while plant personnel investigate the cause of the reactor trip and formulate the repair and restart plan.

"The NRC Senior Resident inspector has been informed. A news statement relative to this event is planned."

Secondary atmospheric relief valves lifted and reseated as a result of the trip, however there was no release to the environment. Decay heat is being removed via the steam dumps. The electrical grid is stable.


Power Reactor
Event Number: 41101
Facility: MAINE YANKEE
Region: 1     State: ME
Unit: [1] [] []
RX Type: [1] CE
NRC Notified By: DOUG KINNEY
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/07/2004
Notification Time: 15:29 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(2)(xi) - OFFSITE NOTIFICATION
Person (Organization):
RICHARD BARKLEY (R1)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
1 N N 0 Decommissioned 0 Decommissioned
Event Text
OFFSITE NOTIFICATION DUE TO AN UNSCHEDULED RELEASE

The licensee provided the following information via facsimile:

"[The] Maine Emergency Management Agency [was notified] of an unscheduled release that occurred during the 24 hour period ending at midnight on Thursday, 10/07/04. Maine Yankee identified a minor release of 3.18 E-6 Curies of liquid from the site. This release exceeded the value projected for this period and is therefore classified as unscheduled. The total liquid release resulted in a minor exposure value of 2.21 E-5 millirem.

"The cause of the release resulted from groundwater intrusion of the outfall piping during soil remediation and failure of the clay barrier that was installed. [The] release occurred from 9/30/04 until 10/6/04. The outfall piping is being removed and the area backfilled to eliminate liquid releases via this pathway."

The licensee stated that the radionuclides involved were Cesium-137, Bismuth-214, and Lead-214.

The licensee has notified the NRC Region 1 (Roberts).


Power Reactor
Event Number: 41102
Facility: TURKEY POINT
Region: 2     State: FL
Unit: [] [4] []
RX Type: [3] W-3-LP,[4] W-3-LP
NRC Notified By: CHUCK MASON
HQ OPS Officer: BILL HUFFMAN
Notification Date: 10/07/2004
Notification Time: 20:24 [ET]
Event Date: 10/07/2004
Event Time: 14:00 [EDT]
Last Update Date: 10/07/2004
Emergency Class: NON EMERGENCY
10 CFR Section:
50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) - UNANALYZED CONDITION 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C) - POT UNCNTRL RAD REL 50.72(b)(3)(v)(D) - ACCIDENT MITIGATION
Person (Organization):
CHARLES R. OGLE (R2)
Power Reactor Unit Info
Unit SCRAM Code RX Crit Initial PWR Initial RX Mode Current PWR Current RX Mode
4 N Y 100 Power Operation 100 Power Operation
Event Text
SINGLE POINT VULNERABILITY IN EMERGENCY CONTAINMENT FILTER DOUSING SYSTEM

"A single point vulnerability has been identified in the dousing system for the Emergency Containment Filter (ECF) System that could have resulted in dousing all filter units with borated water during an accident. Inadvertent dousing of the filters could adversely impact the methyl-iodide removal efficiency of the ECFs assumed in the plant safety analyses.

"This condition applies to both Turkey Point units. However, it is reportable under 10 CFR 50.72 only with respect to Unit 4 since Unit 4 is currently in operation while Unit 3 is in a refueling outage.

"The design deficiency has been evaluated in accordance with NRC Generic Letter 91-18. The ECFs have been determined to be operable but nonconforming and reportable under 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(ii)(B) and 10 CFR 50.72(b)(3)(v)(C)and (D).

"A design change is being prepared to correct the vulnerability on both units."

The licensee has notified the NRC resident inspector.